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New frontiers of strategic competition beckon for immediate special operations forces (SOF) transformation to prevail in the space domain and the polar regions. Aligned with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Colby Jenkins’ call to think differently and work together, this article proposes two enhanced roles for combined SOF in the competition sphere—a Space Joint Terminal Attack Controller(SJTAC) function and an emphasis on “reverse” security force assistance (SFA) for selected NATO Arctic allies who rely on the principle of “collective defense” for national security. While numerous efforts across the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command and U.S. Space Force aim to meet the “all-domain fires” demand, and Allied Arctic-focused trainingand exercises have been in place for decades, this essay offers refined proposals in both areas for SOF. While seemingly distinct, both converge in the Arctic, where NATO SOF will require on-call space-based capabilities coupled with SFA essential for High North survivability and success.
SOF as a Space Enabler
First, an SJTAC function would bring significant value to U.S. SOF implementing its role within the “space-cyber-SOF triad,” while providing access to space capabilities in combined operations for allies and partners who lack them organically. This step would particularly align with European military interests to share and pool space assets for enhanced defense and greater burden sharing. In recent years, the United States has pioneered the Triad concept, which combines elements of space, cyber, and special operations to compete with China and Russia across warfighting domains.
Special operations forces play a crucial role in supporting the Triad by securing access and placement to enhance conventional force effectiveness, attaining greater precision in cyber targeting, integrating joint functions across warfighting domains, and leveraging different effects for maximal informational and psychological impact on the opposing force. As U.S. Special Operations Commander General Bryan Fenton noted: “the nexus of USSOCOM, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Space Command, and U.S. Strategic Command creates synergy which enhances kill webs—the integration of sensors from seabed to space and the options to eliminate targets—with SOF providing the physical access to targets to deliver effects for cyberspace and space operations within the Joint Force targeting context.” Put another way, special operators serve as the essential node linking a suite of sophisticated technical capabilities that enable the Joint Force to disrupt, degrade, and destroy an adversary via cyber, space, or kinetic means.
Beyond SOF’s main value proposition for the Triad to provide proximate, physical access to sensitive and strategic targets, SOF are exceptionally well-equipped for operating in politically sensitive conditions and denied areas, where their mobility, adaptability, and low visibility enable them to perform strategic tasks like securing critical infrastructure, gathering intelligence, and conducting targeted strikes. Combined with space and cyber capabilities, SOF can access satellite communications, space-based reconnaissance, and cyber tools to disrupt enemy activities while maintaining a low signature. This blend enhances the effectiveness of multi-domain operations, providing strategic and tactical advantages against competitors in contested regions worldwide. A missing element to this concept is a capability, such as a joint terminal attack controller, to execute such operations.
The increased importance of cyber and space calls for a similarly capable joint terminal attack controller to integrate cross-domain capabilities, much like the traditional joint terminal attack controller demonstrates how SOF links the air and land domains. A JTAC is “a qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations”—the link between ground forces and air support. The JTAC designation derives from a certification, available to service members from all branches, granted through the five-week Army-run Special Operations Terminal Attack Control Course (SOTACC). JTAC-certified personnel work at the lowest SOF level—within a Special Forces operational detachment, an Army Ranger platoon, a Naval SEAL platoon, or a Marine Corps Special Operations team. In a related fashion, the space JTAC would connect tactical, on-the-ground SOF units with space assets for targeting adversary military airbases, critical infrastructure, and more complex targets, such as Russian floating nuclear power plants.
This element would differ from space personnel already assigned at the theater special operations command (TSOC) level in that it would embed within the SOF tactical unit of action. This space connection would enable the assessment of vulnerabilities, ensuring precision in any potential attack, as well as monitoring target activities, tracking movements, and providing real-time situational awareness for preemptive strikes or future sabotage missions. Furthermore, as space capabilities develop from science fiction to reality, the SJTAC could access future space weaponry ranging from lasers, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, to the currently theoretical “Rods from God” kinetic bombardment concept.
Given that not all NATO countries have space assets, and the planning assumption is that NATO SOF formations will operate in a combined fashion, a space JTAC becomes a critical linkage for allied interoperability. This expertise would be beyond current multi-domain SOF capabilities, but would be essential for SOF formations, especially those from smaller states, to access allied space assets from remote and austere locations, and coordinate fires or maneuver among their conventional forces. This development could also serve as an integral element of the emerging, but controversial concept of a U.S. Space Force special operations component command. Here, the Space Force, as an independent service, would provide its own SOF component command to SOCOM just like the Army does with U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The SJTACs, individuals and units, would be assets provided by this component
Critics may argue that an “SJTAC” capability could be more effective and fiscally realistic by expanding the SOTACC qualification to integrate the space domain—or, alternatively, placing it within existing Air Force specialties, such as the Combat Controller (CCT). Indeed, the U.S. Air Force has already transformed its legacy Special Operations Weather career field into the new all-domain Special Reconnaissance Airman. But detractors of the SJTAC approach overlook the fact that with space defined as a separate warfighting domain from the air, and with the creation of U.S. Space Force as a separate service, organizational logic and the development of deep space expertise necessitate a division of labor that would place the SJTAC function firmly within the Space Force sphere of responsibility. This placement would also avoid the inefficiency of having SOF from each service—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—develop their own SJTAC capabilities. This proposal is amplified by the assessment that space capabilities will rapidly evolve and emerge in the coming years, requiring a deeper knowledge and applicatory understanding of space-to-ground integration for special operations.
Similarly, just as SOF through the SJATC can serve a natural bridging function for the SOF-space-cyber triad, so also can selected allied SOF enable greater effectiveness in the austere Arctic operating environment through “reverse” security force assistance provision—connecting local, niche polar expertise with that of incoming and reinforcing allied SOF formations.
“Reverse” Security Force Assistance Provider
The overarching concept of “collective defense” among allies rests on several layers of liberal world-order principles, and it aims to generate a wide range of effects for the different actors involved. The most obvious differences are easiest to point out by comparing a great, or global power—like the U.S., and a smaller state—like Norway. Simply stated, when Norway commits to collective defense on behalf of allies, it does so as an insurance, for a “seat at the table,” for burden-sharing, as an escalatory control measure, and to generate regional deterrence. In contrast, the U.S. supports collective defense for regional access and placement, strategic communication, regional and global deterrence, and for re-assuring trust among other allies around the globe.
These different perspectives generate two distinctive requirements—the ability to generate a contextual situational understanding of the operating environment, and the capability to operate effectively within that environment. Logically, the Norwegians are better equipped, trained, and organized for operating in the High North, and possess a greater appreciation for regional considerations, compared to most other allies – including Americans, British, Canadians, and the French. The latter, however, need an adequate capability standard for successful operations. This dynamic means the local forces possess subject matter expertise and niche capabilities which surpass those of other allies. If these resources are utilized correctly, the allies can benefit from both the indigenous expertise and the niche capabilities.
The SOF of smaller allies, such as the Nordic countries—including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden—could take on a reverse SFA provider function, which would facilitate the reception, staging, onwards movement and integration (RSOI) of NATO SOF reinforcements in the High North in event of conflict with Russia, particularly from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France. This reverse SFA function would also help bolster allies’ effectiveness with all-domain operations in the unforgiving Arctic climate and landscape.
The Arctic and its unique environment create an unusual situation for the classical SFA relationship between Allied providers and Arctic partners, especially in the European High North. The polar regions in Europe and North America are characterized by eight months of winter with continuous darkness, summers with continuous daylight, and temperatures dropping as far as -40 °C (-40 °F) and unlikely to rise above 10 °C (50 °F). With storms and inclement weather present in all seasons, the harsh environment and its volatile weather patterns present unique challenges for planning and sustaining all-domain military operations in the High North. These conditions require specialized expertise, including Arctic-trained and equipped formations to help Allied forces survive and maximize their combat effectiveness.
Defense requirements of the European NATO Arctic states rely heavily on Allied reinforcements and support to be realistic and effective. However, those reinforcements are unlikely to possess all the necessary skills and expertise to thrive in the harsh Arctic climate on their own. Close cooperation and integration within the NATO framework are essential for success, and forces not originating from the European High North will likely require specific training to be effective within this Arctic operational environment. European High North SOF, then, are naturally suited to serve the role of providing “reverse” SFA.
To illustrate the point, a British, Dutch or French SOF formation deploying to the European High North must have specific training from its SOF hosts if the detachments are to be effective and survive outdoors. The same prerequisite applies for U.S. and Canadian SOF elements, even though both originate from Arctic states. This seemingly odd situation arises from the fact that the environmental, climatic, and weather conditions in the North American Arctic differ significantly from those in the European High North. More importantly, the SOF from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have deep, lifelong Arctic experience that equivalent units in U.S. SOF and Canadian SOF lack. This markedly different situation often results in SOF Allies arriving to the European High North unfit and incorrectly equipped, and therefore only partially interoperable and with limited operational effectiveness. A few RSOI experiences in Norway at the NATO exercises Trident Juncture 2018, Cold Response 2020, Cold Response 2022 and Nordic Response 2024 confirm this latter point, however, there still remains no institutional solution to address this challenge.
Equally important for SOF Arctic employment is Admiral (retired) William McRaven’s assessment that what represents a special operation differs from one NATO nation to another, even though all operate in accordance with NATO SOF doctrine. American and Canadian SOF formations might not be specialized in the tasks these units will face when they rush to their “European brothers in arms” to provide essential allied support in the polar region.
A relevant specific example is the U.S. SOF deployment into the European High North in support of NORSOF. U.S. SOF possess the generic hardware, software, niche capabilities, and personnel needed to augment Norwegian defense in the polar regions. Nevertheless, both U.S. conventional forces and SOF do not possess true all-season Arctic capability. As Barrett, Tovo and Kirkwood noted:
[The U.S.] military’s recent execution of training and operations—such as Arctic Edge, Vigilant Shield, and Arctic Warrior—might best be classified as Arctic tourism. Military units deploy for a few weeks to train but do not really build true Arctic capabilities… military Arctic tourism does little to build the capabilities needed for military forces to survive, thrive, and effectively operate in the harsh Arctic environment, especially for prolonged durations.
Partners like Norway are not engaged in Arctic tourism. They are comprised of personnel raised in Arctic or subarctic environments and have units explicitly designed for Arctic warfare. NATO SOF organizations like Norwegian Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) should be prepared to conduct a “reverse” SFA mission to re-train, adapt tactics, techniques and procedures, and innovate on behalf of the incoming SFA provider to make the allied SFA effective when it arrives in the Arctic. This situation can be expected to occur also in Sweden, Finland, Canada, and Greenland (Denmark).
Thoughts on the Future
Special operations forces are in a transformative period requiring new force structures, roles, and missions to support combined multi-domain warfighting. This article posits two points: the need to develop a U.S. Space Force-directed SJTAC function to increase Triad lethality and bolster allied SOF with space-based capabilities, and emphasis on select SOF Arctic allies to provide “reverse” SFA to ensure incoming allied reinforcements possess the polar capabilities to operate effectively in the High North. Such refinements are necessary to overcome organizational inertia and bureaucracy which could jeopardize SOF’s ability to achieve national, alliance, and coalition objectives.