Hezbollah’s Pre-October 7 Strategy
In the years prior to the October 7 attacks, Hezbollah developed a sophisticated information strategy based on several pillars, including mastery of traditional media, extensive use of social networks, and psychological warfare. This was illustrated by testimonial from one information fighter of the party, who explained:
“We had a strategy, more precisely: a work plan and guidelines. Our main mission was to monitor different social media platforms and wage war against any account opposing the resistance, regardless of who operated it or where it was based.”
Before October 7, the Shiite organization could rightly boast of being the leading cyber power in Lebanon, with a primary tactic of spreading false information on social media. “Our main target has always been platforms like X (Twitter) and Facebook,” said one operative. Indeed, Hezbollah uses social media platforms as part of its communication and propaganda strategy. The group has also employed Facebook to support operations: Hezbollah operatives posed as women on the platform to lure targets into installing malicious applications, thereby enabling surveillance or control of their devices. The same fighter added that “We had numerous software tools and thousands of accounts allowing us to dominate counter-propaganda against the resistance and maintain control over X […]. We also had software that enabled us to hack vulnerable accounts on Facebook and X.”
The aftermath of October 7 offered opportunities to deploy this cyber framework. For instance, videos purportedly showing successful attacks on Israeli positions were widely circulated during the Israeli ground operation in southern Lebanon, though they were actually montages or footage from previous conflicts. This strategy sought to galvanize Hezbollah supporters and sow doubt among the Israeli population.
At the same time, Hezbollah has exploited incidents to accuse Israel of war crimes. Following an explosion at a hospital in Gaza in October 2023, Hezbollah quickly pointed the finger at Israel, spreading shocking images and damning testimonies. However, independent investigations later suggested that the explosion might have been caused by a defective rocket fired from Gaza.
Hezbollah operates a powerful media network to broadcast its narrative domestically without relying on Western or Israeli outlets. At the same time, it has developed the capacity to project its message abroad, leveraging influential individuals as well as politico-military organizations to penetrate adversary audiences. An additional cyber fighter explained: “We spread false rumors about attacks to incite panic in Israel. We also targeted Israeli soldiers on social media to demoralize them.” Furthermore, to support its information operations, Hezbollah has intensified its cyber operations by targeting strategic infrastructure and the accounts of Israeli officials. For instance, attacks on Israeli telecommunications systems and energy networks have briefly disrupted some military and civilian communications.
Lebanon’s Shiite party has also exploited leaks from Israeli databases to fuel disinformation campaigns. By infiltrating certain Israeli social networks, the party has successfully spread false reports of supposed attacks, creating confusion amongst the population and security forces. Hezbollah has also targeted the relatives of Israeli soldiers through digital harassment campaigns, sending anonymous messages to military families and insinuating that their loved ones were in imminent danger or had been captured in order to provoke intense psychological stress. Finally, the movement has also used influencer and sympathizer accounts to relay content favorable to its narrative, creating the illusion of broad international support for its actions. These actions have had a notable impact on the perception of the conflict abroad, particularly in certain Arab and Muslim communities. Hezbollah’s collaborations extend beyond the information sphere and Lebanon’s periphery, as one of the interviewed fighters revealed:
“We collaborated with the Iranians, Iraqis, Bahrainis, and the Saudi opposition, and personally, I coordinated with Pakistanis and Indians. We also worked together to hack and attack multiple infrastructure[s] in Israel, notably interfering with their navigation and GPS systems.”
Internal Struggles and Strategic Shift
Despite the development of doctrines and the establishment of a vast information system, Hezbollah’s use of information as a weapon remains limited according to the cyber-combatants interviewed. This is due to a lack of resources, internal dissension, and, above all, a lack of interest or vision. Hezbollah’s hackers do not hide their frustration with their superiors’ attitude, ascribing their leaders’ lack of faith in the impact of social media to the limited use of these platforms within the organization. Decision-makers did not truly believe in the power of social media, and as such, have hindered any attempt at modernization.
In the past, when faced with complex challenges, Hezbollah could rely on Iranian assistance, including access to black-market technologies and software to circumvent restrictions. “They always had a bigger budget than we did,” said a Hezbollah engineer. However, this collaboration came to an end—not due to a lack of willingness on Iran’s part, but because it necessitated closed and secure communication channels that were no longer operational. On several occasions, the leadership even considered disbanding the department, viewing it as redundant or unnecessary. In one striking example, when one of the interviewed fighters tried to explain the importance of strategic investment in social media, the response he received left him speechless: “We will simply ask people to stop believing what they read on social media.” The reaction, in his view, perfectly illustrated the disconnect between Hezbollah leadership and the operational realities of information warfare.
Instead, the operators interviewed align more closely with the Iranian vision—which considers the information weapon as a central aspect of warfare, implemented by the Revolutionary Guards—and opposed traditional Lebanese cadres who prefer to allocate resources to conventional weaponry and/or consider the information space insignificant. According to the cyber-combatants interviewed, high command has acknowledged its mistake and intends to give greater prominence and more resources to cyber and information warfare units. One of the fighters explained:
“A lot of commanders from the previous generation have been killed and the new ones are more aware of the importance of cyber skills and information for their organization. They are also aligned with Tehran’s vision, which seeks [for] Hezbollah to strengthen its cyber and informational capabilities. However, it will take at least two to three years to regain the operational capabilities that existed before October 2023.”
Israel’s AI Advantage
While rebuilding their forces, Hezbollah’s cyber combatants face an even greater challenge: keeping pace with Israel’s growing advantage in artificial intelligence. “Artificial intelligence is omnipresent in our daily lives, and its role in modern conflicts continues to grow. Without an effective counter-strategy, we risk an irreparable defeat,” explains a Hezbollah cyber combatant.
Hezbollah’s cyber operators insist that the use of AI in modern warfare is no longer speculation but a tangible reality. During recent confrontations, this threat manifested itself in several ways. For example, during the war, Israel used AI power software to analyze tera octets of data, which allowed them to disseminate false information through various channels, social networks included. In December 2024, Israeli forces used an advanced AI tool named “Habsora” to maintain a “target bank” that catalogued Hezbollah operatives along with their respective locations and routines. Then, by monitoring phone communications, they waited for the relatives of targeted individuals to attempt to contact them. Once these calls were made, the location was immediately identified and exploited for military purposes. According to Hezbollah’s cyber fighters, this tactic was widely used in Lebanon and Gaza, resulting in significant human losses.
Beyond these methods, Israel also leveraged artificial intelligence to manipulate public opinion while conducting targeted cyberattacks against computer systems, communications infrastructure, and personal devices. This latest escalation serves as a striking example of how emerging technologies are being used to dominate conflict. As one Hezbollah fighter reflected, “If Israel is my perpetual enemy, I must nonetheless acknowledge that its mastery of digital tools has given it a decisive strategic advantage. It is imperative to learn from this and rethink our own strategies in this new era of informational warfare.”
Israel’s Counteroffensive
In addition to its dominance in the use of AI, Israel has implemented a series of countermeasures aimed at containing Hezbollah’s media influence and protecting its own narrative. These measures include targeted censorship, digital disruption operations, defensive propaganda, and offensive cyberattacks.
Israel perceives this information war as a full-fledged strategic threat, as it impacts not only its international image but also the morale of its population and armed forces. To this end, the Israeli state has developed a media control strategy to limit the spread of Hezbollah’s messages, notably using cyberattacks to disrupt its communication infrastructure.
According to an article published by Haaretz in March 2024, the Israeli army orchestrated multiple cyberattacks against servers hosting Hezbollah-affiliated websites, rendering these platforms temporarily inaccessible. Additionally, Israel requested that American and European technology companies restrict Hezbollah’s digital presence on social media. In January 2024, Meta and X announced the removal of hundreds of accounts linked to Hezbollah propaganda, citing violations of their policies against incitement to violence. However, Hezbollah managed to bypass some of these restrictions by multiplying mirror accounts and encrypted channels on Telegram, reinforcing the clandestine nature of its communication.
The Israeli Defense Forces do not merely block Hezbollah’s messages; they also conduct psychological warfare against the organization. This strategy involves disseminating information designed to morally destabilize Hezbollah fighters and supporters, as well as targeted messaging directed at Hezbollah combatants and their families. According to Skeyesmedia, the Israeli intelligence services infiltrated pro-Hezbollah WhatsApp and Telegram groups to post demoralizing messages, suggesting that certain movement leaders had fled Lebanon in the face of escalating conflict.
Israel also conducts proactive cyberattacks against Hezbollah’s digital networks. In March 2024, an operation carried out by the Israeli military’s electronic intelligence service reportedly neutralized an internal communication network used by Hezbollah to coordinate its strikes. According to the Arab Center in Washington, DC, Israel also successfully introduced spyware into Hezbollah’s messaging systems, enabling the surveillance of internal communications and the compromise of attack plans. This technique aligns with a long-standing tradition of Israeli cyber-espionage, previously observed during operations against Iran’s nuclear program (e.g., Stuxnet).
Conclusion
Hezbollah’s experience in the post-October 7 era underscores the transformation of modern conflict into a multidimensional struggle where information warfare is as decisive as firepower. The group’s gradual embrace of social media manipulation, cyberattacks, and foreign alliances illustrates both its adaptability as well as its vulnerabilities. While Hezbollah has demonstrated the ability to shape narratives, disrupt Israeli networks, and project influence abroad, its efforts remain constrained by internal divisions, limited resources, and Israel’s technological superiority—particularly in artificial intelligence. The evolving clash between Hezbollah and Israel gives way to a broader truth: in contemporary wars, the battlefield extends into cyberspace, where control over perceptions and information flows can decisively alter the balance of power.
Pierre-Yves Baillet is a French war reporter. Holding a Master’s degree from the French Institute of Geopolitics, his research focuses primarily on irregular and hybrid warfare. He has worked in the Balkans, Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Colombia.