What the plan is trying to do in one sentence
It reorients diplomacy around a short list of national priorities and uses visas, bilateral deals, assistance, sanctions, standards setting, and commercial diplomacy as leverage to shape partner behavior and global systems in ways that strengthen U.S. sovereignty, security, and economic power.
The plan’s operating model
The plan’s “how” is built around a few repeated mechanisms:
- Prioritize a small set of interests
The foreword argues resources are finite and the U.S. cannot solve every global problem, so diplomacy must be “clear, concrete, and limited” in defining core interests. - Use leverage, not just engagement
Tools emphasized throughout include visa policy, repatriation arrangements, sanctions and financial pressure, commercial deals, assistance as bargaining power, and standards setting in international bodies. - Shift from multilateral deference to selective multilateralism
The plan says the U.S. will engage international organizations only when they advance U.S. interests, with a focus on reform, accountability, and standard setting bodies. - Make economic and technology policy central to diplomacy
Commercial diplomacy, supply chains, energy exports, critical minerals, export controls, and technology standards are treated as core statecraft, not side issues.
The six goals and how each would work in practice
Goal 1: U.S. National Sovereignty
Intent: Treat sovereignty and border control as central foreign policy outputs.
How it might work:
- Use visa issuance and admissions as national security decisions and tighten screening and vetting.
- Make “remigration and border security” a standing item in diplomacy, especially in the hemisphere, including repatriation facilitation and third country arrangements for transfers.
- Apply visa and financial sanctions against foreign censorship efforts and influence operations targeting Americans.
- Reorient participation in international organizations toward reform and interest based engagement, including conditioning funding and resisting initiatives viewed as sovereignty eroding.
What this looks like operationally: Embassies would have explicit migration and repatriation objectives, and assistance and diplomacy would be used as incentives for cooperation.
Goal 2: Western Hemisphere and the “Donroe Doctrine”
Intent: Treat the hemisphere as the strategic foundation for U.S. security and global power projection.
How it might work:
- Counter and roll back extra hemispheric military and dual use footholds and reduce coercive economic influence over critical infrastructure such as chokepoints like the Panama Canal.
- Offer alternatives through trade deals, near shoring, private investment, and targeted assistance to reduce partner dependence on competitors.
- Treat cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, increase sanctions and economic tools, and retain the option to use force “if necessary and appropriate,” while working with neighbors to improve security capacity.
What this looks like operationally: A regional campaign approach where commerce, security cooperation, and financial pressure are combined to reduce migration pressure, narcotics flows, and competitor influence.
Goal 3: Peace and Stability in the Indo Pacific
Intent: Compete with China through economic strength and deterrence while avoiding unnecessary instability.
How it might work:
- Build resilient supply chains and promote “trusted alternatives” to China created dependencies, including critical minerals and technology partnerships.
- Use bilateral trade deals and commercial advocacy to increase U.S. market presence and support U.S. reindustrialization.
- Encourage allies to spend more, invest in deterrence, and provide greater access to critical infrastructure and resources, in exchange for increased access to the U.S. defense industrial base.
- Maintain open lines with China and aim to reduce miscalculation while signaling U.S. interest in a peaceful and prosperous region.
What this looks like operationally: A mix of deterrence messaging, access negotiation, industrial collaboration, and coalition economic architecture to reduce vulnerability to coercion.
Goal 4: Rebuild the “Civilizational Alliance” with Europe
Intent: Shift conventional defense responsibility to European allies while maintaining alliance cohesion and increasing industrial depth.
How it might work:
- Push allies toward higher defense spending and tangible capability creation, while expanding joint defense industrial base integration.
- Pursue balanced reciprocal trade and push back on regulations that disadvantage U.S. firms, while promoting U.S. energy exports to reduce reliance on adversarial suppliers.
- Maintain dialogue with Russia, seek the end of the Russia Ukraine war, and pursue strategic stability and arms control “as conditions allow.”
What this looks like operationally: A transactional but structured transatlantic bargain: more European capability and industrial contribution in exchange for U.S. partnership and industrial integration.
Goal 5: U.S. Economic and Technological Dominance
Intent: Treat industrial capacity and technology leadership as geopolitical power.
How it might work:
- Identify critical sectors and reduce dependencies through coordinated action with Commerce, USTR, Energy, and other agencies.
- Use tariffs and enforcement against transshipment and other unfair practices, and elevate commercial diplomacy as a primary function of embassies.
- Expand exports and investment to gain leverage over chokepoints and key nodes in global trade, and promote energy exports to sustain “energy dominance.”
- Control and export “American AI tech stack” to trusted partners while using licensing and standards bodies to lock in U.S. preferred standards.
What this looks like operationally: Embassies become economic operators, measured on deals, market access, supply chain outcomes, standards adoption, and blocking competitor tech penetration.
Goal 6: Targeted Foreign Assistance that Puts American Interests First
Intent: Rebuild foreign assistance as leverage for concrete objectives and shift resources toward priority regions.
How it might work:
- State absorbs and realigns former USAID programs into two buckets: lifesaving programs and strategic investments.
- Require every assistance dollar to be justified as statecraft tied to U.S. interests, including migration and remigration cooperation, security ties, votes in international organizations, and trade reciprocity.
- Use assistance to achieve discrete, time bound objectives and to support negotiations, secure critical minerals, and compete in global deals.
- Explicitly reallocate assistance, aiming in 2026 for at least 40 percent of assistance spending in the Western Hemisphere and East Asia regions.
- Shift development toward “trade, not aid,” diversify implementers toward the business community, and adapt procurement to market standards.
What this looks like operationally: Assistance becomes flexible bargaining capital and a tool for competitive dealmaking, rather than primarily a long cycle development enterprise.
What would make it work, in real world terms
For the plan to function as intended, it depends on a few enabling conditions:
- Strong interagency coordination because many tools sit outside State (Treasury, DHS, Commerce, USTR, DOJ, DoD). The plan assumes coordination will be available and effective.
- Credible incentives and penalties since leverage only works if partners believe the U.S. will follow through on rewards and consequences.
- Implementation capacity at posts because this model increases workload for embassies, especially commercial diplomacy, assistance agility, and complex negotiation packages.
- Metrics that match the strategy such as repatriation cooperation, market access outcomes, standards adoption, supply chain risk reduction, and partner dependency shifts.
The practical strengths and risks
Strengths
- Clear priorities and a leverage based model rather than open ended engagement.
- Makes economic and technology competition central to diplomacy.
- Sets a rare, concrete intent to rebalance assistance toward priority regions.
Risks
- Credibility risk if assistance and engagement are perceived as purely transactional or rapidly reversible.
- Capacity risk if posts cannot execute the expanded commercial, assistance, and standards agenda at scale.
- Coordination risk if interagency tradeoffs are not adjudicated quickly when objectives conflict.