By
Introduction
American power is in crisis, and with it, America’s role in the global system. More than thirty years after the end of the Cold War and nearly twenty-four after 9/11, is America still leader of the free world; the self-appointed “indispensable nation”? More importantly, does it want to be?
The security challenges facing the US and the broader global community are increasingly transnational, interconnected, and disruptive, and America continues to be viewed, and act, as the primary security guarantor. In reacting to these “compound security threats” (CSTs) to global stability and US geopolitical primacy, America has too often conflated military force with national power, “contributing to errors in strategic judgement and actions”. This crucial misinterpretation of Newton’s definition of power—force displaced over time—has resulted in two decades of sustained global conflict with inconclusive or failed end states, the progressive alienation of once staunch Western and regional allies, and the rapid erosion of American legitimacy, influence, and perceived capacity and desire to effect positive, sustained change within the global system. Consequently, the US is overextended politically, economically, and militarily, the international security environment is markedly more unstable, and American society, socio-politically polarized and war-weary, is demanding the administration refocus national attention and resources on domestic “nation building” rather than foreign interventionism.
Thus, US power is at an inflection point, where the choices made in the near term will determine America’s geopolitical role, influence, and manner of engagement within the international system in the 21st Century. This paper will present a prescription for a more adaptive, nuanced, and restrained application of American national power in support of strategic policy through discussion of three “American crises” arenas—grand strategy, humanitarianism, and identity.
Crisis in American Grand Strategy
America has radically diverted from the deliberate, pragmatic, realist-based foreign and domestic policies which enabled the US to achieve and maintain great power status throughout most of the twentieth century, and in doing so, lost sight of its core national interest—the continued security and prosperity of the American people. Critically, contemporary discourse often conflates grand strategy with foreign policy, effectively subordinating essential domestic economic and sociopolitical elements of national power, to the detriment of strategic success.
The effectiveness of American ‘strategy’ during thirty-plus years of unparalleled geopolitical freedom of maneuver is evident in the CSTs of today: a revanchist Russia threatens European stability, political cohesion, and the effectiveness of the NATO alliance; China is exploiting its significant economic, industrial, and military potential to expand its regional and global influence and directly challenge the Western-centric liberal international order; transnational and domestic terrorism appears omnipresent; and merging human security and health issues continue to drive humanitarian crises with global consequences. Contemporary American foreign policy has oscillated wildly between liberal interventionism and reactionary, unilateral militarism, resulting in increasingly negative domestic and global perceptions of US power, while subordination of domestic concerns in pursuit of economic globalization has relentlessly eroded America’s manufacturing capacity, and with it the middle class. The persistent inability of American strategy to effectively attain stated foreign or domestic policy objectives, in conjunction with increasingly constrained fiscal and material resources and societal division, has led to renewed debate within US political, military, academic, and social discourse concerning retrenchment, leaving the future role and application of American ‘power’ in a state of transition. However, in entertaining this absolutist debate, the US is again repeating the mistakes of the past.
Moving forward, America must first recognize grand strategy implies a long-term course of action in which all elements of national power—economic, political, military, and societal[1] force—are developed and harnessed in pursuit of clearly defined, achievable strategic objectives which serve the national interest. Continuity and unity of purpose is critical, and cannot vacillate with each election cycle, to include conceptualization of threats. For example, from 1945-1992 America successfully executed a policy of strategic containment targeting the Soviet Union, investing significant political and financial capital in scientific and technological innovation and infrastructure, in close partnership with the private sector, military, and academia, to achieve global dominance across scientific, economic, and military domains. Concurrently, America exploited common security interests, in conjunction with the ideological and cultural appeal of US democracy, to establish strategic partnerships and collective security alliances with key states, and a normative system of behavior through which to regulate the geopolitical environment. Thus, policy continuity over time, and the reasoned application of, and investment in, critical elements of national power, enabled a positive strategic outcome. In contrast, American policies since 1992 have been reactionary, superficial, and militant, focusing on short-term operational successes in the absence of definable or achievable strategic conditions, while over-simplified narratives and methods progressively subverted America’s value-centric legitimacy.
In a period of dynamic CSTs and global connectivity, legitimate national power will be both executed and judged by the effective and balanced application of political, economic, and military force. Therefore, measurements of national power in the 21st Century will simultaneously align with, and transcend, traditional realist metrics, and incorporate a state’s perceived legitimacy and influence in the eyes of the global community, specifically its capacity and desire to effect change which benefits the greater international system, and the means through which it promotes domestic security and prosperity. The US must relearn how to differentiate “force” from “power”, identify and acknowledge the failings of existing strategic guidance, and appreciate how “legitimate power” is globally evaluated.
Thus, the US must not pursue a singular policy of full retrenchment, nor status-quo interventionism, nor execute a “pivot” to the Indo-pacific at the expense of counterterrorism and human security capacity building operations (CBOs)[2]. Too often US national security policy demonstrates the inability to concurrently manage and adaptively prioritize multiple threat actors, instead myopically fixating on a single issue or actor to the detriment of other security interests. For example, the fixation on international terrorism in the opening decades of the 21st Century enabled adversarial powers—China, Russia, and Iran—to significantly improve their military, economic, and political power projection capabilities to the degree where each now challenges, or at the very least subverts, American’s ability to effectively achieve regional and global policy objectives. Instead, retired Lt. Gen. Michael Nagata asserts America must learn how to “walk and chew bubble gum at the same time”. America must develop a blended model predicated upon limited direct intervention in only those instances of the utmost concern to the national interest, and instead act through, and enable, regional actors to address regional threats. This blend of Rooseveltian realism, collective security, and burden-sharing will enable the global community to address globalized security threats, while an increased regional division of labor will reduce the security burden on the US, and force regional powers to assume majority ownership in the provision of their national security. Further, return to a modernized form of burden-sharing will enable the US to devote greater attention and resources to addressing the contributory sociopolitical trends fueling division within American democracy, and reinvest in the scientific and technological innovation and infrastructure necessary to remain competitive across multiple strategic domains with rising powers.
American grand strategy in the post-Cold War era has been haphazardly conceived and executed and directly contributed to the decline of US national power. The US must return to a more deliberate and restrained strategy based upon collective security, burden-sharing, the selective application of national power, and the rational pursuit of domestic security and prosperity, while resisting the impetus to become decisively engaged in conflicts not of vital concern to core national interests.
Crisis in Humanitarianism
In this period of ‘power in transition’, America must rapidly reconceptualize humanitarian intervention from a derided policy of liberal interventionism to an essential, dual-purpose element of realist grand strategy and power projection. Capacity building operations, specifically, represent a strategic opportunity for the US, in conjunction with Western and regional allies, to proactively address the roots of emerging CSTs through the persistent development of host nation (HN) governance, security, infrastructure, and societal capabilities, and concurrently win the battle for influence, legitimacy, and capacity in an era of renewed great power competition (GPC).
The intent of CBOs is to empower local governance and non-state entities to better understand and “manage uncertainty and risk” and develop the necessary integral capacity to pre-emptively address the drivers of instability and moderate unrest in times of acute crisis. CBOs must be understood as a mechanism of proactive, collective burden-sharing, in which improved HN capacity will enable the state to increasingly act as a regional balancer, greatly reducing strain on the US as global security guarantor. Central to this effort will be the collective provision of material and fiscal resources, subject matter experts (SMEs), and the subtle, synergized application of political, economic, and military force in support of HN efforts. CBOs can be executed cooperatively within one state—NATO’s mission in Afghanistan—or delineated by national areas of responsibility (AORs) as part of a broader regional approach, thereby avoiding the frictions of national “caveats” under multinational command structures.
Warfighting and CBOs are often viewed as diametrically opposing campaigns, when in fact they are threat-specific elements of a broader strategy pursuing stability. The CBO approach is equally applicable to failed states as it is in instances of overt GPC, such as the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Petraeus asserts the policy threat to humanitarian assistance, and the irregular warfare methodologies involved, is the tendency of policy-makers and politicians to “pivot” to the Indo-pacific, [and now potentially Europe], instead of a “rebalancing” objectives and resources. Thomas Barnett, acknowledging the complexity of the contemporary security environment and corresponding resource requirements, expertly argues America requires two militaries: a “Leviathan” force, whose primary role is conventional, high-intensity, peer-on-peer conflict; and a “System Administrator” force, tasked with proactive CBO intervention to address the diverse drivers of human security crises. The focused and selective employment of special operations forces (SOF) to execute CBO tasks permits sustained, low-visibility, small-footprint operations within permissive and non-permissive environments, enabling “Leviathan” formations to focus on core mission sets within assigned AORs. The composition of each SOF CBO is task specific, supplemented with essential whole-of-government enablers—governance, law enforcement, engineering, humanitarian, economic, educational actors—for the developing world, and military-centric assets for conventional conflict theatres. In each application, the reduced visibility and scale permits the HN to save face and allows the US to avoid the perils of great power “overextension” which come with sustained, conventional military deployment in pursuit of haphazardly conceived political objectives in which America’s exit strategy is inexorably tied to the effectiveness of HN governance and security actors, aptly demonstrated by America’s experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
This approach, akin to a blend of Kilcullen’s concept of “permanent containment” and Rooseveltian selective interventionism, reflects operational realities and challenges the traditional pillars of peace operations—humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence (Wilson III, Dueling Regimes 32). Therefore, traditional definitions and concepts must be modernized and adapted to more accurately reflect the emerging complexities of the strategic environment, and the unique operational methodologies necessary to mitigate and avert destabilizing and protracted compound security dilemmas.
The national security impetus driving collective, proactive humanitarian intervention is clear, and great care must be taken not to denigrate the strategic necessity of CBO initiatives with simplistic, ideological-based, partisan rhetoric. National power is increasingly a battle for influence, legitimacy, and capacity. Persistent CBO operations, selectively identified and expertly executed, represent an essential, low-cost, high-yield element of realist strategy and power projection, and demonstrate America’s continuing commitment to the stability and prosperity of the collective global system.
Crisis in American Identity
The crisis in American ‘identity’ is inseparable from three issues: the inability of American “grand strategy” and national power to achieve its stated objectives within acceptable costs and timeframes; failure to translate American national power into sustained domestic security and prosperity across all socioeconomic classes; and the propensity to devote American political, fiscal, and material resources to resolving human security issues abroad while subordinating domestic resolution of those same trends. The pervasive sociopolitical division plaguing American democracy, as well as increasingly fervent domestic calls for retrenchment, are in part driven by the prioritization of foreign policy at the expense of domestic affairs. Accordingly, elements of this crisis can be found interwoven into the sections above.
America’s global role will look much different in the years ahead. Though deeply divided, the American electorate has collectively made it clear mitigation of domestic sociopolitical issues is their primary concern, and that the practice of elected officials ignoring the voice of the people is over. The inherent dichotomy is both unremarkable and unsurprising: Americans want to be seen as an integral part of the global community, though they do not want to feel exploited, nor have their role come at the expense of their quality of life. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has happened. NATO member states consistently fail to meet their alliance commitments and routinely rely upon the US to assume the leading role—politically, economically, and militarily—in maintaining stability throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. This parasitical behavior, akin to “buck-passing”, has resulted in growing resentment and calls for retrenchment amongst Americans, exacerbated by the frequency in which states who benefit from US geopolitical primacy critique its methodology. This resentment formed the foundation of President Trump’s rhetoric towards NATO, in which he derided the utility and longevity of the alliance if member states continued to exploit the benefits of US power.
The harsh reality is no other democracy has sufficient capacity or will to assume the role of global leader, increasing the potential for a return to a multipolar international system. Complete retrenchment will likely result in significant and far-reaching perturbations within global systems, along with an unknown impact on perceptions of American power, giving weight to Wilson’s contention that the US “is not merely part of the system, it is the system”. However, a pragmatic “refocusing” of efforts, in accordance with Rooseveltian realism discussed above, may enable the US to devote greater resources at home, while forcing security partners to assume leading regional roles, albeit with American support.
The crisis of American ‘identity’ is a product of the prolonged misapplication of American economic, political, and military force after the Cold War, and the persistent subordination of domestic affairs. Domestic “nation building” is critical to resolving this crisis, the results of which will have significant implications for US power in the 21st Century.
Conclusion
American power is at an inflection point, challenged simultaneously by diverse global threats, accelerating great power competition, and domestic political volatility and calls for retrenchment. The US must rapidly reconceptualize its vital national interest, and develop a grand strategy rooted in pragmatic Rooseveltian realism—clearly defined, achievable objectives, burden-sharing, and continuity of purpose—to guide its actions, while concurrently rebalancing its resources to better facilitate security, prosperity, and unity at home. Central must be the judicious application of American hard and soft power to facilitate positive global perceptions US legitimacy, influence, and capacity to lead. Therefore, selective, subtle, proactive humanitarian intervention and capacity building must remain at the core of realist national security policy. The implications of continued strategic mismanagement for American power, and the broader geopolitical system are unclear. What is certain is the status quo is unlikely to continue, and we are engaged in a period in which traditional conceptualizations and employment of national power is in transition.
Footnotes
[1] Societal refers to a combination of a national value-based ideological, cultural, and social appeal, often linked with conceptualizations of “national identity”.
[2] The term CBOs will used to represent military-centric mission sets—Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Defense, Diplomacy, and Military Assistance (DDMA)—as well as civilian-led economic, governance, and civil infrastructure and development initiatives to improve Host-Nation capacity across all domains.