BLUF: The Department of Defense’s fixation on large-scale combat operations (LSCO) threatens to sideline Special Forces, who are often viewed by outsiders as bespoke capabilities unsuited for wars in the future. Yet adversaries are already waging irregular warfare (IW) as their strategy of choice, an arena for which the Special Forces are uniquely organized and trained. Unless Special Forces can clearly articulate and demonstrate how they bridge IW and LSCO, the Army risks losing its most effective instrument for competition below the threshold of war and for shaping conditions before high-end conflict.
This article seeks to address that challenge. It explains the current strategic transition, highlights how adversaries integrate conventional modernization with irregular approaches, and shows why IW and LSCO are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing. It then frames the conundrum facing Special Forces: a force born of irregular warfare now confronting an Army culture dominated by LSCO and modernization imperatives. By analyzing the future operational environment, identifying enduring requirements, and offering concrete imperatives for reinvestment, this paper makes the case that Special Forces are not an anachronism but an indispensable asymmetric edge.
It is important to note that this article does not simply restate Special Forces’ history or legacy, but it provides a forward-looking argument for their relevance in great-power competition. It seeks to shape the narrative within the Department of Defense and the Army, ensuring that Special Forces are understood not as a luxury capability, but as the connective tissue that binds America’s conventional deterrent to the irregular contests where strategic outcomes will be decided. From the Jedburghs of WWII to Afghanistan in 2001, history shows that irregular warfare repeatedly shapes outcomes in conflicts defined by mass and maneuver.
The United States military is navigating one of the most difficult transitions in its modern history. After twenty years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, the Department of Defense has shifted its focus toward strategic competition with peer and near-peer adversaries. That competition is framed largely through the lens of high-intensity, large-scale combat operations (LSCO): divisions massing under fire in Eastern Europe, fleets maneuvering in the Pacific, and long-range strike networks battering adversary formations. Training, doctrine, and procurement are now geared toward a return to wars of mass and maneuver.
Yet America’s adversaries are not betting solely on direct confrontation. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are modernizing their conventional forces to project parity with the United States—capabilities meant to signal strength, impose caution, and make Washington think twice about escalation. At the same time, they recognize the danger of a head-on clash. Their real strategy lies in the gray zone, where irregular warfare (IW) provides a safer, more effective path to achieving objectives while managing escalation. Proxy networks, disinformation campaigns, cyber intrusion, lawfare, economic coercion, and covert action are not peripheral activities; they are central tools for contesting the United States continuously while remaining below the threshold of open war. Conventional modernization provides visible deterrence, but irregular warfare delivers the day-to-day gains. For America’s rivals, the two are complementary, not in tension.
This dual approach creates a false dichotomy for the United States. If IW remains the dominant form of competition—where adversaries maneuver for advantage below the threshold of conflict—then current capital investments risk preparing brilliantly for LSCO while ceding the ground of everyday competition. IW and LSCO are not mutually exclusive; they are mutually reinforcing. Conventional capabilities deter by making open war unwinnable, while IW ensures adversaries cannot win without one. Together, they form a seamless deterrence ecosystem, contesting aggression from the shadows of gray-zone competition to the blunt force of large-scale combat. Treating them as rivals for resources or attention misunderstands the nature of modern conflict: deterrence is strongest when irregular and conventional capabilities are deliberately integrated.
The Special Forces Conundrum
This reality places the U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment at a crossroads. Born of irregular warfare and validated in conflicts from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, the Green Berets now face an institutional climate dominated by great-power competition and LSCO. Inside the Pentagon, the future appears to belong to multi-domain formations bristling with long-range fires, precision effects, contested logistics, and cyber capabilities. In such a vision, Special Forces risk being cast as anachronistic—a low-density capability shaped by counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, misaligned with wars of mass and maneuver. The challenge for the Regiment is to tell a new story: one that shows how its unique contributions reinforce, rather than compete with, the Army’s vision for LSCO.
The dilemma is stark. Every dollar invested in a Special Forces Group is a dollar not spent on artillery, armor, or air defense—capabilities the Army sees as central to deterring and defeating peer adversaries. History offers a cautionary precedent. During the Korean War, Ranger companies were hastily reconstituted to conduct raids, reconnaissance, and infiltration against a capable adversary. They performed effectively but were disbanded as the Army shifted back toward conventional formations, leaving a critical gap in unconventional expertise. Special Forces emerged soon afterward to fill that void, but the lesson endures: when the institution prioritizes mass at the expense of specialized capability, it risks discarding precisely the tools required to contest irregular approaches. The Regiment today faces a similar danger if its unique contributions are not clearly articulated and institutionally preserved.
Internally, the Regiment struggles with its identity. Some argue SF has drifted from its irregular roots, chasing raids and duplicating other SOF units instead of focusing on long-duration, partner-centric campaigns. Others contend SF is not in crisis but in evolution, with adaptability and mission diversity proving its resilience. Both views miss the deeper risk: if Special Forces are perceived merely as elite direct-action teams, their institutional future will remain precarious.
Timing compounds the challenge. After two decades of counterinsurgency, the Army has pivoted hard toward LSCO—preparing to survive massed fires in Europe and precision strikes in the Pacific, not cultivating resistance networks or working with indigenous partners. Against this backdrop, Special Forces risk being dismissed as a luxury—useful in niche contexts but secondary to conventional modernization. Without a clear and compelling case for relevance, the Regiment may find itself marginalized just as adversaries are doubling down on irregular approaches.
And that is the paradox. While Washington debates whether Special Forces belong in the future fight, America’s rivals have already decided that irregular warfare is decisive. Russia’s hybrid campaigns in Ukraine, China’s “three warfares,” Iran’s proxy militias, and North Korea’s illicit networks all reflect strategies built on irregular foundations. History underscores the danger of sidelining SF: when conventional campaigns bogged down, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, it was Special Forces’ cultural fluency, partner development, and ability to operate in denied areas that proved indispensable. The challenge now is not simply for SF to preserve its identity, but to make the case that irregular warfare is central to great-power competition.
The Future Operational Environment
The operational environment in which Special Forces must prove their relevance will be a blend of LSCO and IW. Future conflicts will unfold in contested theaters where great-power adversaries employ advanced surveillance, precision strike, and electronic warfare to deny U.S. freedom of maneuver, while simultaneously leveraging proxies, disinformation, and economic coercion to shape the battlespace below the threshold of open war. In such environments, SF must demonstrate value on two fronts: enabling LSCO by building resilient resistance networks, securing access in denied areas, and shaping conditions for conventional maneuver; and contesting IW by countering adversary influence, training and advising partners, and conducting operations that erode enemy confidence without escalating into full-scale war. The Regiment’s relevance will rest on its ability to bridge these domains, providing commanders with flexible options in an environment where the line between competition and conflict is increasingly blurred.
Six realities define that environment: (1) persistent multi-domain transparency, where concealment is fleeting; (2) democratization of precision strike, which pushes lethal fires down to the lowest echelons; (3) fragile command and control in contested spectrums; (4) compressed decision cycles, where time becomes decisive terrain; (5) industrial, informational, and political depth as critical sustainment factors; and (6) democratic constraints that adversaries exploit as battlespace. Together, these realities impose enduring operational requirements:
Preserve Freedom of Action in a Transparent Battlespace
Strategic: Protect decision-making, infrastructure, and communications from exploitation via cyber, satellites, and global networks.
Operational: Maneuver and mass under constant ISR and AI-driven analytics; deception and dispersion are essential.
Tactical: Survive when concealment is fleeting—dispersion, deception, and emissions control are prerequisites for survival.
Build and Maintain Resilient Kill Chains
Strategic: Safeguard global C4ISR while degrading adversary sensor-to-shooter links.
Operational: Integrate ISR, targeting, and fires across domains while fighting through jamming, spoofing, and cyber attack.
Tactical: Operate in degraded environments using decentralized mission command, improvisation, and rapid exploitation of vulnerabilities.
Sustain the Force in Protracted Conflict
Strategic: Mobilize industrial capacity, secure supply chains, and sustain political will for campaigns measured in years.
Operational: Defend contested lines of communication against interdiction, cyber disruption, and economic coercion.
Tactical: Improvise resupply, maintain combat effectiveness in austere conditions, and adapt logistics under pressure.
Integrate Effects Across DIME-FIL
Strategic: Orchestrate diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal tools as one campaign.
Operational: Synchronize operations with interagency and coalition partners across domains.
Tactical: Understand how even small-unit actions influence legitimacy and strategic outcomes.
Maintain Legitimacy and Cohesion
Strategic: Legitimacy sustains industrial power, political will, and alliances.
Operational: Preserve coalition cohesion against adversary disinformation and wedge campaigns.
Tactical: Conduct operations that respect populations, minimize civilian harm, and reinforce credibility through host-nation partners and rule of law.
Meeting the Operational Requirements: The Special Forces Contribution
Special Forces and the Enduring Operational Requirements
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Freedom of Action in a Transparent Battlespace
Whether avoiding massed fires in LSCO or operating under constant surveillance in IW, freedom of action is decisive. Special Forces thrive in low-signature environments, leveraging cultural immersion, human networks, and deception to create maneuver space where conventional formations are exposed. -
Resilient Kill Chains
In LSCO, victory depends on protecting U.S. decision cycles and disrupting those of the adversary. In IW, kill chains extend beyond missiles and radars to include proxies, logistics, and influence networks. Special Forces contribute in both contexts—sabotaging adversary nodes, enabling partner fires, conducting reconnaissance, and injecting friction into enemy systems that precision strikes alone cannot replicate. -
Sustainment in Protracted Conflict
LSCO demands industrial depth and resilient supply lines; IW requires persistence and local endurance. Special Forces extend both by cultivating indigenous capacity, leveraging partner sustainment networks, and enabling operations in austere environments where conventional logistics cannot reach. -
Integration Across DIME-FIL
Whether synchronizing combat power in LSCO or shaping influence in IW, unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential. Special Forces operate at the intersection of military, diplomatic, informational, and economic tools, serving as connective tissue between tactical actions in the field and strategic objectives at home. -
Legitimacy and Cohesion
LSCO campaigns cannot be sustained without allied cohesion, just as IW campaigns cannot succeed without local legitimacy. Special Forces are uniquely positioned to deliver both. By working by, with, and through partners, they reinforce coalition credibility, strengthen host-nation sovereignty, and ensure that U.S. power is seen as enabling rather than imposing.
This pattern is not new. During World War II, the Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupied Europe to link up with resistance movements, disrupt German logistics, and prepare the environment for Allied advances. Their ability to operate clandestinely, build local trust, and synchronize guerrilla activity with conventional campaigns gave the Allies freedom of maneuver and reinforced the legitimacy of liberation efforts. The Jedburghs demonstrated precisely the kind of low-signature, partner-centric operations that remain indispensable today, proving that irregular warfare can decisively shape large-scale combat outcomes.
These contributions reinforce the notion that Special Forces are indispensable regardless of conflict type. They are uniquely designed to meet the enduring operational requirements of modern warfare—making campaigns not only effective in battle, but sustainable, legitimate, and strategically decisive in both competition and conflict. This is the story Special Forces must tell: that their relevance is not confined to counterterrorism or niche irregular operations, but rooted in the very requirements that define success in modern war, whether large-scale combat or gray-zone competition. If Special Forces fail to articulate this clearly, they risk being dismissed as an exquisite but expendable capability at a time when resources are flowing toward conventional modernization.
The burden, therefore, falls on the Regiment and its leaders to make the case for reinvestment in SF’s core missions. Language proficiency, cultural expertise, partner development, unconventional warfare, and preparation of the environment are not relics of past wars but essential capabilities for the future fight. By demonstrating how these missions directly support deterrence, shape the battlespace for LSCO, and contest adversaries in IW, the command can secure the commitment of the Army and DoD to sustain—and expand—the unique edge that Special Forces provide.
Reinvesting in Special Forces
If irregular warfare is the decisive arena of strategic competition, then Special Forces must be its primary practitioners. Yet two decades of emphasis on counterterrorism and direct action have dulled the Regiment’s unique edge: languages atrophied, networks neglected, doctrine ossified, and identity blurred. This drift has fueled the perception that SF is redundant—just another tactical strike force—rather than the Army’s specialists in irregular competition. To counter that perception, the Army must deliberately reinvest in Special Forces, not as a peripheral adjunct to LSCO but as the connective tissue that binds U.S. conventional strength to the irregular campaigns where adversaries seek advantage every day.
That reinvestment requires five institutional commitments:
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Rebuild the human edge. The Army must resource and prioritize deep language training, cultural immersion, and long-duration partner engagement as hard skills, not “nice-to-haves.” These attributes provide access and influence in contested environments that no conventional formation can achieve.
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Train for the transparent battlefield. The Army should invest in SF’s ability to master deception, dispersion, and emissions discipline. In a world where every movement is visible, the low-signature profile of Special Forces is a survival requirement, not a luxury.
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Integrate technology without eroding identity. Institutional modernization must ensure SF has access to cutting-edge ISR, cyber, and AI-enabled tools, but always in a way that amplifies human networks rather than replacing them. The Army’s investment should treat SF as the bridge between high technology and human access.
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Redefine doctrine for competition. The Army must elevate irregular warfare in its doctrine and planning, recognizing that influence, resilience, and environment preparation are strategic campaigns in their own right—not just “pre-conflict” shaping activities. This requires institutional backing, not just internal advocacy from SF.
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Build enduring partnerships. The Army should resource Special Forces to invest in relationships that persist across rotations and crises. Just as adversaries build long-term proxy networks, SF must have the continuity and institutional support to cultivate allies, resistance movements, and civil-military ties that endure.
Taken together, these investments represent the Army’s commitment to ensuring Special Forces are not treated as a relic of the counterterrorism era, but as its premier force for irregular warfare. They align the Regiment with the enduring operational requirements of modern conflict and secure its role as the indispensable bridge between LSCO and IW.
Conclusion: Why SF is Indispensable
The future battlefield will punish carelessness and reward adaptability. LSCO remains possible, but the more immediate and insidious danger lies in irregular campaigns already underway—where adversaries contest U.S. influence daily without firing a shot. These are not peripheral distractions; they are the main arena of modern strategic competition.
In this environment, no armored brigade, carrier strike group, or precision weapon can deliver the irregular effects required to preserve legitimacy, reassure partners, and provide options short of escalation. Meeting those demands requires a force deliberately designed for irregular warfare—and that force is Special Forces. Properly resourced, the Regiment’s defining missions—unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, preparation of the environment, support to resistance, and special reconnaissance—map directly against the enduring operational requirements of modern conflict.
Afghanistan in 2001 underscored this truth: a handful of ODAs, working by, with, and through the Northern Alliance and backed by U.S. airpower, toppled the Taliban in weeks. That model—leveraging partners, shaping the environment, and linking irregular action to conventional power—remains the clearest proof of Special Forces’ enduring relevance in modern warfare.
The choice now lies with the Army. Without deliberate reinvestment, Special Forces risk becoming redundant—another trigger-pulling formation in an institution already bristling with kinetic power, too expensive to justify when resources are scarce. With reinvestment, the Regiment reclaims its rightful place as America’s asymmetric edge: the force that creates freedom of action in contested environments, disrupts adversary kill chains, sustains partners through protracted conflict, integrates across all instruments of power, and delivers the legitimacy on which coalitions and campaigns depend.
Special Forces’ ability to operationalize irregular warfare is not a substitute for LSCO—it is the capability that ensures LSCO occurs on favorable terms, or is deterred altogether. With the right investments, Special Forces prove their worth not as a relic of counterterrorism, but as the indispensable connective tissue between America’s overwhelming conventional strength and the irregular contests where strategic competition will ultimately be won or lost.