Despite its introduction over a decade ago by the People’s Liberation Army, there is no common understanding of Cognitive Warfare. Nor is there an agreement on the existence of a human or cognitive domain. These concepts compete in a crowded and confusing field centered around information technology and the related information dimension of statecraft. While the US intelligence community notes the increasing prevalence of Chinese concepts and research for what they term Cognitive Domain Operations (as well as active Russian activities), there is little appreciation for the implications of Cognitive Warfare in the US military as described by the pacing threat.
Scholars have generated numerous labels to capture the ongoing evolution of information technologies as a vector to influence decision-makers and impact public opinion. See Figure 1 for a partial list. Recently, US government agencies have been using Foreign Malign Influence or just Influence Operations to address the threat.[1] RAND has published studies on cyber-enabled Influence Operations, Virtual Societal Warfare, and Next Generation Psychological Warfare to capture the contest in the information environment.[2] Related studies on Russian disinformation are also common, and with overlapping definitions.
War in the future will not be “wars of attrition but wars of cognition.”
Now the concept of Cognitive Warfare is competing in this crowded space, with no accepted definition or understanding of how it fits within the national security agenda. While information and narratives have shaped wars in the past, ongoing technological developments provide extremely efficient tools to expand this battlespace and substantially raise the potential and salience of Cognitive Warfare. New communication tools now offer infinite possibilities for digital distortion, opening the way to achieving desired objectives in opponents’ minds. Key competitors from autocratic states are not content to merely control their own population; instead, they have “weaponized” social media with “algorithmic amplification” against Western societies.[3] In the words of one expert, war in the future will not be “wars of attrition but wars of cognition.”[4] The joint warfighting community is aware of the challenge, but the national security community is reducing its ability to monitor and respond effectively.
Figure 1. Information Warfare Variants
To the historically oriented, the fight for the minds of decision-makers and noncombatants does not expand the battlespace, but it does expand or at least challenge long-held Western conceptions about war.[5] Those encultured with violent visions, per Clausewitz, will struggle with this concept. The acolytes of the Prussian sage think in terms of physical violence as the essence of war and overlook his description of war as a clash of wills, as well as his discussions about rational and irrational factors in human conflict.
Thus, Cognitive Warfare runs against the grain for the selective Clausewitzian reader, as it goes after a much softer target: the human mind. Because of this bias, Cognitive Warfare faces a steep uphill fight for acceptance within the US military establishment. The American predisposition to kinetic operations and attrition stems from the defense establishment’s strategic culture. This stress on hard power is part of the prevailing conventional US strategic and military culture, which privileges strike operations in the physical realm over more unconventional approaches and especially those involving the human domain.[6] As Colin Gray noted long ago, the US military culture is thoroughly conventional, firepower-centric, and technologically oriented.[7]
This assessment reviews the literature and ongoing dialogue on Cognitive Warfare within the research community. The reviewed scholarship details relevant material from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as well as from other international sources. The paper then moves to coverage on the subject in the United States. This analysis concludes with a brief assessment to further develop this framework.
Defining Cognitive Warfare
In Cognitive Warfare, the message is the munition, and the target is the mind of either specific individuals (e.g., elites, influencers, policymakers) or the collective population of a democratic state. Distorting what these individuals think is a precursor to how they think, and thus how they behave.
Early advocates such as the French officer, Francois du Cluzel, defined Cognitive Warfare as “the art of using technologies to alter the cognition of human targets, most often without their knowledge and consent.”[8] This early conception stressed Cognitive Warfare as an offensive form of cyber conflict; however, he recognized that countermeasures and preventive measures were required. Du Cluzel differentiated psychological operations from cognitive operations, but it is unclear whether the distinction is valid or of value. For du Cluzel, psychological warfare attempts to change what the target audience thinks, but Cognitive Warfare aims at shaping how they reason and their resultant behavior. This distinction lies at the heart of why human cognition is the central objective.
Cognitive War is the application of targeted and tailored messages and nonviolent methods used against civilian and military decision-makers or the general population of a target state to gain a positional advantage in the cognitive domain or gain desired political, military, and informational outcomes.
While Cognitive Warfare is not new, there are a number of novel technologies that significantly enhance the reach and efficacy of activities that target the way decision-makers and individuals think about a crisis situation. Some have seen this as social media-based influence operations.[9] These technologies can be combined to “assess, access, and affect the cognitive space.”[10] While our competitors think in terms of systems and confronting and deceiving us, Western militaries orient on hardware, maneuver platforms, and kinetic operations.
Cognitive Warfare but can be refined to capture a clear theory of victory focused on tailored actions in the information domain. My starting definition of Cognitive War is the application of targeted and tailored messages and nonviolent methods used against civilian and military decision-makers or the general population of a target state to gain a positional advantage in the cognitive domain or gain desired political, military, and informational outcomes. This definition aligns with most Western theorists, who focus on social media manipulation of civilian populations. There are limitations with this approach, which are addressed later.
State of the Security Literature
International Perspectives
There are numerous research articles throughout the international security community on this topic. NATO has continued to build upon Du Cluzel’s work.[11] Du Cluzel also recognized the array of new technologies that would increase the salience of Cognitive Warfare, including the weaponization of neuroscience and the potential convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, gene editing, computer science, information technologies, and cognitive sciences. His most recent work defined Cognitive Warfare as “an unconventional form of warfare that uses cyber tools to alter enemy cognitive processes, exploit mental biases or reflexive thinking, and provoke thought distortions, influence decision-making and hinder action, with negative effects, both at the individual and collective level.”[12]
In the last two years, there has been a surge in interest in this mode of conflict in Europe and Asia.[13] Japanese military officers have tracked PLA developments closely and analyzed Russian efforts in Ukraine to assess how effective the information activity has been.[14] They assess the PLA’s interest in what they call “Cognitive Domain Operations” (discussed in depth later) as strong and growing. Military analysts in India have also assessed PLA writings on the topic.[15]
Taiwan has studied and faced this threat. Their scholars erroneously think that cognitive warfare is part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategy of “unrestricted warfare” (超限戰). However, Taiwanese strategists correctly recognize that Cognitive Warfare targets human perception, attitudes, and decision-making through information manipulation, propaganda, and psychological operations with the intent of gaining strategic objectives. The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND) describes it as an effort “to sway the subject’s will and change its mindset. Psychologically, the PRC is trying to cause mental disarray and confusion, in order to weaken fighting will and determination to defending ourselves.”[16] The MND also assesses that cognitive warfare “originated from the [disciplines] of intelligence warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare.” As a clear target in China’s crosshairs, the government in Taiwan has set up a research center tasked with deflecting the PRC’s narratives.[17] This research concluded that the PRC has not been very effective despite continued pressure campaigns against Taipei.[18]
China and Cognitive Domain Operations
In contrast with US strategic and military culture, China has embraced the existence of a cognitive domain and has expanded its thinking about contemporary warfare. It views the cognitive space as increasingly central to future conflict. “The cognitive domain will become another battle domain next to the land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic, and cyber domains of warfare.”[19] The PLA has been discussing the relevance of psychological conflict for several generations, but began writing about the cognitive domain as far back as 2002, with a steep increase in 2014. Some of these early Chinese writers stressed the novelty of the cognitive space as “a brand-new battlefield.”[20] [21]
Back in 2017, Major General He Fuchu forecasted, “The sphere of operations will be expanded from the physical domain and the information domain to the domain of consciousness (意识域); the human brain will become a new combat space.”[22] Consequently, success on the future battlefield will require achieving not only “biological dominance” (制生权) but also “mental/cognitive dominance” (制脑权) and “intelligence dominance” (制智权).
Chinese analysts employ a deep historical perspective about the impact of technology over time, and they note that each industrial revolution has extended the reach and impact of information. Our current era, the Fourth Industrial Revolution, is said to extend the multimedia of the previous period with AI and image processing technologies to create deepfakes that can be used by the military to fool the enemy. “Throughout the continuous evolution of technology, more and more media can be used,” one Chinese author notes, “to influence the enemy’s thinking, judgment, and cognition, thus creating new modes of cognitive domain combat.”[23]
Chinese analysts have studied this aspect of modern conflict, and the government has supported research on how to translate the concept into an advantage for the PLA. This comports with the famous Sun Tzu maxim that equates winning without fighting as the highest form of the art of warfare.
Many scholars think this remains a key feature of Chinese strategic culture. Evidence for thinking that this is an operative concept can be seen in the activities of the Political Work department inside the PLA and the promulgation of its “Three Warfares” concept.[24] These include 1) public opinion warfare to influence domestic and international public opinion, 2) psychological warfare to demoralize enemy soldiers and civilians, and 3) legal warfare to gain international support through both international and domestic law. Only the latter element is outside what most people term influence operations or cognitive warfare.[25]
Chinese literature on cognitive warfare (認知作戰) is as diffuse as Western research is about influence operations. The volume of Chinese writings on the topic is significant, indicating the emphasis and interest within China’s leadership.[26] Recent articles address the value of confrontation via the social media battlefield.[27] Researchers from China’s psychological warfare unit call for the PLA to “speed up the research for online propaganda technology targeted toward the real-time release on social platforms, voice information synthesis technology using deep learning and other technology, as well as online netizen sentiment trend analysis using big data analytics.”[28]
One pair of Chinese researchers identified another aspect of intelligent operations in the form of “cognitive confrontation” (认知对抗), in which the key objective is to achieve decisive supremacy over enemies in terms of information and awareness. They forecast that future operations should attack enemy perceptions and understanding of the battlespace by “taking the cognitive initiative and damaging or interfering with the cognition of the enemy based on the speed and quality of the cognitive confrontation.”[29] Such a struggle will replace traditional warfare concepts that have emphasized control over physical domains such as land, air, and sea. This extends the concept from purely social media manipulation towards an operational application that US military planners may need to worry about.
China has read Clausewitz, and PLA analysts recognize that war “is ultimately a contest of human will. The key to victory is the ability to impose one’s will on the audience. Cognitive domain warfare takes people’s will, spirit, and psychology as the goal of confrontation, strengthens one’s own will and weakens the enemy’s will.”[30] They recognize that modern technology, including generative AI, has increased the ability to target the cognitive domain with “cognitive ammunition.” Yang Cunshe talks of increasing the fog of war for the opponent through cognitive interference, confusion, and blocking in order to increase the likelihood of the opponent making wrong decisions and actions.
The PLA has long extolled “disintegrating the enemy” via politico-psychological attacks and subversion as a means of undermining an opponent’s will to fight.[31] Chinese researchers appear to be interested in exploring methods of impacting key decision-makers, rather than just the general public. They are also interested in various physical means of targeting and affecting human targets beyond social media and other information systems.
Evidence of this is seen in Chinese military analysts writing about Cognitive Domain Operations, which is defined narrowly and focused on degrading both the military will to fight and generating friction and uncertainty. As one trio wrote:
Cognitive domain operations take the human brain as the main combat space and focus on striking, weakening, and dismantling the enemy’s will to fight, using human psychological weaknesses such as fear, anxiety and suspicion as a breakthrough point, focusing on soft-kill methods to create an atmosphere of insecurity, uncertainty and mistrust within the enemy, and increasing their internal friction and decision-making doubts.[32]
Some Chinese writers think in terms of multi-domain operations and creating dilemmas just as US joint doctrine authors do. In this regard, one author admits that physically destroying enemy decision-making centers, command hubs, and early warning systems is necessary. But he goes on to stress the greater need to work at “soft killing” through cognitive shaping, induction, intervention, and control, by embedding cognitive domain operations into “hard destruction” efforts to generate an asymmetric advantage.[33]
Some PRC researchers feel that the emerging metaverse will vastly expand the target set and success rate for CDO.[34] Some others write in terms of hearts and minds and impacting the emotions of target audiences.[35] Other scholars are more technologically oriented and see the potential for cognitive enhancement through Brain-Computer Interfaces.[36] As reported by Elsa Kania, the Chinese are interested in more than the employment of modern information technologies. Their research programs include work in brain sciences, human enhancement, biotech, as well as military applications of neuroscience.[37]
Chinese officials do not anticipate that the application of cognitive sciences and technologies will be used only against adversaries. They envision employing these technologies to enhance their own human performance as well. As noted in the CCP’s leading theoretical journal:
Brain Strengthening is to enhance human cognitive functions by means of neurofeedback technology, electromagnetic stimulation technology, etc., to improve the effectiveness of military training of personnel and enhance their combat capability. Real-time neurofeedback techniques can train and reshape the brain to improve its cognitive functions, thereby enhancing cognitive combat capabilities.[38]
Russia’s Version
There is little in the Russian literature that discusses Cognitive Warfare in those terms. However, indirect modes of warfare are a familiar strain in Russian scholarship and practice, including notable writings about ‘Subversion Wars’ (Myatezhevoyna) during the Cold War.[39] Moscow has employed so-called “active measures,” including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, as well as limited coercive measures, to advance its interests for generations.[40] The Russian intelligence services are well-practiced in designing and conducting campaigns to utilize coercive actions and information tools.[41] Western analysts tend to divide Russian practice through various lenses, including propaganda, information operations, or disinformation.[42]
The latest wrinkle in Moscow’s longstanding practice is the exploitation of social media, which is seen as an extension of the battlespace.[43] Election interference in Europe and the United States is another aspect of this playbook, but a critically important one to deflect if we expect to preserve democratic freedom.[44]
While the term may not be common, the pursuit of cognitive effects is clear. President Putin’s advisors brag openly about the Kremlin’s influence campaigns. “Foreign politicians talk about Russia’s interference in elections and referendums around the world,” one such advisor stated, but “In fact, the matter is even more serious: Russia interferes in your brains, we change your conscience, and there is nothing you can do about it.”[45] Experts warn that a general understanding of Russia’s malign influence playbook is lacking.[46]
The closest concept to Cognitive Warfare is the Russian concept of Reflexive Control. This has been defined as consisting of “transmitting motives and grounds from the controlling entity to the controlled system that stimulate the desired decision. The goal of reflexive control is to prompt the enemy to make a decision unfavorable to him.”[47] This definition notes a key requirement: the need to tailor false information to the specific target, to impact the target’s responses and reactions. Reflexive control involves targeting decision-making through multiple vectors — adversary information processing, as well as emotional, psychological, and cultural frames within which decisions are made. Reflexive control appears to have evolved in Russian discussions and is now displaced by perception management.[48]
As early as 2010, influential Russian military authors noted the superiority of Western military power and began to stress the need for more asymmetric approaches.[49] This idea was expanded upon in subsequent articles, which saw a role for information confrontation to disorganize military command and control and state administration.[50] They further extended their thinking to stress the role of non-military attacks in what they labeled the Initial Period of War (IPW). They argued that this period can be decisive in future wars, and that it would include subversive acts, provocations, information operations, and psychological attacks in conjunction with military operations.[51] Their assessments also found that success could be accomplished by the employment of “military, economic, and IT measures in combination with efficient psychological information campaigns.”[52] These authors later argued for a concept called New Generation Warfare (NGW), a “new” form dominated by “information and psychological warfare seeking to achieve superiority.”[53] The Russian Chief of Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, expanded on this aspect in his noted talk on future warfare, going so far as stating that “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”[54]
There has been a recent link between Russia’s indirect methods and cognitive warfare produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). According to this research, “The primary objective of Russian cognitive warfare is to shape its adversaries’ decision-making and erode our will to act.” [55] Their study identifies the multi-modal character of Russia’s disinformation efforts. The Kremlin uses all platforms that transmit information, not just social media, but conferences, international frameworks, diplomatic channels, and influential individuals as means of employing Cognitive Warfare. According to the analysts at ISW, Russia’s version goes well beyond the dissemination of information and includes physical activities in peace, crisis, and war. These physical means include military exercises, sabotage, cyber-attacks, combat operations, and exaggerations of Russia’s military capabilities and battlefield progress.
This was not news to dedicated scholars of the Russian way of war.[56] In both theory and practice, the Russians employ a broader conception of war than most Western states.[57] This includes forms of subversion against political leaders and the general population, as well as other hostile measures that combine physical and cognitive means and effects.[58] Like the Chinese, Russian writers are becoming less concerned with attrition of the opponent’s order of battle and increasingly interested in targeting the adversary’s perception and will. To be sure, traditional military means are not overlooked either, as they too can impact perception and will. More recent scholarship highlights the potential impact of Artificial Intelligence on Russian disinformation efforts.[59]
United States
The earliest US author on this topic is James Lewis from CSIS. His in-depth 2018 study of cyber conflict highlighted the generation of what he termed “cognitive effects.” The goal in future conflict, Lewis concluded, “is not a kinetic effect (achieved with shells and bombs), but a cognitive effect, in other words, manipulating information to change thoughts and behavior. The strategic goal is to influence morale, cohesion, political stability, and, ultimately, to reduce the opponent’s will to counteract.” [60] His view aligns well with Russian thinking and the PLA.
The US intelligence community has monitored this development as well. In its annual threat assessments, both in 2022 and 2024, the Director of National Intelligence devoted coverage to the evolution of Chinese writings from psychological warfare to CDO, which they describe as combining psychological warfare with cyber operations to shape adversary behavior and decision-making. The assessment also noted that the PLA is looking at generative AI to generate synthetic media, including deepfakes.[61]
Analysts at RAND have identified China’s growing interest in systems and information confrontation.[62] One RAND researcher, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, has extensively studied the PLA’s development of Cognitive Domain Operations.[63]
While the Chinese military seems intensely interested in cognitive warfare, the American professional military journals are fairly quiet. Yet, there have been few articles in the professional journals. One pair of Marine officers wrote about how CDO is tied to Maneuver Warfare because of its emphasis on human will (and presumably psychological dislocation) and argued that “the United States must develop its approach to CW—defensively as well as offensively.”[64]
One relatively recent article tied Cognitive Warfare to actions below the threshold of warfare, the so-called ‘gray zone.’[65] This seems to be tied to a very limited reading of both Chinese and Russian publications. The article’s criticism of Joint doctrine was noteworthy, as were its series of recommendations to enhance the readiness of the Joint warfighting community. The subject is not entirely unknown to readers of this journal.[66]
Assessment
There are many and varied definitions of this topic, and its complexity is exacerbated by the nature of the technologies involved, including those in the cognitive and neurosciences. It is further complicated by vague connections to larger conceptions like gray zone tactics and influence operations. The literature is scattered and contains limited evidence on tactics and technologies being considered.
Cognitive warfare could be viewed as a concept that may help promote the cognitive domain and squeeze out “the ounces of cognitive effect” the JCS Chairman has called for.[67] While I have some reservations about introducing a new term into a crowded field, the term “cognitive” is superior to broad terms like information or influence. Psychology is a broad field, and cognition narrows the subject to key features. It directs attention to the target and desired effect. I am less enthralled with the “warfare” label and think the Chinese terminology is better.
Arguably, some of the effects expected by the conduct of Cognitive Warfare can be conceived as part of the under-appreciated concept of subversion.[68] Some scholars believe we have entered an age of algorithm-fueled propaganda and superpowered subversion.[69] This is a valid term, but it is not traditionally employed in the US military lexicon. A RAND study almost two decades ago found the term vague at best.[70] It has not become any clearer over the last two decades, given the proliferation of terms.
The term “cognitive” is superior to broad terms like information or influence.
Scholars in this field have addressed cognitive warfare as a form of subversion. This would be fine if we limited the concept to non-military targets by non-military forces. The writings and efforts by the PLA and Russian military would beg to differ here and suggest that more than informational subversion is involved.
Subversion is not traditionally seen as a complement or component directed at conventional forces in warfare as understood in the West. It is clear that China and Russia expect to exploit psychological and cognitive effects in wartime as well, and seek to target military decision-making and combat effectiveness. We should expect military formations and their leaders to be targets as well. In short, the employment of cognitive confrontation against national security leaders or military commanders and their staff in wartime does not square with subversion.
If US adversaries were solely oriented on manipulating domestic audiences, a strong argument could be made that labeling this as a form of “warfare” over-militarizes the problem and distorts the search for solutions that would best address the issue. But as China and Russia use both intelligence and military assets, and seek to target political and military command systems, Cognitive Warfare seems to warrant greater consideration over subversion.
Analytical Framework
To help promote the potential development of this concept, we will need an analytical framework that explains the scope of the cognitive domain and the potential for applications of maneuver/confrontation in that domain. To grasp the potential of cognitive warfare, including its offensive use and appropriate defensive countermeasures, a broader analytical framework was conceived that captures a range of perspectives and authors. This framework helps define the potential scale and scope of the concept and its applications. Figure 2 offers an initial depiction to stimulate discussion and debate.
This framework depicts a larger or more comprehensive conception of cognitive warfare that captures both offensive and defensive contributions. The matrix reflects a continuum of targets—from individuals to collective populations—along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis separates actions and technologies that degrade human cognition (entire lower half of the matrix) from those that enhance individual decision-making (upper left) and those that counter cognitive warfare by improving social cohesions and resilience (upper right quadrant). Along the vertical continuum, political decision-making processes and military commands are in the middle of the matrix.
Figure 2. Analytic Framework for Cognitive Warfare/Domain Operations
As seen in the literature review, most of the research focuses on cognitive degradation, especially through the manipulation of social media against target societies (lower right quadrant). The majority of PLA authors fall in the lower half of the matrix, emphasizing the projected need to successfully apply information confrontation against a sophisticated, large-scale competitor. But they also include discourse on enhancing human performance and strengthening civil society. Overall, Chinese military authors touch upon every quadrant as opposed to Western analysts, who look at social media manipulation.
The most interesting quadrant is the individual block, which would address how we prepare future leaders to be able to design and conduct campaigns, as well as detect and deflect adversary Cognitive Domain campaigns. In this quadrant, we can conceive of applications of neurosciences and AI-enabled agents to enhance the cognitive function of military commanders and staffs through machine learning and brain-computer interfaces (BCI) of various types.[71] There are advances in BCI technologies that may extend the ability of decision-makers and warfighting operators to make sense of their situational context and make timely decisions.[72] DARPA is funding projects that examine how to augment human cognition via its SCEPTER study.[73] Investments targeting enhanced decision augmentation are represented in this portion of the matrix, as well as defensive measures to thwart neurological weapons and technologies. The legal, moral, and ethical framework for this work should be established first.
The converging role of AI and the neurosciences is going to impact command and control, and should include an ability to detect and deflect adversary CDO.[74]
Revised Definition
Accepting this framework would require some modifications to how we define Cognitive Warfare. Rather than just manipulating or degrading target audiences, the scope of Cognitive Warfare would have to incorporate efforts to develop and attain cognitive advantage at both the individual and collective level, as well as detecting and defending against cognitive domain operations.
This leads to a revision of my original definition: “The application of information and cognitive sciences to enhance or degrade the decision-making process and resulting behavior of political and military leaders, and civilian society, in order to obtain a positional advantage in the information environment and designated political objectives.” This is a concise initial stab that can be refined. It is not the final answer, but it does capture the offense/defense or enhancement/ degradation continuum to a greater degree than others.
Revision of Information Operation
Advancing the concept will face an uphill battle with the existing crowded terminological minefield in information warfare. A conceptual schema for placing Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO) that builds upon the existing joint information operations taxonomy is presented in Figure 3. A few adaptations are embedded in this proposed schema. This deliberately excludes operational security and deception as inherent to sound operational planning. Consideration could be given to including public media engagement for both domestic and foreign audiences. The interface between CDO and MISO needs further study regarding a division of labor. The inclusion of CDO within the joint doctrine pertains solely to the military’s use of or defense against CDO, and is not intended to suggest applications to domestic contexts.
Figure 3. Relationship of Information Operations and Cognitive Domain Operations
Tomorrow’s Cognitive Confrontation
The convergence of physical and moral forces during conflict will continue in this century. The advances in neuroscience, brain sciences, computational technologies, and AI-enabled models have altered the strategic environment and should change how we conceive of and prepare for conflict. These advances have enhanced the ability of competitors to “expanding the attack surface that foreign adversaries can exploit using cognitive manipulation.”[75] As the technological advances in artificial general intelligence (AGI) and machine learning become more operational, they can create mass disruption using low-cost but possibly impactful forms of influence. In the near term, distinguishing between real and manufactured products will become more difficult, if not impossible. The orchestration of physical and cognitive means to generate changes in human behavior and decision-making will thus accelerate with the advances in cognitive and neurosciences. The eventual development of AGI offers the potential for the perfect storm in Cognitive Warfare. A pro-Chinese influence operation in 2022 involved video content with AI-generated fictitious ‘people’ acting as newscasters, created using artificial intelligence techniques. In the future, competitors will continue to experiment with AI technologies, producing increasingly convincing media that are harder to detect and verify.[76]
Some states will find these technologies uniquely suited to sow divisions and undermine public support in free and open Western societies. Ongoing advances in generative AI will undoubtedly promote the proliferation of deepfakes.[77]
As authoritarian states such as Russia and China exploit these technologies, the global competition in influence or cognitive operations is going to intensify. Studies have identified variation in methods but convergence in narratives between Russian and Chinese foreign information manipulation and interference operations.[78] Veteran intelligence experts believe the United States is losing the battle for cognitive superiority.[79] However, the US government has shuttered intelligence and law enforcement cells and agencies designed to thwart foreign malign information efforts.[80] An objective assessment of this challenge suggests it is misguided and should be reconsidered. Strategies to address authoritarian influence campaigns, including Cognitive Warfare, need to be developed.[81] Our special operations personnel bring a lot to this arena, coupled with the cyber and information professionals.[82] Embracing the conceptual challenge and addressing capabilities is the first step toward reversing this widening gap.
Conclusion
Information warfare has a long historical foundation in conflict. The concept is linked to our understanding of war’s fundamental nature and its essential element of human will. New technologies and methods have altered how information and beliefs can be manipulated to generate effects that impact will and its underlying beliefs, which are producing changes in war’s evolving character today. These technologies can also enhance or degrade critical decision-making processes and influence the key contributions that human expertise brings to bear.
Whatever we choose to call it, ignoring our adversaries in this field places the Nation in peril. The United States is presently underprepared to contest intrusions in its information space and will remain so until we recognize the problem and conceive of a more holistic counter approach. Mastering the opportunities and vulnerabilities within the cognitive domain will be increasingly relevant to strategic success in the 21st Century.
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End Notes
[1] For example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence once housed the Foreign Malign Influence Center which is focused on mitigating threats to democracy and US national interests from external sources.
[2] Michael J. Mazarr, Ryan Bauer, Abigail Casey, Sarah Heintz, and Luke J. Matthews, The Emerging Risk of Virtual Societal Warfare: Social Manipulation in a Changing Information Environment, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019); Elina Treyger, Joe Cheravitch, and Raphael Cohen, Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022); Nathan Beuachamp Mustafaga, Chinese Next Generation Psychological Warfare: The Military Applications of Emerging Technologies and Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, June 2023).
[3] Matthew Ingram, “What should we do about the algorithmic amplification of disinformation? “ Columbia Journalism Review, March 11, 2021, https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/what-should-we-do-about-the-algorithmic-amplification-of-disinformation.php
[4] As noted by James Giordano, “Is Neuroscience the Future of Warfare?,” Defence IQ, April 17, 2019, https://www.defenceiq.com/defence-technology/articles/neuroscience-and-future-warfare-1;
[5] The weaponization of social media for conflict is best captured in Peter Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018); David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, How Social Media is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017).
[6] For a distinctive exception, see Todd Schmidt, “The Missing Domain of War: Achieving Cognitive Overmatch on Tomorrow’s Battlefield,” Modern War Institute, April 7, 2020, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/missing-domain-war-achieving-cognitive-overmatch-tomorrows-battlefield/
[7] Colin Gray, “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?” Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2014.
[8] François du Cluzel, “Cognitive Warfare, A Battle for the Brain,” NATO, Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, VA, 2018.
[9] Andrew Radin, Cyber-enabled, Social Media-based Influence Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2679-1.html).
[10] Robert “Jake” Bebber, “Cognitive Competition, Conflict, and War: An Ontological Approach,” Hudson Institute, 2024, 12.
[11] Bernard Claverie1 and François du Cluzel, “The Cognitive Warfare Concept,” NATO Innovation Hub (2020), https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/CW%20article%20Claverie %20du%20Cluzel%20final_0.pdf.
[12] Bernard Claverie and François Du Cluzel. “Cognitive Warfare”: The Advent of the Concept of “Cognitics” in the Field of Warfare,” in Bernard Claverie, Baptiste Prébot, Norbou Buchler and François du Cluzel, eds., Cognitive Warfare: The Future of Cognitive Dominance, NATO Collaboration Support Office, 2022, 2–1.
[13] To capture the growing breadth of research, see Olga Chiriac, “Military applications of cognitive sciences: cognitive warfare, matter of perception and misperception,” International Scientific Conference, Strategies XXI Bucharest (2022), 474-484; Jean-Marc Rickli, Federico Mantellassi and Gwyn Glasser, “Peace of Mind: Cognitive Warfare and the Governance of Subversion in the 21st Century,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Policy Brief No. 9, August 2023; Jean Lauglois-Berthelot and Didier Bazalgette, “Chinese Army Cognitive Warfare: Challenges for the Next Direction of Operations,” 2023, https://hal.science/hal-04253095v1; Irene Pujol Chica and Quynh Dinh Da Xuan, “The Battle for the Mind: Understanding and Addressing Cognitive Warfare and its Enabling Technologies,” IE Center for the Governance of Change, April 2024, https://static.ie.edu/CGC/CGC_TheBattleofTheMind_2024.pdf.
[14] Koichiro Takagi, “New Tech, New Concepts: China’s Plans for AI and Cognitive Warfare,” War on the Rocks, April 13, 2022; Koichiro Takagi, “The Future of China’s Cognitive Warfare: Lessons from the War in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, July 22, 2022; Taro Nishikawa, “The Mind Is a Battlefield: Lessons from Japan’s Security Policy on Cognitive Warfare,” 49Security, February 22, 2023, https://fourninesecurity.de/en/authors/taro-nishikawa.
[15] Prasun K. Sengupta, “All in the Mind: China has developed blueprint to dominate perceptions, narratives without need for actual conflict,” Force India, online, April 25, 2025, https://forceindia.net/feature-report/all-in-the-mind/.
[16] Commander Jeremy (Yen-ming) Chen, ROC Navy, “The Challenges Taiwan Faces in Cognitive Warfare and Its Impact on US–Taiwan Relations,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (Spring, 2025): 89–102.
[17] Chien Li-chung and Jason Pan “Research center set up to combat cognitive warfare,” Taipei Times, January 19, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/01/19/2003812310.
[18] Tzu-Chieh Hung and Tzu-Wei Hung, “How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan’s Anti-Disinformation Wars,” Journal of Global Security Studies 7, no. 4 (December 2022): 1–18.
[19] Yang Wenzhe, “How to Win Intelligentized Warfare by Analyzing what are Changed and What are Unchanged,” (在变与不变中探寻智能 化战争制胜之道 ) Jiefangjun Bao, 22 October 2019.
[20] A detailed analysis of PLA writings can be found at Josh Baughman, “The People’s Liberation Army at the Nexus of Mind and Technology to Shape the Cognitive Battlefield,” in Nicholas Wright, Michael Mikalaucic and Todd Veazie, eds., Human, Machine, War How the Mind-Tech Nexus Will Win Future Wars (Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, March 2025).
[21] Wang Hongyou [汪洪友], “Fight Cross-Domain Asymmetric Warfare,” [打好跨域非对称作战], PLA Daily, August 29, 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-08/29/content_242008.htm
[22] He Fuchu, “The Future Direction of the New Global Revolution in Military Affairs” [世界新军事革命未来走向], Reference News, August 24, 2017, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190823210313/ http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/24/c_129687890.htm. Thanks to Elsa Kania for identifying this source.
[23] Guo Yunfei, “Cognitive Warfare Has Entered the Era of Combat for Brain Control,” Qiushi Magazine, June 2, 2020. http://www.qstheory.cn/llwx/2020-06/02/c_1126063647.htm.
[24] Sangkuk Lee, “China’s ‘Three Warfare’s: Origins, Applications, and Organizations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (2014): 198–221; Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfare’s, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013.
[25] Peter Mattis, “China’s Three Warfare’s in Perspective,” War on the Rocks, January 30, 2018.
[26] For a sample of Chinese commentary on cognitive warfare or CDO see Li Minghai, “The cognitive domain is becoming the main battlefield,” (认知域正成为未来智能化混合战争主战场)
Global Times, March 16, 2022, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/47DoZ45dMzV; Sun Zhiyou and Sun Haitao, “Exploring the Way to Win in Cognitive Domain Operations,” [探寻 认知域作战制胜之道] PLA Daily, September 1, 2022, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022- 09/01/content_323230.htm; Zhang Guangsheng, Li Yongli and Wang Haoxian, “A Brief Analysis of the Basics of Cognitive Domain Operations,” [浅析认知域作战的基本要义] PLA Daily, September 8, 2022, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/ content/2022-09/08/content_ 323692.htm; Liu Haijiang, “The Key to Accurately Deepening the Study of Cognitive Domain Operations,” [把准深化认知域作战研 究的关键], PLA Daily, April 25, 2023; Li Xiaoyang, “Intelligent Communication: An Important Field for Cognitive Domain Operations” [智能传播:认知域作 战的重要场域], PLA Daily, April 18, 2023; Huang Yanlong, Wu Qiong, and Jiang Rile, “Intelligent Algorithms: A Decisive Weapon in Cognitive Domain Operations,” ([智 能算法:认知域作战的制胜利器), PLA Daily, March 21, 2023. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2023-03/21/ content_ 335982.htm.
[27] Duan Wenling and Liu Jiali, “Cognitive confrontation on the social media battlefield,” [社交媒体战场上的认知对抗PLA Daily, February 2, 2023, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/4931739.html.
[28] Liu Huiyan, Xiong Wu, Wu Xianliang, and Mei Shunliang, “Several Thoughts on Promoting the Construction of Cognitive Domain Operations Equipment for the Omni-Media Environment,” [“全媒体环境下推进认知域作战装备发展的几点思考”], National Defense Technology [国防科技] 39, no. 5 (October, 2018). Quoted in William Marcellino, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Amanda Kerrigan, Lev Navarre Chao, and Jackson Smith, “The Rise of Generative AI and the Coming Era of Social Media Manipulation 3.0,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, September 2023), 16.
[29] Brent Eastwood, “A Smarter Battlefield?: PLA Concepts for ‘Intelligent Operations’ Begin to Take Shape,” Jamestown Foundation, February 15, 2019.
[30] Yang Cunshe, “Quasi-Cognitive Domain Combat, Exploring the characteristic and development trends of cognitive domain operations,” Military Forum, August 16, 2022; http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/ 2022-08/16/content_322064.htm. On how PLA analysts see the impact of Generative AI, see Chen Dongheng and Xu Yan, “Generative AI: A New Weapon for Cognitive Confrontation” [生成式 AI: 认知对抗的新武 器], PLA Daily, April 4, 2023; Zhang Guangsheng and Tian Ling, “How Generative AI Will Affect Future Warfare,” [生成式AI如何影响未来战争], PLA Daily, April 18, 2023.
[31] Jacqueline N. Deal, “Disintegrating the Enemy: The PLA’s Info-Messaging,” Parameters 50, no.3 (Autumn 2020): 5–16; Evan Montgomery and Toshi Yoshihara, “Conquering Taiwan by Other Means: China’s Expanding Coercive Options,” Washington Quarterly 48, no. 1 (2025): 143–163.
[32] Zhang Guangsheng, Li Yongli, and Wang Haoxian, “A Brief Analysis of the Basics of Cognitive Domain Operations,” [浅析认知域作战的基本要义], PLA Daily, September 8, 2022, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-09/08/content_ 323692.htm.
[33] Yang Longxi, “Aiming at the Future War and Fighting the Cognitive ‘Five Battles,” (“瞄准未来战争打好认知 ‘五仗’”) PLA Daily, August 23, 2022. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-08/23/content_322554.htm.
[34] Chen Dongheng, Zhai Chan, and Feng Yaru, “Metaverse: A new highland for cognitive warfare in the future,” PLA Daily, March 3, 2022, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-03/03/content_310602.htm
[35] Zhang Zhiwei, “Cognitive Domain Operations from the Perspective of Intelligence: Emotional Conflict Becomes a Prominent Attribute of Cognitive Domain Operations,” [智能化视阈下的认知域作战:情感冲突成为认知域作战突 出属性] PLA Daily, December 8, 2022.
[36] Li Yue and Liu Gang, “Brain-Computer Interface Technology Has Made New Progress,” [脑机接口技术又有新进展], Ministry of National Defense Network, August 8, 2023, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/ szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-08-18&paperNumber=11&articleid=912797, cited by Josh Baugham, 252; Staff, “Brain-computer interface technology rapidly evolves in China, expected to form a new quality productive force,” Global Times, March 14, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202403/1308834.shtml.
[37] Elsa B. Kania, “Minds at War: China’s Pursuit of Military Advantage through Cognitive Science and Biotechnology,” 8, no. 3 PRISM (2018): 83–101.
[38] “Cognitive Domain Warfare Has Entered the Era of Struggle for Brain Control,” Qiushi Magazine, June 2, 2020, https://chinascope.org/archives/32555
[39] On Messner’s concept of Subversion War, see Ofer Fridman, Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare:’ Resurgence and Politicisation (London: Hurst, 2018), 57–73.
[40] For evidence of Russian activity inside the United States see Clint Watts. “Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,” Statement prepared for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017; https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-cwatts-033017.pdf; Thomas Rid, “Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,” Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U. S. Senate, March 30, 2017. See also US Department of State, Kremlin-Funded Media: RT and Sputnik’s Role in Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem, Special Report (Washington, DC: Global Engagement Center, January 2022), https://www.state.gov/report-rt-and-sputniks-role-in-russias-disinformation-and-propaganda-ecosystem.
[41] The literature on Russian disinformation efforts is deep. See Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” 27, no. 1 Journal of Slavic Military Studies (2014): 101–30; Kier Giles, et al, The Russian Challenge, (London: Chatham House Report, June 2015); Martin Kragh and Sebastian Asberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence through Public Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish Case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 6 (2017): 773–816. For a comprehensive study of Russian methods, see Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2020).
[42] Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.htm; Keir Giles, “Russian Cyber and Information Warfare in Practice,” Chatham House, December 14, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/ russian-cyber-and-information-warfare-practice.
[43] For useful insights from the US military see T. S. Allen and A. J. Moore, “Victory without Casualties: Russia’s Information Operations,” Parameters 48, no. 1 (Spring, 2018): 59–71; Buddhika B. Jayamahaa and Jahara Matisek, “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace,” Parameters 48, no. 4 (Winter, 2018–2019): 11–23.
[44] Oliver Backes and Andrew Swab, “Cognitive Warfare: The Russian Threat to Election Integrity in the Baltic States,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 2019; Report of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, On Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 US Election, Washington, DC (2020), www.intelligence. senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ report_volume5.pdf.
[45] Vladislav Surkov quoted in Heather Conley, et al, Playbook 2: The Enablers, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2019), v.
[46] Heather Conley, James Minz, Ruslan Stefanov and Martim Vladimirov, The Kremlin Playbook Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, Center for Strategic and International Studies (October 13, 2016).
[47] For an assessment of reflexive control see Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004): 237–256; updated at Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements” McLean, VA: MITRE, August 2019, https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/prs-19-1004-russian-military -thought-concepts-elements.pdf.
[48] For insights on the evolution of reflexive control, see Keir Giles, James Sherr and Anthony Seaboyer, “Russian Reflexive Control,” Royal Military College of Canada, October 2018, 5.
[49] This section relies heavily on the work of Tim Thomas for the following section, see Timothy Thomas, The Chekinov-Bogdanov Commentaries of 2010-2017: What Did They Teach Us About Russia’s New Way of War?, McLean, VA, Mitre Corporation, November 2020.
[50] S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetrical Actions to Maintain Russia’s Military Security,” Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) no. 3 (2010): 6; S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Influence of the Indirect Approach on the Nature of Modern Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) no. 6 (2011): 6.
[51] S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War and their Influence on a Country’s Preparations for Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) no. 11 (2012): 24-25.
[52] Quoted by Thomas, “The Chekinov-Bogdanov Commentaries,” 27.
[53] S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “On the Nature and Content of Wars of a New Generation,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) no. 10 (2013): 22.
[54] Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” Military Review (January/February, 2016): 23-29. In the translation by Charles Bartels, Gerasimov forecasts a “new type war” with greater reliance on non-military means.
[55] Nataliya Bugayova and Kateryna Stepanenko, “A Primer on Russia’s Cognitive Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, June 30, 2025.
[56] On Russia’s use of various forms of subversion see Andreas Krieg, Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023), 119–145.
[57] For a comprehensive assessment of enduring elements of Russian military thinking and strategic precepts, see Michael Kofman, et al, Russian Military Strategy Core Tenets and Operational Concepts, CNA, August 2021.
[58] Ben Connable, Stephanie Young, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Raphael S. Cohen, Katya Migacheva, and James Sladden, Russia’s Hostile Measures (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
[59] Claudia Wallner with Simon Copeland and Antonio Giustozzi, “Russia, AI and the Future of Disinformation Warfare,” Royal United Services Institute, June, 2025.
[60] James Lewis, Cognitive Effect and State Conflict in Cyberspace. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018, 20, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/cognitive-effect-and-state-conflict-cyberspace
[61] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment, 2024, 37–38.
[62] See Edmund Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez Cooper and Mark Cozad, “People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020); Mark Cozad, et al., Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare: China’s Perspective on the US– China Military Balance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023).
[63] For an early and exceptional analysis see Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Cognitive Domain Operations: The PLA’s New Holistic Concept for Influence Operations,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 19, no. 16 (2019); Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Chinese Next-Generation Psychological Warfare: The Military Applications of Emerging Technologies and Implications for the United States,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA853-1.html.
[64] Majors Andrew MacDonald and Ryan Ratcliffe, USMC, “Cognitive Warfare: Maneuvering in the Human Dimension,” Naval Institute Proceedings (April, 2023).
[65] Michael J. Cheatham, Angelique M. Geyer, Priscella A. Nohle, and Jonathan E. Vazquez, “Cognitive Warfare: The Fight for Gray Matter in the Digital Gray Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly 114 (3rd Quarter, 2024), 83-91.
[66] See R. McCreight, “Neuro-Cognitive Warfare: Inflicting Strategic Impact via Non-Kinetic Threat,” Small Wars Journal, September 16, 2022; Douglas Wilbur, “The Challenge of AI-Enhanced Cognitive Warfare: A Call to Arms for a Cognitive Defense,” Small Wars Journal, January 22, 2025.
[67] Andrew White, “Chairman Caine Has an Algorithm for US Winning,” Breaking Defense, May 8, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/joint-chiefs-chairman-caine-has-an-algorithm-for-us-winning/
[68] Professor Hew Strachan of St. Andrews and Dr. Lukas Milevski from Leiden University make this point.
[69] Jill Kastner and William C. Wohlforth, “A Measure Short of War: The Return of Great-Power Subversion,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2021); Josh A. Goldstein and Girish Sastry, “The Coming Age of AI-Powered Propaganda,” Foreign Affairs, April 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/coming-age-ai-powered-propaganda; Lennart Maschmeyer, “A new and better quiet option? Strategies of subversion and cyber conflict,” Journal of Strategic Studies 46, no. 3 (2023): 570–594.
[70] Willian Rosenau, Subversion and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).
[71] Anika Binnendijk, Timothy Marler, and Elizabeth M Bartels, Brain Computer Interfaces, US Military Applications and Implications. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2020; Peter Bovet Emanuel, “Making Chameleons: Techno-shaped, Software-defined Special Operations Assemblages,” in James D. Kiras and Martijn Kitzen, eds., Into the Void: Special Operations After the War on Terror (London: Hurst, 2024); Anna Gielas, “Tip of the Spear, Edge of the Mind: Neurotechnology’s Roles in the Future of Special Operations,” SOF Support Foundation, May 2025, https://sofsupport.org/tip-of-the-spear-edge-of-the-mind-neurotechnologys-roles-in-the-future-of-special-operations/.
[72] For ideas see Nicholas Wright, “Enhancing the Humans in the Mind-Tech Nexus” and Timothy Grayson, “Breaking the OODA Loop: Human Machine Symbiosis to Manage Complexity and Accelerate Decision-Making as a Decisive Warfighting Advantage,” in Nicholas Wright, Michael Miklaucic, and Todd Veazie, eds., Human, Machine, War: How the Mind-Tech Nexus Will Win Future Wars (Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, 2025).
[73] SCEPTER stands for Strategic Chaos Engine for Planning, Tactics, Experimentation and Resiliency. Joe Phelan, “DARPA is funding AI to help make battlefield decisions,” Live Science, September 19, 2023, at https://www.livescience.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/darpa-is-funding-ai-to-help-make-battlefield-decisions.
[74] Lieutenant General Clint Hinote, US Air Force, (ret.) “Reimagining Command and Control with Human-Machine Teaming,” Special Capabilities Study Project, Defense Policy Paper, 2024.
[75] Bebber, 9.
[76] For insights on Chinese development of Deep Fakes see Graphika, “Deep Fake It Till You Make It: Pro-Chinese Actors Promote AI-Generated Video Footage of Fictitious People in Online Influence Operation,” February, 2023, https://www.graphika.com/reports/deepfake-it-till-you-make-it.
[77] Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur, “How Deepfake Videos are Used to Spread Disinformation,” New York Times (February 7, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake.html; Tiffany Hsu and Stuart A. Thompson, “A.I.’s Ease at Spinning Deception Raises Alarm,” New York Times, February 9, 2023, A1, A22.
[78] Tamás Matura, “Sino-Russian Convergence in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: A Global Threat to the US and Its Allies,” Center for European Policy Analysis, June 30, 2025.
[79] Renee Pruneau Novakoff, “Why the US Is Losing the Cognitive Competition,” Cipher Brief, October 16, 2025.
[80] The US government has curtailed centers at the FBI and State Department in order to reduce domestic censorship. David Siman-Tov, “The Trump Administration’s Withdrawal from the Fight Against Foreign Interference—Strategic Implications,” INSS Insight No. 2006, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University, July 7, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/trump-influence/.
[81] For substantial insights into China’s approaches and ideas to combat them, see Thomas G. Mahnken, Ross Babbage and Toshi Yoshihara, Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies against Authoritarian Political Warfare (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018).
[82] Jeremiah “Lumpy” Lumbaco, Cognitive Warfare to Dominate and Redefine Adversary Realities, Joint Special Operations University Press, Special Report 25-23, September 30, 2025.