In the 1960s, some analysts and scholars were convinced that the Soviet Union was on a trajectory to overtake the U.S. in industrial production and material satisfaction. In the 1980s, Japan’s efficient manufacturing prowess and high-profile purchases of U.S. real estate and entertainment companies caused concern about the end of American hegemony.4 In the 2020s, the fear is that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will chart a course to global dominance that displaces the U.S.-backed Western Liberal International Order (WLIO) by 2049 or earlier. Although the CCP could be successful in its efforts, the previous two examples indicate there is nothing preordained about
the Chinese communist 21st century. World politics and economics are rooted in complex adaptive systems (CAS) dynamics, and this plays to the strengths of the West—not to centralized political and economic systems like those of the CCP. If viewed solely as a unitary actor in military and economic terms, China seems like an indomitable kraken, spreading its tentacles around the world with coordinated, strategic purpose (see Figure 1.1). Or, in strictly military terms, the correlation of forces appears to favor the rising power at the expense of a declining U.S.—a seemingly hopeless and depressing scenario (see Figure 1.2). Yet, when perceived as a series
of interacting networks and social systems, China, led by the CCP, has many tensions, stressors, and internal challenges to manage. In short, there are many things keeping the leaders of the CCP up at night, and most of them emanate from their own people (see Figure 1.3). It is the purpose of this edited volume to highlight key challenges the CCP faces in its rise and contextualize the potential contribution of special operations to “competing for advantage”5 based on the CCP’s interests and vulnerabilities. Special operations’ main benefit to the Joint Force will likely be—as the epigraph from Sun Tzu suggests—“to attack the enemy’s strategy.”6 Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) actions on the ground will certainly draw from the range of core activities, but most of their effects will need to be overtly political. Competing for advantage below armed conflict to “overwhelm and/
or exhaust the adversary, competitor, or population”7 requires a special sensitivity to political effects—the accrual of national power through allies and partners, amplifying the natural headwinds faced by the CCP, encouraging complexity and unexpected problems in its plans, and frustrating its attempts to solidify diplomatic influence. In short, SOF in strategic competition is essential for shaping—not countering others in—the future operating environment. Strategic competition is fundamentally about seizing the initiative to change the incentive structures that drive behavior in the international system. The U.S., its allies, and its partners benefit from the residual hegemony of the post-World War II political and economic order, and while the CCP currently benefits as well, in the long-term, it knows that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has to transform the international order for the regime’s survival.8 Behavioral change among states depends upon risk–reward calculations of opportunities as they arise in the system, and these opportunities include elements of cooperation, competition, and conflict. It is entirely feasible that SOF support to strategic competition might entail contributing to opportunities for cooperation with Chinese counterparts in one area of responsibility and, in the process, complicate the calculations of the CCP on the risks and rewards of problematic actions in others. It is also entirely feasible that SOF’s main contribution could be in supporting Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multilateral, and Commercial (JIIM-C) efforts to generate networks across the Global South that are resilient to the negative political, economic, and environmental effects of CCP activity and thereby diplomatically interrupt a core CCP strategic interest in
consolidating control over its periphery. Competing for advantage, broadly speaking, means accruing power and influence in such a way that the adversary’s or competitor’s plans cannot be realized. To do so first requires two elements: (a) an appreciation of the adversary’s worldview, interests, and political culture and (b) a positive strategic vision for the future that is more compelling than the one put forward by the adversary or competitor. This volume focuses principally on the former, though it adds to the discussion about SOF’s support to the latter. More important, however, is the mindset underlying how the special operations enterprise
imagines itself contributing to strategic competition. In the future operating environment, SOF will need to reinterpret their value from providing a military effect to providing a political effect through military means. Amplifying national power for strategic advantage entails much more than eliminating enemies and networks from the battlefield. How SOF imagines itself and its activities in support of the JIIM-C in integrated campaigning will bear directly on the ability of the U.S. Government (USG) to seize the strategic initiative.
Link to Article: Competing for Advantage: The Chinese Communist Party, Statecraft, and Special Operations