Figure 1. Russell W. Volckmann at his guerrilla headquarters in North Luzon during the war. Three years leading resistance forces behind enemy lines made him one of the Army’s leading UW practitioners. When asked to write doctrine, he still studied other resistance movements.
“The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.”
Sir William Francis Butler, Charles George Gordon (1889)
“If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.”
Isaac Newton, letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory.”
Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (1951)
The instructors called the recruit “clumsy” and “unsuitable for jumping.” Another wrote that the recruit had arrived “without the foggiest idea” what the training was for. Once on the ground, instead of destroying messages, the radio operator kept them, in code and in clear, in notebooks. The Gestapo seized them. With them, the Germans could work the captured radio back to London as if nothing had happened, and London believed it. Three more agents were captured as they landed. The radio operator was Noor Inayat Khan, a children’s author before the war. Executed at Dachau in September 1944.
In 1942 the United States established the Office of Strategic Services, its wartime organization for intelligence and unconventional operations. Many of its recruits were what William Donovan called his “glorious amateurs.” Playing it by ear and making it up as they went were famous traits of the organization, although the OSS also developed increasingly systematic selection and training. The Americans were not alone. Britain’s Special Operations Executive, two years ahead and a model the OSS learned from, was sending agents into occupied France, and its F Section paid the bill. By F Section’s official ledger, 393 officers went into France. One hundred nineteen were arrested or killed. Of those arrested, only 17 came home. Some agents were parachuted into the Prosper network after the Germans had already taken it over.
The survivors, along with those who learned their trade with Detachment 101 in Burma and with the guerrillas of the occupied Philippines, brought home lessons paid for in blood. One of those survivors was Russell Volckmann, who stayed behind to lead the resistance in the mountains of North Luzon and later worked the partisan war in Korea, until a relapse of the stomach illness he had carried since the Philippines forced his evacuation. He was tasked to capture those lessons, and he wrote both of the Army’s first manuals on the subject, published in 1951: FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, the U.S. Army’s first doctrine for what is now called unconventional warfare, and its counterguerrilla companion, FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces.
The Feeling in the Force
Seventy-five years later, those manuals have descendants. Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, defines unconventional warfare, Congress has written that definition into law, and a schoolhouse at Fort Bragg teaches it. Yet a feeling is spreading through the force that none of it matters. Definitions are for academics. Doctrine slows units down. Theory, the line goes, is navel-gazing for people who have never had to “jack steel and shoot dots.” Real practitioners figure it out on the ground.
The feeling deserves a fair hearing. It also deserves an answer, because the force has already tested the alternative. The SOE and OSS were not operating without theory. Their decisions rested on assumptions about whom to select, how to train them, and which security checks to trust, and too many of those assumptions went unexamined. The bill came due in captured notebooks, compromised drop zones, and concentration camps.
The Case Against Theory
The strongest version of the argument comes from practitioners. Irregular warfare, they say, is the business of finding seams. The irregular looks for the uncovered flank, the lock that does not close, the loose corner of tile that can be pried up. Every line a theorist draws to define the field becomes one more seam to exploit. A definition will not help practitioners whose art begins where everyone else says to stop.
A second strand attacks the categories themselves. Calling one kind of war irregular implies that another kind is regular: tanks fighting tanks, ships sinking ships, a clean contest without people or politics. That war has never existed. If every war is irregular, the prefix adds nothing, and arguing over its boundaries is wasted motion.
A third strand is about time and process. Doctrine hardens into checklists. Staff procedures grow until the briefing consumes the window it was built to exploit. Adaptation in the field outruns the manuals, and by the time a lesson is published, the enemy has moved on.
Each strand holds some truth. Bad doctrine exists. Bloated process exists. The best tactics, techniques, and procedures often do come from the field long before they reach a manual. A defense of theory and doctrine that denies any of this is not worth reading.
The skeptics even have an unlikely ally. In Theory in Practice, organizational theorists Chris Argyris and Donald Schön described professionals who hold few stated theories but many effective ones in use. Their example was a school administrator who could not explain how he knew a school was in trouble, yet diagnosed the problem accurately after a visit and a few informal conversations. Every unit has someone like that. Often it is the best operator in the room.
Three Things, Not One
The case against theory usually treats three different things as one.
Theory offers an explanation of why something works, under what conditions, and where it may fail. It is an account of cause and effect beneath practice: why a resistance needs an underground, how a sponsor and an irregular partner combine into a single capability, why some denied areas can be reached and others cannot. Doctrine is the institution’s authoritative guidance for action, informed by theory, experience, and policy. It gives the force a common baseline to train against. In the Department of Defense’s long-standing definition, doctrine is “authoritative but requires judgment in application.” Process is the staff machinery built to apply doctrine: planning sequences, briefing formats, approval chains.
Many complaints that doctrine slows the operator down are complaints about process. A ninety-slide brief is a process failure. So is a planning sequence that cannot finish inside the decision window. Either one can be killed without touching FM 3-05. Other complaints may expose a flaw in doctrine or in the theory beneath it. The task is to identify which layer failed, then correct it.
Argyris and Schön supply the deeper answer. They distinguished a person’s espoused theory, the account given when asked how one would act in a situation, from the theory that actually drives behavior. In their words, “the theory that actually governs his actions is this theory-in-use.” The two often diverge, and the person often does not know it.
The practitioner who says theory does not matter is still working from one. Every decision about which seam to pick at, which partner to trust, or which risk to accept rests on assumptions about cause and effect. The administrator who could not explain his diagnosis still had a theory-in-use, whether or not he could articulate it. The question was never whether practitioners use theory. It is whether their theory can be examined, tested, revised, and shared, or remains largely private and beyond challenge. A written theory earns no exemption: if evidence contradicts it, the theory must change. A useful UW theory must state the conditions under which support to a resistance fails or does net harm. If it cannot, it is not yet a theory.
A team may assume that more weapons make a resistance more effective. That assumption rests on more than delivery: can the movement distribute them, employ them, and replace losses without exposing its networks? If more weapons bring more compromise than combat power, the team must rethink its explanation, not deliver more.
One Part of the Elephant
Few Americans knew unconventional warfare from the inside as well as Russell Volckmann. Three years at the head of a guerrilla army in North Luzon set him apart, and an Air Command and Staff College study later judged him the Army’s best-qualified officer to write the first doctrine. When the Army asked him to write it, he could have written down what he knew and called it finished.
He studied instead, learning from every source and existing theory he could find. The concept, he later explained, rested on his operational experience “but also upon every major Resistance Movement that could be researched.” For FM 31-20, the manual on fighting guerrillas, he drew on the German army’s wartime manual, Fighting the Guerrilla Bands. FM 31-21 cites T. E. Lawrence’s campaign in Arabia and draws on resistance in France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, Malaya, and Indochina. His own guerrillas had never had a codified structure, so for the teams that would organize and assist guerrillas, he borrowed the OSS Operational Group, name and all. He wrote alongside veterans of other wars: Aaron Bank of the OSS, Wendell Fertig of Mindanao, and Melvin Blair of Merrill’s Marauders.
That choice shows the limits of what one man can see. The old South Asian fable of the blind men and the elephant makes the same point. In John Godfrey Saxe’s retelling, six men each touch a different part of the animal and confidently describe the whole: a wall, a spear, a snake, a tree, a fan, a rope. Each has evidence. None has the whole animal. North Luzon was one part of the elephant. Occupied France, the Burmese jungle, and the Balkan Mountains were others. Three years behind enemy lines gave Volckmann reason to be heard. He also knew how much he had not seen.

Figure 2. The wise men and the elephant: the limits of any single vantage point. Adapted from the ancient South Asian fable of the blind men and the elephant and John Godfrey Saxe’s English verse retelling. Each observer has evidence, but even an expert sees only part of the whole.
What emerged from his study was larger than any one man’s war. FM 31-21 extended well beyond guerrillas behind enemy lines. It defined the resistance movement, described clandestine cells and civilian agents, organized auxiliaries for sabotage and support, and addressed propaganda, escape and evasion, and population control. The underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla forces of today’s definition grew from that foundation, and the line of doctrine that began with it still shapes how Special Forces think about unconventional warfare.
What the House Stands On
Unconventional warfare rests on a structure most practitioners never see, because they work at the top of it.
At the base is theory: an understanding of how resistance movements form, how a sponsor and an irregular partner become what Why Not UW? called a composite organism, two actors functioning as a single capability, and what that organism can and cannot do. Doctrine stands on theory.
Doctrine helps connect that understanding to everything that lets an option exist beyond a single team: the common language planners use, the policy that frames when the option applies, the authorities that permit it, and the funding that pays for it. These are not automatic products of doctrine; they require political and institutional decisions. The definition of unconventional warfare that the commanders of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Special Operations Command approved in 2009 did not stay in doctrine. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, enacted in November 2015, Congress adopted nearly the same wording for its counter-UW strategy requirement, changing a single “and” to “or.” The words of doctrine helped shape the words of law. Clear definitions cannot settle every legal question, but muddy ones make the task harder.
At the top sit operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and best practices. That is where practitioners live. From there, the layers below look like overhead, the way a foundation looks like wasted concrete to someone who has never seen a house without one.

Figure 3. What the house stands on demonstrates how theory leads to practice. Theory informs doctrine; doctrine supports shared language and the institutional case for an operational option. Field experience feeds back into the doctrine and theory beneath it.
Sociologist Andrew Abbott explained why the lower layers matter in The System of Professions. Professions, he argued, compete for jurisdiction: socially recognized control over a set of problems and the right to solve them. Technique alone is vulnerable because others can learn or take it over. Abstract knowledge helps a profession explain its work, connect particular cases, and defend or extend its claims. Medicine’s changing claims over alcoholism and obesity illustrate that competition. “Abstraction,” Abbott wrote, “enables survival in the competitive system of professions.”
The analogy has limits. UW is not a profession competing for clients. It is a capability competing with precision strikes, special-operations raids, sanctions, and conventional force to solve strategic problems. The mechanism is the same. A community that cannot explain what UW is, which problems it can address, why it may work, and where another option is better weakens its claim to a place in that discussion. Jurisdiction does not guarantee authorities and funding. Without it, they go to the options that can explain themselves.
Speaking the Same Language
Common language does more than satisfy Congress. It is how one planner knows what another means.
A definition is an agreement about meaning. It tells planners what an activity is called and where its boundaries lie. It does not, by itself, explain why the activity will work. That is theory’s job. Without a shared definition, every planning conversation either begins by negotiating vocabulary or, more often, skips the negotiation and proceeds on assumptions no one has checked.
Unconventional warfare suffers from this more than most terms. Put three planners in a room and say “UW.” One hears the overthrow of a hostile regime. Another hears support for an allied resistance under occupation. The third hears whatever Special Forces happen to be doing. All three nod. The meeting ends in apparent agreement, and the staff goes off to plan toward three different end states. Why Not UW? called the first of those readings overthrow bias, the habit of equating UW with only one possible use. Here it shows up as something simpler: a failure to speak the same language.
Research on expert teams explains why that failure matters. In “Shared Mental Models in Expert Team Decision Making,” psychologists Janis Cannon-Bowers, Eduardo Salas, and Sharolyn Converse argued that expert teams coordinate through shared knowledge of the task and of one another. Teammates who hold compatible mental models anticipate each other and adjust without stopping to talk it through. The result is coordination without conversation. Where those models are not shared, the team falls back on explicit communication, and explicit communication is hardest to sustain in exactly the moments that matter most.
Army doctrine already says so. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, lists seven principles: competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance. The doctrine most often invoked to justify improvisation places disciplined initiative beside shared understanding. Initiative depends on it. Without shared understanding, capable people act decisively toward different ends.
Aviation learned this lesson at a terrible price. On March 27, 1977, at Tenerife, a KLM Boeing 747 received its route clearance, the instructions for how to fly after departure, and the captain began his takeoff roll without a takeoff clearance. The first officer ended his readback with an ambiguous reference to being at takeoff. Fog prevented the controller from seeing the runway, and simultaneous transmissions interfered with warnings while a Pan Am 747 remained on it. Five hundred eighty-three people died. The official investigation identified takeoff without clearance as the fundamental cause and also identified inadequate language and other contributing circumstances.
The first officer and the controller were both trained professionals. Language was not the only failure that day. It was the one a definition could fix.
ICAO procedures now reserve “take off” for issuing or canceling a takeoff clearance. At every other moment, pilots and controllers say “departure.” One word was given one meaning because two meanings had helped kill 583 people.
Knowledge Flows Both Ways
Return to the skeptics’ best point. The best tactics, techniques, and procedures usually come from the field, not the schoolhouse. A lesson learned in the field, however, belongs to the team that learned it, and it leaves when they leave.
In The Knowledge-Creating Company, management theorists Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi described how organizations get past that limit. Their model has four modes of knowledge conversion. Socialization passes tacit knowledge from person to person through observation, imitation, and practice, the way an apprentice learns from a master. Externalization puts tacit knowledge into explicit concepts, models, and analogies. Combination joins explicit knowledge from different sources into a larger body. Internalization returns explicit knowledge to individuals, who absorb it until it becomes instinct. Then the cycle repeats.
Unconventional warfare runs on the same cycle. Socialization is the team room, where experience passes from senior to junior. Externalization is Volckmann at his desk, turning North Luzon into FM 31-21. Combination is doctrine joining the Philippines, Burma, occupied France, and Korea into one body of knowledge. Internalization is the next generation absorbing that doctrine until it no longer feels like doctrine at all.
A community that lives only in the team room has stalled at the first step. Its knowledge is real, but it sits in individual heads and lasts only as long as they serve. The OSS was ordered disbanded in September 1945. Much of what its people learned survived because a few of them, along with veterans of the Philippine resistance like Volckmann, wrote it down and taught it. Doctrine is how field experience outlives the people who earned it.
The Cost of Not Knowing
The cost of abandoning theory shows up in options never offered.
Who Speaks for UW? argued that unconventional warfare is seldom rejected at the decision table. It seldom arrives. Part of the reason is advocacy. Part is understanding. UW is not put forward as a strategic option largely because senior leaders do not understand what it is, and that includes some who wear green wool hats. An option no one in the room can define cannot be assessed. An option no one can assess is not offered. The test is simple. In a major planning effort, how often does unconventional warfare appear as a fully developed course of action with its own theory of victory, and how often as a task for Special Forces?
The same instinct now operates at institutional scale. In November 2026, a directive overhauling professional military education charged that it had traded “combat readiness for theory.” Some of its reforms, rigorous wargames and decision-forcing exams among them, deserve support. Every wargame, however, runs on a theory of cause and effect, and every exam tests one. Combat readiness is not the alternative to theory. It is built on it. Everyone in that debate says they want critical thinkers. A critical thinker with no theory to think with is left with experience alone, and experience covers only what has already happened to the person who has it.
The three bodies of research above explain how the loss compounds. Argyris and Schön show how the assumptions governing action drift from the account a practitioner gives. Nonaka and Takeuchi show that knowledge left tacit stays local: it can be passed from senior to junior, but it cannot be combined across teams or kept after they leave. Abbott shows why a field that cannot explain its work loses its claim on problems. Unexamined assumptions stay private. Private knowledge leaves with the people who hold it. A community that cannot explain its contribution loses the argument for support. At the end of the chain is an option left on the shelf and a force paying again for lessons it already learned.
Does Unconventional Warfare Theory Matter?
The radio operator’s instructors recorded their doubts. The organization sent Noor anyway and later accepted the enemy’s transmissions as genuine. Betrayal, German counterintelligence, and operational pressure all played a part. So did an organization that had not tested its own assumptions about selection, training, and radio security.
Theory does not replace judgment, courage, or experience in the field. It can be wrong. A theory that cannot be tested against evidence or revised after failure is a liability, no matter how elegant it sounds. Theory does not go to the battlefield. It goes into the people who do, and into the doctrine, definitions, authorities, and budgets that let their work reach beyond a single team. The real choice lies between assumptions that can be examined and corrected and those that remain private and unchallenged.
For planners and analysts, the first task is precision. When a staff uses the term unconventional warfare, someone should ask which meaning is in play: coercion, disruption, or overthrow; through or with; a resistance under occupation or an insurgency against a hostile government. A plan built on three silent definitions is three plans. The doctrinal and statutory definitions exist for exactly this purpose. They are planning tools. Before the first slide, the staff should state the end state (coerce, disrupt, or overthrow) and the relationship (through or with).
For practitioners, the task is externalization. The knowledge in the team room is the force’s most valuable and most perishable asset. Practitioners who have done the work owe the next generation more than war stories. They owe it the theory-in-use behind those stories, examined and written down, so it can be argued with, corrected, and taught. After every operation, the team should write down the assumption that made it work or fail, not only the action. That is how Volckmann’s generation built the foundation Special Forces still stands on. Disdain for theory leaves practice with nothing underneath it.
The lessons of unconventional warfare have been learned, relearned, and paid for again and again since Volckmann captured them in doctrine seventy-five years ago: its nature, its framework, how to organize for it, and its strengths and weaknesses. Practitioners who understand that inheritance stand on the shoulders of the giants who came before them. They still have to look, question, and revise. If they do, the next generation will not have to pay for those lessons again.
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Sources and Further Reading
A note on sources. Descriptions of how unconventional warfare is discussed and misunderstood in planning settings draw on the author’s participant observation across more than four decades in U.S. special operations, including UW doctrine work at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and service as Senior Irregular Warfare Advisor at U.S. Special Operations Command.
Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 8–9. On jurisdiction and abstract knowledge; source of the quotation on abstraction and survival.
Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), 6–7. Source of the distinction between espoused theory and theory-in-use and of the quotation on theory-in-use. The book’s discussion of problems in professional education includes the example of the school administrator with few espoused theories but effective theories-in-use.
Arthur G. Bedeian, “A Note on the Aphorism ‘There Is Nothing as Practical as a Good Theory’,” Journal of Management History. On the history of Lewin’s aphorism, which Lewin first used in 1943 and credited to an unnamed businessman.
Robert Bourne-Paterson, SOE in France, 1941–1945: An Official Account of the Special Operations Executive’s French Circuits (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2016). Bourne-Paterson’s 1946 official account, first published in 2016. Source of the ledger figures of 393 officers sent, 119 arrested or killed, and 17 of the arrested who came back, as quoted in WW2 Today.
Sir William Francis Butler, Charles George Gordon (London: Macmillan, 1889), chapter IV, 85. Epigraph, quoted as printed in the Macmillan edition. The line is frequently misattributed to Thucydides, and popular versions often alter its wording.
Janis A. Cannon-Bowers, Eduardo Salas, and Sharolyn Converse, “Shared Mental Models in Expert Team Decision Making,” in Individual and Group Decision Making: Current Issues, ed. N. John Castellan Jr. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993), 221–246. On shared mental models and implicit coordination in expert teams.
Central Intelligence Agency, “The ‘Glorious Amateurs’ of OSS.” On Donovan’s term for OSS personnel.
John Whiteclay Chambers II, “OSS Training During World War II,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 2 (June 2010). On the challenge of training the glorious amateurs: training built from scratch and almost overnight, which sometimes appeared confused and indecisive, and which encouraged students to improvise from principles.
Joshua Cline, “Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann,” Army Historical Foundation. On Volckmann writing FM 31-21 during his recovery. Guardia’s American Guerrilla attributes his evacuation from Korea to a relapse of a medical condition, most likely a severe stomach ulcer, incurred in the Philippines.
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, s.v. “doctrine.” Source of the definition of doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” NATO’s definition keeps the same wording. Since January 2019, the Joint Staff has described joint doctrine as “official advice” in which “the judgment of the commander is paramount” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Publications).
Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC, July 31, 2019). The seven principles of mission command.
Department of the Army, FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces (Washington, DC, February 1, 1951). Preceded by Infantry School Special Text ST 31-20-1 (September 1950); the February 1951 date is given in the 1955 edition that superseded it. Written by Volckmann; see Fowler.
Department of the Army, FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare (Washington, DC, October 5, 1951). Principal author Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann. The 1951 manuals used “guerrilla warfare”; the term “unconventional warfare” entered Army doctrine in 1955.
Department of War, Rebuilding the Warrior Ethos in Professional Military Education, memorandum, February 2026. Faults universities for teaching warfighters “what to think not how to think.” Critics of the reforms make the same claim from the other side, arguing that senior leaders must be critical thinkers who can understand different points of view.
Department of War, Reforming Professional Military Education to Forge Warfighters and Secure Victory, memorandum, November 9, 2026. See the Department’s release, reposted by Small Wars Journal, and coverage in The Hill, which quotes the memorandum’s charge that professional military education traded “combat readiness for theory.”
Maurice “Duc” DuClos, “Why Not UW? The Three Half-Truths Killing Unconventional Warfare,” The Unconventional Warfare Review, October 26, 2026.
Maurice “Duc” DuClos, “Who Speaks for UW?,” The Unconventional Warfare Review, November 8, 2026.
Engelsberg Ideas, “The Courage of Noor Inayat Khan.” Source of the SOE training assessments.
Christopher E. Fowler, “Forgetting Lessons Learned: The United States Army’s Inability to Embrace Irregular Warfare,” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2014). On Volckmann as the best-qualified officer to write the doctrine, his authorship of both FM 31-20 and FM 31-21, and his use of the German manual Fighting the Guerrilla Bands.
Mike Guardia, American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2010).
History Revealed, “Noor Inayat Khan: The Daring Life of the British WW2 ‘Spy Princess’.” On the notebooks of messages kept in code and in clear.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (July 16, 2014), publicly available edition consulted for this article. Doctrinal definition of unconventional warfare, which differs from the statutory definition in one word: doctrine reads “underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force,” the statute “underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force.” The definition is reproduced in Air Force doctrine on special operations core activities.
Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 169. Epigraph.
Chad Machiela, “Whole-of-Government Irregular Warfare Requires a Common Language,” Small Wars Journal, September 4, 2026. On shared vocabulary as the first step toward interagency irregular warfare, drawing on Paul Carlile’s distinction among syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic knowledge boundaries.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Public Law 114–92, enacted November 25, 2015, §1097(d). For purposes of the counter-UW strategy requirement, defines unconventional warfare as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.”
Isaac Newton, letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675 (Old Style; February 15, 1676, by modern reckoning), Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Epigraph. The image of standing on the shoulders of giants predates Newton; John of Salisbury attributed it to Bernard of Chartres in the Metalogicon (1159).
Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 61–62, 71. The SECI model of knowledge conversion.
Eugene G. Piasecki, “The Psywar Center, Part II: Creation of the 10th Special Forces Group,” Veritas 8, no. 1 (2012). Source of Volckmann’s statement that the Special Forces concept drew on “every major Resistance Movement that could be researched,” his drafting of the field manuals, and the OSS veterans who trained the first Special Forces group.
John Godfrey Saxe, “The Blind Men and the Elephant,” collected in The Poems of John Godfrey Saxe (1872). Verse retelling of an older South Asian fable; 1872 is the collection date, not a claim of first publication.
Secretary of Civil Aviation, Spain, report on the KLM and Pan Am collision at Tenerife, October 1978, published in ICAO Aircraft Accident Digest, Circular 153-AN/56. Source of the finding on inadequate language. On the phraseology rule that followed, see International Civil Aviation Organization, Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions (Doc 9870), appendix C: “take off” is to be used only when an aircraft is cleared for take-off or when a take-off clearance is cancelled; see also ICAO, Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444), chapter 12, and the ICAO phraseology reference guide published through SKYbrary.
Francis J. Suttill, Shadows in the Fog: The True Story of Major Suttill and the Prosper French Resistance Network (Stroud: History Press, 2014). On the collapse of the Prosper network.
Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 9621, “Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions,” September 20, 1945, effective October 1, 1945.
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann,” Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment. On Volckmann’s service in the Philippines and Korea and his authorship of FM 31-21.
10 U.S.C. §167. Lists unconventional warfare among special operations activities.
“The Evolution of the Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA),” Veritas 19, no. 1. On Volckmann borrowing the OSS Operational Group for FM 31-21.
Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New York: W. W. Norton, 1954).
David M. Witty, “The Great UW Debate,” Special Warfare 23, no. 2 (March–April 2010). On the definition approved by the commanders of USSOCOM and USASOC in June 2009.
