By
Intro
The convergence of rapid technological proliferation, economic globalization, and liquidity in democratic institutions has disaggregated key coercive capabilities of the state to subnational political agents and non-state actors. These groups can now achieve political objectives by exploiting the rapid feedback mechanisms of modern democratic societies through the targeted use of force designed to manipulate electoral outcomes.
This is post-modern warfare characterized by the blurring of boundaries between military and civilian domains, where achieving political objectives relies less on traditional kinetic force and more on information operations, economic pressure, and psychological influence. The implications of post-modern warfare for how the United States and its allies and partners need to think about future war are grave. The increasing disaggregation of power and social liquidity in Western democracies necessitates a fundamental shift in strategic thinking, which requires strategists to focus on the cognitive domain and understand how adversaries can exploit democratic vulnerabilities to achieve political objectives through targeted disruptions.
The increasing disaggregation of power and social liquidity in Western democracies necessitates a fundamental shift in strategic thinking.
It is not quite axiomatic to say that the Westphalian conception of the nation-state as a source of political power is eroding rapidly. With the swift proliferation of technology, hyper-concentration of extreme wealth with an increasingly small group of powerful elites, and the ever-increasing scope and reach of globalized economies and the connected international systems they support, non-state actors alongside traditional and nontraditional political agents wield political power that was, until very recently, unheard of and likely impossible. In other words, an immediate and increasingly far-reaching consequence of the erosion of the Westphalian international system is the disaggregation of power and the ability to use power, or force, from traditional, well-known political institutions.
Clausewitz Reconsidered: Politik, Power, and the Evolution of Force
As traditional sources of political power continue to erode, so too does our understanding of the use or utility of violence and force. Military force that was once the exclusive tool of the state is increasingly available to achieve an end for political agents, terrorist groups, private military organizations, and on and on. As politics and power disaggregate from known political institutions, so too does the utility and employment of force by those same political institutions. It is no longer an analytic leap to recognize that non-state criminal groups like LockBit, FIN11, ALPHV/BlackCat, or state-sponsored criminal groups like APT29 can and do use coercive power to achieve their policy objectives.
Contemporary cyber operations illustrate this evolution. The 2016 Russian interference campaign exemplifies sophisticated exploitation of democratic liquidity—using stolen emails, disinformation, and social media manipulation to influence elections without firing a shot. Ransomware groups like LockBit demonstrate how criminal enterprises achieve quasi-political effects by targeting critical infrastructure during sensitive periods. When Colonial Pipeline was shut down in May 2021, the resulting gas shortages created political pressure on the Biden administration that transcended the initial criminal motive. These cases show how the line between criminal activity and warfare blurs when democratic feedback mechanisms amplify the political consequences of disruption.
This analysis distinguishes between three phenomena: political power (the ability to influence government policy), the use of force (threatened or actual harm to change behavior), and warfare (organized force directed toward political objectives). While cyber criminals like LockBit exercise coercive force for economic gain, they cross into warfare when serving political goals—as when ransomware groups coordinate with state sponsors to target Western infrastructure during geopolitical crises.
Clausewitzian Maxims
In thinking about this trend, two of the most famous maxims of the master theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, developed in On War come to mind. Almost immediately, indeed, it is the first thing he says in Book 1, Ch. 1, Clausewitz tells us what war is: war is thus an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will. His definition is highly useful, explicitly for what he says—the use of force to compel. Yet it is what he does not say, and his use of the word ‘force,’ that is perhaps more interesting. His definition of war does not use words like combat, killing, or fighting, or any other words that might be associated with war’s inherent destructive violence.
To be sure, Clausewitz wrote about his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars and used that experience to inform his ideas about war, and there is no doubt that when Clausewitz wrote his definition of war, he was thinking about combat and battle. Yet the Napoleonic age is long gone, and the character of warfare is always changing (another Clausewitzian idea), which gives his use of the word ‘force’ a kaleidoscope of possible meanings and modern strategists something wonderfully broad to think about.
In Book 1. Ch. 1 Part 24 Clausewitz delivers what is easily his most well-known and often quoted maxim—war is merely the continuation of policy by other means. Critically, in the original German, Clausewitz uses the word Politik, which has a very different meaning than the word policy as used by Michael Howard and Peter Paret in their translation of On War.
Disaggregated Power, More Fluid, Temporary Arrangements
Clausewitzian scholars like Hew Strachan, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, and Antulio Echevarria have cleverly argued that an overly narrow English-language interpretation of Politik has stunted modern understanding of what Clausewitz meant by the term, which was not state policy. Rather, it is more likely that Politik, according to Clausewitz, was used as a vehicle for explaining or describing power. That is not to say that there is not a political connotation to power as thought of by Clausewitz, but rather to say that Clausewitz’s Politik transcends policy and is probably a blend of politics, policy, polity, and power.
This fluid political environment creates vulnerabilities that actors seeking rapid political impace can exploit through targeted disruption.
Turning back to disaggregation of power, Zygmunt Bauman, in his book Liquid Modernity, argues convincingly that the political landscape of modern Western society is increasingly moving away from solid, stable institutional structures toward more fluid, temporary power arrangements. One consequence of this evolution is that politics becomes more focused on the immediate imperatives of retaining power and surviving election cycles. Liquidity, therefore, manifests most obviously in the endless election cycles that characterize modern, specifically American, democracies, where political actors are perpetually concerned with reelection and appealing to voters rather than implementing sustained governance strategies. This fluid political environment creates vulnerabilities that actors seeking rapid political impace can exploit through targeted disruption.
Madrid 2004: Force, Electoral Response, and the Politics of Liquid Democracy
On March 11, 2004, Al-Qaeda terrorists bombed four commuter trains entering Madrid, killing 191 civilians and injuring almost 2,000 more. While the Madrid bombings occurred before social media’s emergence, the attacks represent an early manifestation of trends that have since accelerated. The 72-hour cycle from attack to electoral consequences that seemed remarkable in 2004 is now routine, as seen in rapid public opinion shifts after the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing or the 2019 Christchurch attacks.
The Madrid train bombings were timed to generate maximum psychological effect on Spanish citizens, days before national elections. The ruling conservative National People’s Party lost its parliamentary majority to the Spanish Socialist Party. The immediate political consequence was the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.
Through Bauman’s liquidity lens, several points emerge. The terrorists timed their bombings to generate a specific cognitive effect. Voter reactions broadcast to Al-Qaeda that Spanish citizens associated the attacks with Prime Minister José María Aznar’s Iraq War involvement. Spanish citizens changed their votes because they connected the bombings with the war. In effect, Spanish citizens controlled enough political power to force a major change in Spanish policy vis-à-vis the war in Iraq. The train bombings, therefore, were a catalyst Al-Qaeda used to rupture how Spanish citizens thought about war and subsequently generated a desired strategic effect.
Disaggregate Political Power in Practice
The Madrid bombings exemplify how disaggregated political power works in practice. The bombings were physical violence aligning with Clausewitz’s definition of war, but they were not existential. The force that generated the desired effect was the cognitive aspects and how Spanish citizens responded. Al-Qaeda succeeded because Spanish citizens associated the attacks with Iraq War involvement rather than with terrorism. The power brokers—Spanish citizens—drove policy from the bottom up, altering traditional power dynamics with decisive effects. Political party control became irrelevant because the population’s narrative fundamentally differed from the government’s.
The Madrid example has not proven universally effective, suggesting key conditions must exist for such attacks to work. The 2004 Beslan school siege, despite massive Russian casualties, strengthened Putin’s control rather than forcing policy changes. The key difference is regime type. Bauman’s liquidity is particularly potent in modern democracies, where competitive elections are vulnerable to attacks that prompted Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq.
Actors can manipulate rapid democratic feedback mechanisms to generate policy changes from the bottom up.
Clausewitz’s concept of Politik—encompassing politics, policy, polity, and power—provides a framework for understanding how non-state actors achieve political objectives through force. In liquid democratic societies, achieving political objectives no longer requires controlling the state apparatus; actors can manipulate rapid democratic feedback mechanisms to generate policy changes from the bottom up. The Madrid bombings exemplify this: Al-Qaeda achieved Spanish withdrawal from Iraq not by defeating Spanish forces, but by using targeted violence to influence electoral choices.
Strategy in an Age of Disaggregated Power
The disaggregation trend shows no signs of slowing. War and conflict will remain fundamental to human interaction globally. Looking ahead, what can modern strategists learn from these socio-political trends and expanded understanding of Clausewitzian ideas alongside social liquidity and power disaggregation? Such analysis should inform how the United States and its allies may fight the next war.
If power disaggregation and socio-political liquidity in Western liberal democracy have fundamentally altered how force achieves political objectives, how should strategic thinking evolve? And how might adversaries exploit democratic liquidity to achieve strategic effects similar to those in Madrid?
The first shots of the next war will likely be adversaries aiming at American citizens’ minds through media and information flows saturating the United States. How adversaries “fire” those shots is speculative, but examples should inform how strategists think about insulating against cognitive force. One example is the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu aftermath, when a dead American soldier’s remains were dragged through Somali streets.
Disaggregate Power: The Battle of Mogadishu
The Battle of Mogadishu losses and widespread media images of Somali partisans dragging American Soldiers through the streets evoked tremendous public outrage. But the public directed their outrage internally at the Clinton administration, not at Somali militia or suspected Al-Qaeda supporters. Outrage drove Congressional debates. Republican Senators Hank Brown and Phil Gramm, alongside Representative Henry J. Hyde, led the Congressional backlash, citing inadequate equipment, negligence, and face-saving.
Three days after the Mogadishu raid, President Clinton ordered an end to all combat operations in Somalia. Six months later, UU.S. troops withdrew entirely by March 25, 1994. The Clinton administration’s response had one additional effect that continues to shape how the U.S. thinks about using force and American combat power. Mogadishu’s psychological influence generated U.S. reluctance to enter foreign conflicts, helping explain why there was no response to the Rwandan Genocide and why the Bosnia response was muted at best.
Dr. Kenneth Allard correctly said in Mogadishu’s aftermath, “if you can defeat the American will, then you have a chance…. all you need to do is to shed their blood. And if you do that, they’ll cut and run.” Allard brilliantly demonstrated Politik in action: “the lesson given to the rest of the world was that the United States can be had.” Somali militia and Al-Qaeda generated strategic effects in the U.S. Government and in ordinary Americans’ minds.
Battle for the Mind and Will of the Public
Drawing on another Clausewitzian motif, consider how he used the concept of center of gravity and how modern strategists should think about it in the context of disaggregated power and future wars. Echevarria offers the best insight: “In general, a center of gravity represents the point where gravity’s forces converge within an object, the spot at which the object’s weight is balanced in all directions. Striking at or otherwise upsetting the center of gravity can cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall to the ground.” He describes a physical thing being acted upon, but what about the metaphysical, like a democratic citizenry’s mind?
In Western liberal democracies, disaggregated power dynamics increasingly generate policy effects. An aggressor will likely direct their strategy against the population’s mind first.
Given the Madrid bombings’ effects on Spanish citizens and high-level government, and the U.S. response to Mogadishu, the key terrain for strategists is the minds of the citizens they serve. In Clausewitzian terms, the center of gravity in post-modern warfare is citizens’ minds. In Western liberal democracies, disaggregated power dynamics increasingly generate policy effects. An aggressor will likely direct their strategy against the population’s mind first.
Weinberger and the Caution of Force
Caspar W. Weinberger, President Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, famously articulated views about when the U.S. should use military power in his six tests following the October 23, 1983 truck bombing that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut, Lebanon. Weinberger urged caution in using force, especially sending troops into combat. One rule stands out: before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be reasonable assurance of American people and Congressional support.
Weinberger wrote in an era dominated by the Cold War and Vietnam War legacy. Yet his thoughts on generating and retaining American public support and Congressional support are more pertinent today. How the American public perceives force, violence, killing, and death matters to how the U.S. Government will use force for strategy and policy, regardless of justification. More interesting is how adversaries might use public perceptions of violence and death to shape opinion about a Taiwan crisis, for example.
Engineering Public Opinion: The Future of Warfare?
A key shift in modern conflict is the increasing effectiveness of “bottom-up” pressure, in which adversaries bypass traditional power structures to directly influence public opinion. Adversaries cultivate narratives and exploit vulnerabilities within the citizenry, generating public pressure to compel policymakers to alter course against their initial intentions. The Madrid bombings exemplify this: Al-Qaeda successfully influenced Spanish electoral choices and foreign policy by directly targeting public cognitive associations rather than engaging in conventional military conflict. This ability to leverage public sentiment as a power lever necessitates a fundamental strategic reassessment, demanding greater attention to vulnerabilities in the cognitive domain and in democratic feedback mechanisms.
The Madrid bombings, Mogadishu, and the rise of cyber and ransomware attacks demonstrate how adversaries exploit disaggregated power and democratic liquidity to achieve strategic effects. Al-Qaeda manipulated Spanish citizens’ cognitive association of train bombings with the Iraq War, forcing policy change, while a single brutal Mogadishu image eroded American will and precipitated Somalia withdrawal. These events highlight how adversaries could engineer events using violence to target public perception, directly influence opinion, exploit emotional responses, and ultimately drive policy changes.
The people’s voice and will manifest democratic legitimacy. U.S. adversaries understand this and will draw on a deep reservoir to shape how everyday Americans think about crisis, war, and the U.S. response when the next war comes. Senator Karl Mundt said it best in 1962: “We train and prepare our military people for the war which we are not fighting and which we hope will never come, but we fail to train our own citizens and our representatives abroad to operate in the cold war—the only war which we are presently fighting.” Senator Mundt’s remarks, like Weinberger’s, are perhaps more relevant now than ever before.