News & Briefings
Get the latest news and SOF commentary here. Your source for all news SOF since 2017.
The convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and non-kinetic irregular warfare (IW) represents both a qualitative shift in the nature of strategic threat and a quantitative increase in adversarial operational effectiveness. To be sure, IW has always relied upon exploitation of asymmetries of expectation, capability, attribution, legality, and response thresholds. Certainly asymmetries, and tactics like indirect approaches (e.g., employing covert and clandestine and non-kinetic operations) are factors in both regular warfare and IW. AI affords unprecedented capacity to operationalize these asymmetries and tactics at scale, and when employed within IW (often within a paradigm of “matrix operations” to coordinate exceedingly large number of participants in/across vast networks), can afford speed and precision to enable minimal cost (of resources and personnel) and augmented effectiveness of such engagements. Indeed, current peer competitors and state adversaries have explicitly recognized that strategic objectives can be achieved through persistent sub-threshold engagements that avoid triggering conventional military retaliation.
In 2013, Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno, Marine Corps Commandant General James Amos, and commander of US Special Operations Command Admiral William McRaven cosigned a document that should have grabbed the attention of the entire American defense establishment. Its central observation was unambiguous: The Pentagon’s concept of competition does not reflect the fundamental reality that “competition and conflict are about people.” A decade later, the Army proposed cutting its special operations forces by up to 20 percent. Congress felt compelled to insert a $20 million provision into the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act simply to make permanent US special operations forces’ ability to conduct irregular warfare by, with, and through partners. The defense establishment continued its decade-long debate about whether irregular warfare capabilities are still needed at all. The warning from three four-star generals produced no durable institutional change. Why? And what should the defense establishment do about it now?
For more than two decades, U.S. national security policy has repeatedly relied on leadership decapitation as a mechanism for catalyzing systemic change. In practice, this has often meant turning to military force as the primary instrument for resolving problems rooted in political decay, institutional corruption, and fractured legitimacy.
Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer led approximately 600 soldiers of the 7th Cavalry against a Native American coalition of 4,000 to 8,000 people, led by Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Gall, and Two Moons. The Native Americans deployed decentralized command, superior terrain knowledge, mobility, psychological warfare, and cultural cohesion to defeat Custer’s force at Last Stand Hill, killing over 200 soldiers. The authors argue that Custer’s fatal underestimation of his opponent, combined with fractured command and control and a failure to conduct adequate intelligence preparation, exposed his force to a series of encirclements that his divided units could not survive.
In the current landscape of strategic competition and irregular warfare, the ability to operate covertly in the financial domain is a critical component of mission success. As nations and non-state actors compete for influence, the tools of unconventional warfare increasingly extend beyond the kinetic. Crypto has rapidly grown as a method to store and transfer value, providing speed, global reach, and 24/7 availability. For Special Operations Forces (SOF) tasked with enabling partner elements, conducting stabilization activities, or executing sensitive missions in politically complex environments, it offers an additional tool – provided crypto’s advantages and vulnerabilities are understood and effectively managed.
United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are increasingly evaluated through conventional readiness frameworks that degrade the human capital and relational capabilities essential to irregular competition. This article argues that military leaders must optimize SOF primarily for irregular competition by redefining readiness metrics, decoupling SOF employment from conventional readiness cycles, and institutionalizing disciplined mission selection—even at the cost of reduced preparedness for large-scale conventional conflict.
No results found.
Stay Up To Date
Subscribe to Our Newsletter and Stay Up to Date with the Latest Special Operations Forces Support News and Events