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In recent years, some theater special operations commands (TSOCs) have tended to focus more on scrutinizing the actions of tactical units than on synchronizing resources and activities to support broader campaign goals. This approach puts tactical elements under constant observation, often with unclear goals, limited resources, and restrained initiative. Operational success at the subordinate level often happens despite TSOC processes, not because of them. Units sometimes deliberately operate below the level one concept of operations (CONOP) threshold to avoid TSOC interaction and preserve momentum.
Strategic counter-narratives function as purposeful reframings of identity and causality designed to shift audience behavior against an adversary’s frame. Effective implementation demands a plot that resonates with the target audience’s existing identity. Practitioners utilize these stories for sensemaking, de-escalation, and recruitment deterrence, yet success remains contingent on the alignment of words with visible deeds. The repetition paradox often causes these efforts to fail when they inadvertently grant salience to rival storylines by attempting to refute them. Furthermore, defensive lateness and credibility gaps occur when state voices lack the authenticity of in-group messengers.
Today’s conflicts are evolving. The threat environment is complex, dynamic, asymmetric, technological and intense — all adjectives that play to the strengths of special operations.
So, it is perhaps no surprise that at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 36th annual Special Operations Symposium, Special Operations Forces, or SOF, were held out as a competitive advantage in meeting threats across the board.
By Dr. Joseph Long
In the preceding analysis—the first installment of what has become a three-part series—I introduced the Guerrilla Leader Theory (GLT), a framework that provides a static taxonomy of leadership for the human domain. It posits that a leader’s effectiveness is a function of ...
Check out this latest article from The Modern War Institute! Jeremy Mushtare argues in “The Sisyphean Struggle for Influence Campaigning in Competition” that U.S. influence efforts fail because they lack prioritization, integration, and alignment with strategic objectives. He explains that combatant commands treat influence as fragmented, bottom-up activities rather than as coherent campaigns tied to theater priorities. The article emphasizes that effective influence campaigning requires deliberate focus on positional advantage, deterrence, and threats, while integrating physical and informational actions. Mushtare also highlights structural challenges such as interagency friction, embassy gatekeeping, and risk-averse decision-making that limit execution. He contends that success in competition depends on precision, targeted audiences, and disciplined campaign design rather than mass messaging. The article ultimately argues that influence must become a core operational function, directed at scale and aligned with clear priorities.
United States Special Operations Command will prioritize cyber warfare in response to the increasingly sophisticated technology of adversaries, military leaders told members of Congress during a House Armed Services Committee hearing on March 18 in Washington, D.C.
Derrick Anderson, U.S. assistant secretary of war for special operations and low-intensity conflict, and U.S. Navy Admiral Frank M. Bradley, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, told lawmakers that Special Operations Forces need to maintain a competitive edge in disruptive technology to succeed in the modern threat environment.
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