News & Briefings

One of the most striking patterns I have observed across recent wars has little to do with drones, artificial intelligence, or precision fires. It has to do with darkness. In three major conflicts involving forces that range from professional to semiprofessional—the 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and Israel’s campaign against Hamas after October 7, 2021—large-scale night operations have been notably rare. Outside of highly specialized units conducting limited raids, most decisive fighting has occurred during daylight. At night, both sides tend to pause, reorganize, and recover. In effect, the night is ceded rather than dominated.

Twentieth-century warfare was defined by industrial-scale lethality: mass mobilization, mechanized destruction, and the pursuit of decisive battlefield supremacy. In contrast, the strategic environment of the twenty-first century reflects a profound transformation. The digital revolution has fractured traditional hierarchies of power, accelerated the flow of information across borders, and empowered individuals and non-state actors in unprecedented ways. As a result, warfare is no longer confined to the physical domain. It has expanded decisively into the cognitive realm, where perceptions, narratives, legitimacy, and belief systems constitute the primary battlespace.

This article argues that cultural competence and relationship-building are essential force multipliers for special operations forces. When “the population is the center of gravity,” understanding that population becomes imperative for mission success. Comprehensive interdisciplinary cultural education, not just hardware or superficial “Dos and Don’ts,” is a critical skill that special operations forces need to build partner resilience and prevail in irregular warfare against peer competitors. The authors join many leaders across the special operations enterprise who have expressed concern that the trend toward SOF convergence with exquisite technology may signal higher leadership’s overemphasis on tech at the expense of human-centric competencies and core tasks.

The Chief Scientist Research Reports (CSRRs) provide NATO’s senior political and military leadership with clear, evidence-based insight into science & technology (S&T) developments. These reports translate complex research results into actionable analysis to help the Alliance anticipate potential technological disruption, identify likely capability gaps, and adapt strategically in order to shape the future security environment and battlespace.

Foreword: Mastering the fight for the 21st century This paper is the first in a six-part series developed by CACI to reframe how national security professionals understand and engage in 21st century strategic competition. Its core argument is that Irregular Warfare (IW) — anchored in the effective use of information, influence, and other instruments of power short of armed conflict — has become a coequal dimension of strategic competition. Our adversaries wield it persistently to create advantages and impose costs without escalating to open war or prompting a U.S. military response. As the United States continues to invest in conventional deterrence, our rivals are too often winning strategic objectives through proxy warfare, disinformation, cyber aggression, legal or illicit manipulation, economic coercion, and narrative dominance. This series is intended to illuminate how the U.S. must adapt and expand — doctrinally, structurally, and cognitively — to succeed in this environment. The six papers in this series will address the following themes: 1. Defining the Environment – Understanding IW as a critical component of modern strategic competition, and aligning our doctrine, posture, and planning to compete effectively within it. 2. Gray Zone Conflicts: Redefining Victory Without Combat – Exploring how adversaries use ambiguity, information, and lawfare to shift the status quo without crossing conventional redlines. 3. Operationalizing CAPIA: Planning IW in the 21st Century – Introducing a new campaign-planning construct built around Capabilities, Access, Partnerships, Information, and Authorities — the core levers of IW success. 4. Doctrine and Authorities: Overcoming the Legal and Structural Barriers to IW – Examining the Title 10/Title 50 divide, planning gaps, and doctrinal inertia that limit IW effectiveness — and offering actionable solutions. 5. Force Design for Persistent Competition – Proposing a restructured force posture for IW dominance, from Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployment models to interagency integration and digital influence capabilities. 6. Institutionalizing IW: A Roadmap for Enduring Advantage – Providing a blueprint for integrating IW with the full range of U.S. competitive advantages — military, diplomatic, informational, and economic — while avoiding the pitfall of confining IW to a narrow “silo of excellence.” This first paper — Irregular Warfare: The Prevailing Warfighting Environment in an Era of Strategic Competition — lays the foundation. It explains why IW is the current fight, how adversaries are winning without triggering war, and what the United States must do to adapt before it is too late. The next five papers will expand the lens — from operational frameworks to structural reform — so that we are not just aware of the threat, but ready to win in its domain. BLUF: This paper examines the strategic risks inherent in deprioritizing irregular and information-centric warfare. Despite the U.S. military’s continued emphasis on conventional strength, recent policy shifts reveal a growing mismatch between our investment priorities and the evolving character of modern conflict. Adversaries are advancing their strategic aims through persistent, ambiguous, and asymmetric methods — while the U.S. remains largely focused on traditional force projection. The takeaway is clear: IW can no longer be treated as a supporting effort — it is integral to how we fight and compete.