By SOF Support Staff
On September 26, 2022, a series of underwater explosions ruptured the Nord Stream pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea. The blasts were strong enough to register on seismic stations across northern Europe. Four years later, the attack is still one of the clearest examples of how a very small team can produce effects of strategic scale, and it remains a case study that anyone who follows irregular warfare should understand.
This week, the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI) published a question-and-answer session with Bojan Pancevski, the Wall Street Journal’s chief European political correspondent and author of a recent book on the attack. At SOF Support, we follow IWI closely because it bridges scholars, practitioners, and policymakers on exactly the issues that shape the special operations community. This interview is worth the read.
A Small Team, a Strategic Effect
Nord Stream was the largest offshore gas pipeline system in the world, carrying Russian gas directly to Germany. According to Pancevski, it took 16 years and roughly $20 billion to build. By his account, it was disabled by seven people: three servicemen and four civilian diving instructors, operating from a leased leisure yacht.
Pancevski’s reporting, which he says aligns with the work of German federal prosecutors, attributes the operation to veterans of a Ukrainian intelligence service. That attribution is his and has not been officially confirmed by the governments involved, and readers should treat it as one journalist’s well-sourced account rather than a settled finding. What is less contested is the shape of the operation itself: a small, specialized team using commercially available means to strike infrastructure of enormous economic and political value.
One detail stands out. Pancevski reports that the planners could not find enough military combat divers able to work at depths beyond 80 meters, so they recruited civilians with that technical skill. That blend of military planning and civilian expertise is a recurring feature of irregular and unconventional warfare.
The Gray Zone Is Getting Busier
Pancevski describes the attack as an escalation in gray-zone conflict and argues the problem is likely to grow. Since 2022, he notes, Europe has seen a rise in sabotage and covert activity connected to the war in Ukraine, including incidents involving railways, airports, and undersea cables and power links. He also points to Russian vessels mapping the critical infrastructure of NATO countries.
At the same time, cheap drones on land and at sea have lowered the cost of threatening high-value targets. In his words, the arrival of “cheap, scalable technology” has opened an era in which relatively small operations, including by non-state actors, can threaten very valuable infrastructure.
Why Seabed Infrastructure Is So Hard to Defend
According to officials Pancevski interviewed, governments have responded with more patrols, surveillance drones, and underwater sensors. But the core problem is geography. Pipelines and cables run for hundreds or thousands of miles along the seabed, and several officials conceded there is no foolproof defense against a small, skilled team working from an inconspicuous civilian vessel.
His conclusion is that serious militaries and intelligence services need two things at once: the ability to defend against this kind of operation and the capacity to conduct unconventional maritime operations of their own.
Why This Matters to the SOF Community
Special operations forces have always been the part of the force built for problems like this: small teams, specialized skills, ambiguous environments, and effects far out of proportion to their size. The Nord Stream case shows that adversaries and partners alike understand that model, and that critical infrastructure such as energy, communications, and undersea cables is now a front line in strategic competition.
For SOF personnel, that means continued demand for maritime and diving expertise, for partner-force relationships with allies who live alongside these vulnerabilities, and for the patient intelligence and planning that irregular warfare requires. It also means sustained operational tempo for the people who carry those skills, and for the families who support them while they do. Understanding the strategic environment is part of how SOF Support helps the public appreciate what our special operations community is asked to do, and why caring for those operators and their families matters.
Sources
- Inside the Nord Stream Conspiracy: Q & A with WSJ’s Bojan Pancevski, Irregular Warfare Initiative, November 16, 2026
To learn more about SOF Support and our work with the special operations community, visit sofsupport.org.
