Before dawn on June 1, 2025, Ukrainian intelligence and special-operations planners initiated truck-launched first-person-view (FPV) drones they had hidden in trucks delivering goods near four Russian strategic bomber bases scattered across Russia. In a matter of minutes, multiple bombers, including Tu-160, Tu-95, Tu-22Ms, and A-50 early warning aircraft, were burning on their parking stands in what Kyiv code-named Operation Spider Web. According to the Ukrainian president, 117 drones were used in the operation to knock out over 30 percent of Russia’s bomber fleet capable of launching deadly attacks on Ukrainian cities.
The raid is a reminder of the enduring utility of special forces during large-scale conventional conflict as well as a call to arms to further help Kyiv deny Russia the ability to sustain a coercive air campaign designed to break Ukraine’s will.
Combat Power Beyond Mass: Relative Superiority
In his 1993 master’s thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Admiral William McRaven described how small raiding forces could achieve disproportionate battlefield outcomes. Through speed, surprise, and tailored tactics at a pivotal moment in an engagement, these teams could generate disproportionate combat power. In this theory of special operations, the resulting “relative superiority” allowed smaller forces to play critical roles in major campaigns. To make his case, McRaven used a mix of cases ranging from Operation Chariot (British commando raids on St Nazaire, France, in 1942) and Operation Source (British midget submarine attacks on the Tirpitz in 1943) to the German attack at Ében-Émael in 1940 and Operation Jonathan (the Israeli raid on Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976).
The logic applies across domains. As seen in Operation Spider Web, small land and air littoral forces (i.e., drones) can be used to hold other domains at risk. This idea is not new. In 1942, the British Special Air Service and Long Range Desert Group conducted raids on German airfields in Egypt. A closer look at the history of war illustrates a recurring theme: The best place to kill aircraft is on the ground. There is a long track record of ground-based attacks against airbases. Ukraine just brought the concept into the drone age, complementing its earlier series of long-range strikes on Russian airbases.
Initial reports suggest Ukraine developed the operation for over a year, hiding in plain sight and likely using a mix of open-source intelligence assets like commercial satellite and transponder aggregators as well as special reconnaissance to plan the attack. The operation likely also involved a mix of electromagnetic spectrum and cyber operations to set conditions for the raid, which comes just one week after Russia’s largest air and missile attack on Ukraine and in the midst of stalled peace negotiations.
Setting Conditions for a Defensive Campaign
By demonstrating it can hold Russian airbases at risk, Ukraine achieves multiple campaign objectives. First, it forces Russia to increase security around its airbases, thus pulling forces from the frontline and creating a compounding psychological effect. Now, Ukraine has demonstrated it can hold both bomber and fighter airbases at risk using a mix of drones. Second, the asymmetric attacks limit the ability of Russia to use its advantage in air power to attack Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and major military hubs that supply the frontline. In fact, the attack comes as the battlefield has seen an increase in Ukrainian air sorties along the front lines and even air assault missions behind Russian lines. Combined with the recent lifting of restrictions on long-range strikes by major European states and the United States, the net result could be an operational air campaign that slows down the impending Russian summer offensive. Russia will have to worry about both more drone raids and cruise missile attacks on its airfields.
That is, the June 1 drone raid should not be viewed in isolation from broader defensive campaign objectives. The best way to use special operations and intelligence operatives is in support of a larger campaign. That campaign is seeking to offset Ukraine’s manpower shortage with a mix of drones, air power, and bold use of maneuver.
Beyond Ukraine: Creating New Frameworks for Attacking and Defending Airbases
The stunning success and longer history of special forces raids against airbases suggest a need to rethink aspects of offensive and defensive campaign designs in large-scale combat operations.
First, the United States and its allies will need to reconsider how to defend air bases in the new drone age. Airbases are operational targets difficult to defend from every domain, given their large (land) size, fixed character (easy to see and hard to move), and reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum to coordinate sorties. The new concept will need to build on foundational concepts like defense-in-depth to ensure adversaries are denied the ability to launch drone raids as well as long-range missile strikes. This approach will likely involve a mix of hardened shelters, decoys, mobile jammers, and other capabilities designed to counter unmanned aircraft systems alongside traditional point air defenses and security forces.
Second, the June 1 airbase attack is a reminder of the utility of special forces in large-scale combat operations. U.S. military planners and leadership should ensure they are generating unorthodox and unconventional approaches to conventional combat scenarios and using them to test new tactics and capabilities. The case is a reminder that not every operation requires an expensive missile to achieve the desired effect.
Third, while the mission was a success, it still carries the risk of significant escalation, which, while manageable, should be understood. This creates a need for more wargaming on the modern escalation ladder and understanding how even unconventional attacks on nuclear facilities could change the character of the conflict. As seen outside Russia in the recent limited conflict between India and Pakistan, there appear to be shifting norms against targeting nuclear-capable assets and installations with conventional and special forces. The latent risks need to be better understood to avoid inadvertent escalation spirals.
Relative Superiority at Drone Speed
The logic of the unconventional air-base raid endures. FPV drones compress McRaven’s window of relative superiority from hours to seconds and make every flight line on the planet a potential kill zone. Survivability now hinges on seeing the raid before it launches—or launching one’s own. In the age of autonomy, the side that masters the art of the air-base raid will own the runways—and the skies above them—in the wars to come.