By Brig. Gen. Matthew J. Hardman, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Ian M. McConnell, U.S. Army
In large-scale combat operations, communication may be the most precious opportunity that we have. —Brig. Gen. Joe Wortham After a protracted war period from 2001 to 2021, the U.S. Army is trying to make sense of what it did during those years and what it will likely be required to do in the future. The U.S. Army, like almost all armies, has a track record of getting it 100 percent wrong. No one knows when, where, or how the Nation will employ the Army in the future. T he Army’s first significant battle of the Global War on Terrorism was Operation Anaconda in the ShahiKhot Mountains of Afghanistan in March 2002.1 Elements from the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions, 5th Special Forces Group, 75th Ranger Regiment, Army and Navy special mission units, the U.S. Air Force, other government agencies, and Afghan partner forces enveloped and defeated al-Qaida and Taliban forces. Many things went well, and many things did not. Post-Desert Storm, no one had predicted that kind of fight. If it is unlikely that we will know how we will fight, then how do we “train as we fight”? We need to shift paradigms, leadership, and guidance to a “train-to-fight” approach and do so in the most challenging circumstances that stress our ability to execute fundamental tasks and skills while driving behaviors that make us lethal and survivable, no matter the enemy or environment. During the 7th Special Forces Group’s (SFG) Joint Readiness Training Center rotation in April 2024, the SFG transitioned from crisis to conflict during the time-phased force deployment of conventional forces (CF). During that transition, significant friction in command-and-control (C2) relationships emerged. T he SFG commander had to reframe and form a closer relationship with the lead division conducting a joint forcible entry to enable the joint task force commanders’ intent. T he mutual dependencies and unique capabilities of the conventional and Special Forces required a change in C2 relationships for a discrete period to accomplish the purpose. The spatial and temporal context of the division’s deep fight necessitated direct commander dialogue to ensure mission accomplishment for the division and appropriate support to and synchronization with special operations forces (SOF). After consolidating the division’s gains, the SOF element reverted to its original C2 relationship within the joint task force. Without the adjusted C2 relationship, the division would not have appropriately understood the SOF capabilities or the requirements that enable the SOF elements to achieve desired effects. It also highlighted the fluidity of supported and supporting forces in large-scale combat operations (LSCO), which requires a flat and shared understanding among commanders. Additional layers of headquarters (HQ) would not have kept up with the speed of operations. During the next Joint Readiness Training Center rotation, a battalion from 1st SFG also executed a transition from crisis to conflict. Based on the scenario, that battalion—serving as a special operations task force (SOTF)—started the conflict in the division’s deep area, necessitating direct coordination with the division. While these scenarios may not represent the most likely relationships between CF and SOF, they are realistic for transitioning from crisis to conflict. The primary way combat training centers (CTC) “train to fight” is a joint forcible entry or initiation of U.S. ground combat operations, which replicates the stresses of transition from competition to crisis, or crisis to conflict, and requires synchronicity of effort across all domains and environments. Regardless of context, SOF and CF must work together to synchronize effects. Consistent with “trainto-fight” paradigms, it’s all about forcing SOF and CF to understand Army doctrine, each other’s capabilities and limitations, their mutual interdependencies (fire Brig. Gen. Matthew J. Hardman, U.S. Army, is the deputy commanding general-support for the 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Kansas. During his time in service, he successfully led and commanded light, airborne, and mechanized and armor formations from the company to brigade levels and served as an observer coach/trainer at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. Lt. Col. Ian M. McConnell, U.S. Army, is a Special Forces officer and the G-5 director for U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He previously served as the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) special operations task force commander during the National Training Center rotation with the 1st Infantry Division. MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · NOVEMBER 2025 2SOF IN LSCO An M1A2 Abrams tank from 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, fires an antitank round 12 September 2024 during live-fire training on Fort Irwin, California. The training was part of a predeployment requirement. (Photo by Pfc. Joshua Fish, U.S. Army) support, intelligence, and sustainment, in particular), and interoperability challenges that allow for lethality and survivability when overcome. Many of these factors are academic or hidden in a simulation but become glaringly evident in the dirt. T he National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 2503 enabled the Army to put the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) and 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (SOTF-31), in the dirt. Leaders from 1ID and Army SOF discussed lessons learned from the recent SOF CTC rotations, observations from ongoing global conf licts, and the collective experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. In preparing for a LSCO environment at NTC, several challenges emerged: (1) the scale and tempo of operations; (2) achieving unity of effort across adjacent units, partners, allies, and interagency partners; and (3) building combat power in a contested environment under constant observation. SOTF-31 deployed to the combined joint operations area just ahead of CF; it was subsequently tasked to set conditions for the III Armored Corps (III Corps) and 1ID, which were its main effort. For 1ID to rapidly generate combat power unimpeded, it needed to gain situational understanding of the operational environment rapidly. Given an immature theater and finite resources, SOTF-31 was critical in enabling the 1ID commander and his staff to orient, understand, and visualize future operations in the corps’ area of operations. Pre-positioned SOF are key sensors for CF in LSCO. SOF can see, sense, and even stimulate the environment through and with various partner forces and capabilities. Therefore, SOF can perform a critical task of helping friendly commands at any echelon see themselves and the enemy during key transitions. In the early stages of setting the theater, this is exactly what SOTF-31 did for III Corps HQ and 1ID. As III Corps and 1ID arrived in theater, SOTF-31 provided a common intelligence picture and common operational picture within the combined joint operations area. This MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · NOVEMBER 2025 3SOF IN LSCO enabled a rapid transition to fires coordination, the first SOF-to-CF synchronization test. As the SOTF’s higher command did not own organic fires assets, and the enemy’s sensor to effects performance averaged five minutes, SOTF-31 could not wait for multiple layers of SOF and CF command nodes to deliver effects. They needed to rapidly get inside the enemy commander’s decision cycle by coordinating fires directly through the corps. At the time, this was the art of what 1ID and SOTF-31 both understood to be necessary for the mission: III Corps, 1ID, and SOTF-31 could not “coordinate” or “deconflict” efforts to control tempo through agility; they had to synchronize. Inherent in that word is the use of authority to direct and control. Established doctrine emphasizes using a liaison between SOF and CF commands to communicate, coordinate, and deconflict efforts.2 However, when a maneuver commander must converge effects, that commander must speak directly with involved commanders to control timing and tempo, ensure clarity, and maintain risk awareness. For those reasons, the SOTF-31 commander placed himself physically in 1ID’s main command post and functionally under 1ID’s tactical control. The spatial and temporal conditions required it. It’s important to explain how and why a SOTF commander would operate in a manner viewed as heretical a decade prior. It’s also important to understand why it worked in this “train-to-fight” scenario. SOF warfighters have long understood that interoperability, integration, and interdependence with CF are standing principles founded in doctrine. Training to fight in a LSCO environment is challenging SOF’s traditional path of how to understand, visualize, and describe, let alone achieve, interoperability, integration, and interdependence with CF. The LSCO environment demands SOF and CF be prepared to go beyond creating a tailored task organization for discrete missions: T hey must operate within various C2 systems and build relationships to synchronize effects. 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) defines f ive lines of effort guiding its formation’s concept of employment: 1. conduct deep and denied area sensing; 2. enhance C-C5ISRT (counter-command, control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting); 3. conduct deep area partner force maneuver; 4. conduct psychological warfare; and 5. enhance resilience, develop resistance forces, and consolidate gains.3 T heir preponderance (four of the five lines of effort) involves operations, activities, and/or investments (OAIs) within the corps’ rear-to-deep and operational deep frameworks. For those OAIs to be operationally valuable to the corps’ scheme of maneuver, SOF subunits operating in shared spaces must be coordinated or synchronized with corps command or subunits as required. For synchronization to work, all components of C2 systems (people, processes, networks, and command posts) must be included. SOTF-31 had to synchronize with the corps to defeat enemy midrange fires, employ joint capabilities to set conditions for 1ID to maneuver, and maintain the tempo of operations. Likewise, SOTF-31 integrated all components of C2 within 1ID. T he SOTF command team federated itself across decentralized command posts aligned with those of 1ID, and the SOTF also integrated its people, processes, and networks. Though diffused across multiple locations, SOTF-31 benefited tremendously from 1ID through the fifth SOF truth: “Most special operations require non-SOF support.”4 While certainly true in standard logistics, it was more than that in 25-03. SOTF-31 embedded its staff into 1ID’s integrated staff processes across all 1ID command posts. This was to prevent staff overmatch and preserve agility to influence tempo. SOTF-31 integrated with 1ID’s staff to the extent that all staff had a clear understanding of the SOFunique tasks and support requirements. Conversely, the 1ID commander’s visualization from the future operations cell drove the SOF operations process to set conditions for future 1ID operations. SOTF-31 staff or command team members could then engage in 1ID working groups wherein SOF-specific effects could be included, and 1ID staff completed all major staffing actions as though it were SOTF-31’s higher HQ. Though SOTF-31 remained in daily contact with its senior SOF HQ for SOF-only OAI staffing and coordination, SOTF-31 was not overmatched by the division because it was staffing SOTF-31’s supporting actions as though their own. SOF equities were shepherded along the way within appropriate classification and need-to-know. Operating this way directly contributed to SOTF31 maintaining a small footprint for survivability while MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · NOVEMBER 2025 4SOF IN LSCO Soldiers from Bravo Company (Bandits), 11th Cyber Battalion, conduct shaping operations on 23 January 2025 to set conditions for 1st Infantry Division and 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) offensive and defensive operations during National Training Center Rotation 25-03 at Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Steven Stover, U.S. Army) enabling a reach-back capability to SOF support in support areas. This level of integration allowed the SOTF-31 commander to have daily commander dialogue with the 1ID commanding general. This dialogue helped to shape the 1ID commander’s visualization and enabled the SOTF-31 commander to set conditions for future actions. Further, the physical presence of SOTF31 enabled 1ID to actively maintain a SOTF common operational picture, which enabled rapid delivery of f ires and effects. Fire missions from an operational detachment alpha went directly to the division’s joint air-ground integration cell. SOTF-31 and 1ID were able to mutually complete battle damage assessments and assess conditions for transition points. SOTF-31 and 1ID could therefore rapidly understand, decide, act, assess, and adapt from a shared visualization, leveraging each element’s strengths and capabilities. The downside is that such an approach consumes a SOTF command team’s focus and could ostensibly limit their mission command for additional organic forces operating outside or beyond III Corps’ boundaries. This concept should be discussed in terms of common Army approaches: commanders go to the decisive point or point of friction. Subordinate elements in supporting or independent missions are entrusted to continue their operations with assistance from an adjacent or higher command for the same discrete time a SOTF command is committed to the decisive point or solving a point of friction. The same logic that guides SOF form factors to support CF operations (e.g., organizational structure and command relationships) should guide how SOF also adjusts its organic unit structure or alignment within the SOF C2 environment when needed: the key takeaway is that the organizational structure and C2 must be fluid enough to be capable of changing/adjusting on a possible mission-by-mission and/or phase-by-phase basis, whenever circumstances so require. While there were many improvements in our shared training to fight in 25-03, there are obstacles still MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · NOVEMBER 2025 5SOF IN LSCO preventing the realization of full potential. The two apex issues most symptoms spring from: (1) SOF have been allowed to peculiarize themselves out of interoperability through end-item design, and (2) the foundational paradigm of CTC exercises is not ready for training units to dramatically evolve into an LSCO environment. SOF has been, and remains, the mission holder for counterterrorism and related counter-violent extremism tasks on behalf of our Nation. Over the last twenty plus years, SOF excelled at meeting this mission and accordingly evolved its systems and tools used, particularly in communications. There is a good reason for this, as SOF must safeguard much of their backside systems and tactics, techniques, and procedures from vulnerable or compromised access points. Risk mitigation for implications to interoperability with CF systems depended on the operational model of static command posts and a permissive environment. If SOTF-31 had to immediately deploy and integrate with 1ID as it replicated in 25-03, the SOTF would not have been as interoperable with its systems or processes to the degree it was able to marginally achieve with the six months of preparation that SOTF personnel undertook prior to the NTC deployment. For exercise design, broadly speaking, form follows function. Depending on what the training event is designed to test, form will follow. The CTC scenarios must be rewritten for the LSCO environment scale and tempo. Machine learning and other modern tools can easily aid in the construction of an Army-wide model. Simulations run from Fort Leavenworth could adjudicate effects across time and space with training participants anywhere in the United States, even globally, with a new component level or corps base order. Geographic dispersion is less of an issue than presenting a scalable problem that will force the form of training units to match the function their mission requires when considering modern enemy capabilities. Additional plot devices of compartmentation and ally processes can be included to truly test the C2 systems of any training unit. As a benefit, not all participating units need to travel to a CTC to participate—observer controllers simply need to be able to report to an exercise control group and allow effects to play out in real time over distance or modified tempo. We don’t know, can’t know, the intricacies of the next fight. We can, however, aggressively train how to f ight, reinforcing fundamentals grounded in shared doctrine—the rest falls into place. This was reinforced at rotation 25-03. 1ID and SOTF-31 had never met on the battlefield to fight our Nation’s enemies. Unified action was achieved through common operational terms, graphics, and a shared passion for warfighting. The Army is conveying this vision in its continuous transformation approach. There’s no better way to figure it out than getting in the dirt together. Train to fight. Notes Epigraph. Joe Wortham, in discussion with author Matthew Hardman, April 2024 at the Joint Readiness Training Center. 1. Adam Geibel, “Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002,” Military Review 82, no. 3 (May-June 2002): 72–77. 2. Field Manual 6-05, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence (U.S. Government Publishing Directorate, 25 January 2022), 1, 5. 3. 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (1st SFC [A]), “How ARSOF Fights: How ARSOF Enables the Army and Joint Force to Fight in Large-Scale Combat Operations” (1st SFC [A], n.d.), 18–25. The 1st SFC (A)’s lines of effort, especially 1 and 3–5, all involve operations, activities, and/or investments from corps rear through deep (close through deep maneuver area). 4. “SOF Truths,” U.S. Special Operations Command, accessed 29 September 2025, https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.
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