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Introduction
Violence in the world’s highest mountains is once again shedding light on the volatility of mountainous geography. Last May, old conflicts reignited over the disputed Kashmir region high in the Himalayan mountains. Settled only by a fragile ceasefire after a series of tense escalations between India and Pakistan, old deterrence logic has been challenged by two nuclear-armed states battling over the mountainous headwaters that feed the majority of their populations. Nearby, China continues a quiet campaign of damming and re-routing rivers in the high-altitude plains of Tibet to “steal” land from Nepal and threaten downstream countries in Southeast Asia. According to a recent CSIS report, China’s construction of dams provide upstream control of Asia’s major rivers, enabling a form of Gray Zone coercion through the manipulation of downstream nations’ economies. Indeed, the glacier melt from the Himalayas provide nearly half of the world’s population with its most basic need: water. In Taiwan, some analysts suggest that a Chinese invasion would stall at the base of the island’s central mountain range, enabling the Taiwanese to “wage a guerilla warfare campaign”. In fact, 70% of Taiwan is covered by steep and densely forested mountains as high as 13,000 feet, which create numerous opportunities for irregular warfare.
Mountains form the core of many geopolitical challenges for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), creating a strategic imperative to challenge Chinese aggression in such terrain. As such, mountain-specialized Special Operations Forces (SOF) can effectively support and enable national resistance operations and unconventional warfare (UW) against Chinese aggression in militarily challenging mountainous regions like Tibet, Nepal, and Taiwan by leveraging the unique advantages of irregular warfare, fostering cultural resilience, and adapting mountain warfare tactics to indigenous partner forces.
The Mountain Battlefield: Enduring Challenges and Opportunities for Defense
Mountain battlefields are omnipresent within the competition continuum. Whether in crisis or conflict, irregular or conventional warfare, mountainous geography is its own domain and cannot be ignored. Utilizing a framework developed by the Irregular Warfare Center (see Figure 1 below), the role of regional geography is easily visualized between competition, crisis, and conflict. With the Gray Zone occupying the ambiguous borders between war and peace, irregular activities and warfare play the largest role in today’s complex environment.
Figure 1: DOD Irregular Approach to Campaigning
In terms of competition, mountainous battlefields like the disputed Kashmir borders between China and India are rife with irregular activities. The contested area, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is characterized by rugged and austere mountainous terrain which makes border demarcation nearly impossible. China exploits this ambiguous border by “deploying PRC-aligned nomadic tribes to cross and occupy land on India’s side of the LAC”, constructing “xiaokang” (well-off) villages to claim disputed land. Such salami style tactics
permit the slow reclamation of disputed land beyond the LAC, enabling China to take land while avoiding conflict. Despite treaties and international norms of sovereignty, irregular Chinese activities dominate this peripheral mountainous terrain.
In crisis, China’s weaponization of water control presents a serious issue to lower riparian states. The PRC-occupied Tibetan plateau known as “Asia’s water tower” controls eight transboundary river systems which supply water to three billion people in Southeast Asia. With more than 87,000 dams built on these rivers, China has weaponized critical infrastructure to coerce downstream states while redrawing boundary lines with Nepal by diverting the flows of rivers that mark them . Such a crisis of geopolitical leverage “poses a significant concern for lower riparian states, potentially shaping future conflict”. Simply put, China can pull the trigger to create a major crisis at any time, holding water hostage for billions of people.
Yet, the battlefields of competition and crisis do not resemble imagined kinetic or conventional warzones. Instead, these regions are political and economic battlefields, holding civilians and states at risk, and requiring a whole-of-government approach. A 2012 assessment of global water security from the Director of National Intelligence reported with high confidence that “water problems will contribute to instability in states important to US national security interests”. As water use has grown at twice the rate of population increase, state-sponsored Gray-Zone control of major mountainous headwaters will only exacerbate regional disputes in water-stressed nations. Chinese control of the Tibetan plain and its illegal territorial expansion into the mountainous border regions are stark examples of how a near-peer adversary can utilize irregular activities within the Gray Zone to secure their national interests in times of crisis.
In terms of open conflict, the PRC has not been in a declared conventional war since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War so the following is purely hypothetical. In the event China invades Taiwan or launches a conventional assault across the LAC in the Himalayas, it is important to visualize the modern mountainous battlefield. The mountains profoundly impact all warfighting functions, make operations exceptionally difficult, and have high expected casualties. Movement is tortuous, whether mounted or dismounted. Scarce and poorly maintained roads, steep slopes, cliffs, and deep snow all conspire to stop military operations. The LAC traverses through such terrain, among the highest mountains and glaciers of the Himalaya. The Siachen Glacier, home to the 1984 India-Pakistan clash over the LAC, was the world’s highest combat zone at 20,000 feet above sea level. In the Siachen Glacier valley, more soldiers have died from exposure than from bullets; with 30 to 50 percent of the fatalities from cerebral edema. In 2012, an avalanche near the glacier buried 124 Pakistani soldiers in one of the worst such incidents since World War One. Risk to forces is catastrophic, as “the main enemies of the soldier in mountain warfare are altitude, cold and terrain – not the hostile forces”.
In mountain battlefields, logistics, intelligence, command and control must all be decentralized. Narrow valleys confuse air defense radars, and aircraft are easily grounded by thin high-altitude air and severe weather. Not even artillery, drones, or Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) work properly. High altitudes, strong winds, and low temperatures affect ballistics and battery life, increasing the probability of error and causing shells to be less effective or dud in snow-covered terrain. In mountain conflicts, conventional forces dither, while irregulars can thrive.
Irregular Warfare Strategies in Mountainous Environments
Considering the limitations and challenges of mountainous terrain on the full spectrum of the competition continuum, understanding the people who call the mountains home is vital to the irregular warfighter. Only 10% of the world’s population reside in mountainous regions, yet mountains still “host a strikingly disproportionate share of the world’s conflict”. If 10% of the population are indeed considered “mountain people”, they would be compelling partners in irregular warfare. This thought is supported by interesting anthropological findings. One behavioral scientist found three themes which typically describe mountain people: fierce, uncivilized, and resistant to central authority. Matloff claims with ample evidence that “severe weather and physical barriers of mountain regions give rise to mental toughness, self-sufficiency, insularity, and a talent for improvisation”. Mountain tribes like the Gurkhas, Kurds, Chechens, Montagnards, Kashmiri, and the Taiwanese Atayal all personify these stereotypes. It is no wonder that famed political scientist James Fearon found that mountainous terrain was a condition that contributed to “significantly higher rates of civil war”.
Just as the rugged geography shapes its inhabitants, the inhabitants shape their communities through resilience. Sonn and Fisher describe community resilience as the positive capacity for groups to adapt to adversity, stress, and oppressive systems, challenging the notion that oppressed communities inherently lack competence or resilience. The idea of highly resilient mountain people, oppressed at the periphery of the states they belong to, but fortified by difficult lives in austere places, reinforces this theory on cultural resiliency. Geographical isolation in the mountains become the “alternate setting” where identities are safeguarded, and distinctly rugged cultures persist. As Judith Matloff writes in The War is in the Mountains, such remote and archaic communities can be enormously important to the future stability of the world, claiming “the mountain is friend to those who want to elude or destroy authority – the revolutionary, the poppy grower, and the jihadi, to name only a few”. Such communities persist even in the modern world, despite geographic isolation and scarce political involvement or modern services.
Considering the predisposition to violence and high levels of resiliency common to most mountain communities, it is with this lens that we can apply the Duclos “R2D2” framework. The framework, as seen in Figure 2 below, illustrates the relationship between Resilience, Resistance, Deterrence, and Defense (R2D2) throughout the varying statuses of conflict. Much like the Irregular Warfare Center’s interpretation of the competition continuum, the Duclos model depicts the scaling of irregular warfare. The red line shows how irregular warfare becomes more applicable in times of occupation, than in times of peace, but has an equal share with conventional warfare during times of war. Resilience is the connective tissue which fortifies a state’s ability to deter, defend, and resist. To understand this, Fiala’s Resistance Operating Concept provides a useful definition of resilience: “The will and ability to withstand external pressure and influences and/or recover from the effects of that pressure or influence”. Regardless of the method of warfare, a resilient community trained in irregular warfare enables the state to fight for its sovereignty, in peace (competition), war (conflict), and occupation.
Figure 2: The Duclos R2D2 Model
The will to resist is imperative in identifying who will be doing the resisting, and under what conditions. Supporting Sonn’s theory of cultural resilience, Haslam and Reicher find that strong social identities are critical to fomenting change. They argue that shared social identity can be the “basis for effective leadership and organization that allows them to counteract stress, secure support, challenge authority, and promote social change in even the most extreme of situations”. Since mountain people survive in the most extreme of environments, their strong communities can thrive against an oppressor, especially if provided with external support. Applied to the Duclos model, highly resilient mountain communities become especially useful in irregular or guerilla warfare.
Considering mountain communities possess the traits necessary to support resistance operations, it’s important to quickly revisit their relationship with physical space. In Arreguin-Toft’s How the Weak Win Wars, he argues that the two elements required for waging a successful guerilla warfare campaign are: physical sanctuary and a supportive population. As previously discussed, the mountains provide a key element of physical sanctuary. Likewise, the fiercely resilient communities who are inclined to resist authority, provide the supportive population.
Lessons from Historical and Contemporary Conflicts
Therefore, resilient communities of mountain people become the center of gravity when planning unconventional warfare operations along the mountainous peripheries of states like China. Yet, sending Special Operators to the mountains isn’t a novel idea. It is baked into SOF history. In fact, today’s Army Green Berets draw their lineage to an elite group of mountain warriors. The modern 1st Special Forces Regiment traces its roots to the 1st Special Service Force (FSSF), a joint Canadian-American unit established in 1942, referred to as ‘The Force’. Recognizing the hardiness and grit associated with men who earn a living in the mountains, specially selected recruits for The Force were considered ‘highly recommended’ if they were mountaineers, or had occupations like “lumberjack, forest ranger, hunter, trapper, north woodsman (guide), game warden, prospector and explorer”. With mountain men creating it’s backbone, and high altitude winter mountaineering training its focus, the Force became one of the most documented units of “super commandos” in World War II, earning themselves the moniker: ‘The Devil’s Brigade’. This model of recruitment could be easily applied to the LAC or other contested regions.
In Tibet, U.S. paramilitary operators with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sought out mountain communities to support the Dalai Lama against the PRC’s 1956 invasion. Codenamed ST CIRCUS, this operation became one of the CIA’s longest covert actions in history. Lasting from the early 1956 to 1972, ethnic Tibetan mountain tribes like the Golok, Kham, and Ando tribes fought as guerillas against the invading Chinese forces under Mao. Under ST CIRCUS, thousands of guerillas were flown from Tibet to Camp Hale, Colorado to be trained in mountain warfare and guerilla tactics before parachuting back into Tibet to conduct tactical operations against Chinese bases and supply lines. Though conducted by the CIA, ST CIRCUS serves as a realistic example of how Army Special Operations today can train, advise, and assist local mountain tribes in irregular warfare against peer adversaries or occupation forces, even if American boots aren’t allowed on the ground.
In Vietnam, the Green Berets built a highly effective alliance throughout the 1960’s with the indigenous tribes occupying the nations’ central highlands. Called the “Montagnards” (Mountain People), they had their own distinct languages, cultures, and social structures by virtue of being far removed from any kind of government control. Operating in the periphery during a time of war, the Montagnards were skilled fighters and executed an effective campaign of guerilla warfare against the North Vietnamese. Critical to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, the partnership between Green Beret and Montagnard had lasting strategic impacts. By focusing on Toft’s two elements for a successful guerilla warfare campaign (physical sanctuary and a supportive population), the Montagnard’s became fearsome partners.
Conclusion
Historical precedents demonstrate the critical role highly resilient indigenous mountain tribes can play as strategic partners in irregular warfare against peer-adversaries like China, particularly during periods of competition, crisis, or conflict. During competition and crisis, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) can enhance strategic deterrence by identifying and engaging mountain communities along China’s borders. With external support in intelligence gathering and disrupting of illegal infrastructure development, these tribes can effectively resist China’s expansionist tactics, such as the unchecked development of “xiaokang” villages. Drawing a parallel to ‘The Devil’s Brigade’ recruiting hardened mountain men, today’s Green Berets can cultivate partnerships with resilient mountain tribes in austere environments to counter illegal Chinese border expansion and coercive infrastructure development.
If war comes to Taiwan, its survival may be dependent on the indigenous tribes who for generations have called the Chungyang Shan (Central Mountain Range) their home. As policymakers consider an integrated deterrence strategy for Taiwan, the mountains offer a vital domain. Investing externally in these mountain populations to bolster their resilience and prepare them for prolonged guerrilla warfare is essential for shaping the operational environment. If occupied, an unconventional warfare campaign, akin to those waged by the Montagnards or Tibetans, could significantly disrupt Chinese pacification efforts and impose substantial, enduring costs.