By Honorable James R. Locher III
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age is a sweeping monograph that chronicles the history of modern Special Operations Forces (SOF) and insightfully describes their new challenges. The authors have compiled an excellent, concise history of SOF’s three earlier ages: 1941–1960, 1961–1979, and 1980–2020, setting the stage for projecting SOF’s Fourth-Age roles in the emerging era of strategic competition. The early years were not easy, but with determination and perseverance, the SOF community prevailed, and four decades of remarkable and unprecedented SOF achievements resulted. As they begin their Fourth Age, SOF will again be challenged.
Foreword
The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age is a sweeping monograph that chronicles the history of modern Special Operations Forces (SOF) and insightfully describes their new challenges. Authors Mr. Will Irwin, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) research professor, and Dr. Isaiah Wilson III, JSOU president—brilliant scholars and prolific writers—possess the knowledge and expertise to address SOF’s past and future. They have compiled an excellent, concise history of SOF’s three earlier ages: 1941–1960, 1961–1979, and 1980–2020. This historical context sets the stage for projecting SOF’s Fourth-Age roles in the emerging era of strategic competition.
Throughout their history, SOF have had to overcome serious obstacles and fierce resistance. As their need was totally unforeseen during preparations for World War II, SOF were forces born of necessity. Dismantled after the war, they had to be reconstituted for the Korean War. President John F. Kennedy helped build SOF capability as irregular warfare erupted in Southeast Asia. After the Vietnam War ended, SOF were permitted to atrophy throughout the 1970s with the Pentagon excessively focused on defending NATO Europe and determined to endure no more Vietnams. The inadequacies of SOF and joint operations were laid bare by the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission in April 1980.
The Third Age of SOF, initiated in response to this disaster in the Iranian desert, was different. It saw the creation of enduring organizational arrangements and authorities for SOF that permitted great advances in capabilities, credibility, and influence in decision-making circles. The Cohen-Nunn Amendment (section 1311 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987) provided the power of law to bring about and sustain historic changes. As the author of section 1311 and first permanent Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, I was privileged to engage in the initial phases of the Third Age of SOF. Given the Pentagon’s determination to undermine the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, the early years were not easy. It was full-blown bureaucratic guerrilla warfare, but with determination and perseverance, the SOF community prevailed. Four decades of remarkable and unprecedented SOF achievements resulted.
During the last two decades of the Third Age, SOF’s position as a central feature of the Nation’s defense capability became fully established. As Irwin and Wilson write, “The unmatched professionalism, adaptability, and utility of SOF through a progression of very successful operations during this period resulted in increased confidence among joint force leaders in the dependability and competence of SOF.” As they begin their Fourth Age, SOF will again be challenged. America’s last two decades devoted to combating violent extremist organizations have greatly improved certain SOF skills, but others have become dulled. While maintaining their counterterrorism and counterproliferation proficiencies, SOF will need to rebalance and strengthen their capabilities as an agent of influence or coercion in strategic competition with China and Russia. Unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations will require increased emphasis.
The monograph’s Task Force 714 vignette provides a profound lesson for SOF’s Fourth Age. Major General Stanley McChrystal transformed his task force, pursuing high-value terrorist targets from an industrial-age organization into an information-age network of networks. He turned his organization into a deadly weapon. Fourth-Age SOF will need to be equally savvy in organizational arrangements. They will need to be able to collaborate and network with other U.S. forces, other U.S. departments and agencies, host nation forces and entities, and nongovernmental organizations. Collaborative and networked organizations can outperform any other organizational approach.
This monograph should be read by every special operator, Pentagon and Capitol Hill civilians concerned with SOF, other SOF supporters and critics, and members of the media. It will greatly inform the debates and decisions to come.