By
Introduction
The raid that removed Nicolás Maduro and the sudden designation of Marco Rubio as the de facto steward of Venezuela did more than end a regime. It exposed a truth Washington prefers to avoid. Modern statecraft now lives in the gray space between war and peace, where legitimacy, narrative, and perception decide outcomes faster than divisions or carrier strike groups. When the Secretary of State is asked to stabilize a nation, divide oil assets, manage sanctions, and shape elections at once, the problem is not bandwidth alone. It is architecture.
If the United States intends to practice America First statecraft with discipline and effect, the Department of State requires a standing, senior military capability embedded at the policy level. Modeled on the historical role of the Associate Director for Military Affairs within the CIA, this office will provide strategic oversight, operational planning, and interagency coordination to ensure USSOCOM’s irregular warfare capabilities support and enhance national objectives short of war (while continuing to prepare to support the geographic Combatant Commanders should deterrence fail). The DSMA will serve as SECSTATE’s principal military advisor for special operations and irregular warfare with a major focus on integrating Title 10 and Title 22 activities to support execution of campaign plans in the gray of strategic competition and support Chiefs of Mission in critical regions around the world.
The Strategic Moment
The Venezuela episode was not an anomaly. It was a preview. Strategic competition with China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea rarely crosses the threshold of declared war. It unfolds through influence, coercion, proxy forces, and stories that travel faster than facts. In this environment, political warfare is not a metaphor. It is the main effort.
Special Operations Forces were built for this terrain. They train to work by, with, and through partners. They shape before they strike. They influence human networks and decision making under pressure. Yet their employment remains structurally anchored to Title 10 processes, while the decisive terrain is political and diplomatic under Title 22. The result is friction, delay, and lost opportunity.
A Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs would close that gap.
The Office and Its Purpose
The proposed office would be led by a three star general officer serving as the Secretary of State’s principal military advisor for special operations and irregular warfare. The model is not new. During the early Cold War, the United States placed senior military leaders inside civilian intelligence and policy institutions to ensure unity of effort. The purpose was simple. Align action with strategy.
The DSMA would do the same today. The office would integrate special operations capabilities into diplomatic campaigns short of war, while preserving the chain of command to geographic combatant commanders should deterrence fail. It would advise Chiefs of Mission, synchronize interagency planning, and translate policy intent into feasible options in contested environments.
This is not about militarizing diplomacy. It is about making diplomacy effective where power is contested and time is short.
The State Department has already begun reorganization. It can include a DSMA.
Why Venezuela Matters
Venezuela illustrates the problem in sharp relief. The removal of Maduro created a vacuum. Vacuums attract narratives. Who liberated the country. Who controls the oil. Who speaks for the people. These questions are answered first in information space, not conference rooms.
Without a standing mechanism to integrate special operations, influence capabilities, and diplomatic messaging, the United States risks tactical success followed by strategic drift. The Secretary of State becomes a crisis manager instead of a campaign commander.
A DSMA provides continuity. It allows the Secretary to run long campaigns, not just respond to events.
Cognitive Warfare and Narrative Intelligence
No modern political warfare effort can succeed without mastery of cognition and narrative. Adversaries understand this well. They target identity, grievance, and legitimacy. They seed doubt and offer belonging. They rarely need to fire a shot.
The Department of State lacks an institutionalized cognitive warfare and narrative intelligence capability. That gap must be closed, and it should be done in direct support of the Secretary. The DSMA office is the right home.
Narrative intelligence does not mean propaganda. It means understanding how stories move societies, how symbols mobilize or fracture communities, and how adversaries frame reality. Cognitive warfare integrates this understanding with operations, diplomacy, and development. It ensures that actions reinforce words and that words anticipate reactions.
In Venezuela, as in many future cases, the decisive question is not who holds the palace. It is who owns the story the morning after.
Benefits to the Secretary and the Nation
A Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs gives the Secretary unified access to senior military expertise tailored to political campaigns. Decisions become faster and grounded in reality. Options expand beyond sanctions and statements.
Special operations capabilities such as civil affairs, influence activities, and irregular warfare are integrated into foreign policy from the start, not bolted on during crisis. This strengthens allies, counters adversary influence, and provides leverage without escalation.
Interagency synchronization improves. The chronic disconnect between diplomatic intent and military activity narrows. Planning becomes campaign driven rather than episodic, especially in gray zone theaters across the Asia-Indo-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.
Crisis response sharpens. When instability breaks, the Secretary has immediate insight into feasible options, risks, and narratives. Diplomatic and military messaging align when it matters most.
Counterarguments and Risks
Critics will warn of blurred lines between civilian and military authority. That concern deserves respect. The answer is not avoidance but design. The DSMA advises. The Secretary decides. Civilian control remains absolute.
Others will argue that existing structures suffice. The Venezuela case suggests otherwise. When ad hoc arrangements become routine, institutions must adapt.
The final question is cost. The cost of inaction is higher. Strategic drift, narrative defeat, and reactive policy are expensive in blood, treasure, and credibility.
Conclusion
The designation of a Secretary of State as steward of a post regime Venezuela is a signal. American statecraft has entered an era where diplomacy, influence, and special operations converge at the center of policy.
If America First is to mean effective first, the Department of State needs a Deputy Secretary of State for Military Affairs and a standing cognitive warfare and narrative intelligence capability. This is not innovation for its own sake. It is adaptation to reality.
The question is not whether the United States will practice political warfare. It already does, often clumsily. The question is whether it will do so deliberately, coherently, and under civilian leadership. If not now, after Venezuela, when.