Exciting developments as the U.S. Army’s 7th Special Forces Group prepares to land in Mexico to train the Mexican Navy’s Infantería de Marina. This mission, approved by the Mexican Senate, aims to enhance combat readiness against both conventional and non-conventional threats.
Key highlights:
Training Duration: February 17 – March 30 at the Luis Carpizo naval facility in Campeche.
Objective: Strengthening the capabilities of Mexican forces amidst ongoing challenges related to drug cartels and regional security.
Historical Context: The Green Berets, known for their expertise in special operations, have a rich history of international training missions.
This collaboration underscores the importance of cross-border partnerships in addressing security challenges. As nations work together, we can enhance stability and safety for all.
As Israel’scampaign of strikes on Iran continues, a question emerges about whether some level of additional action may be required on the ground to meet the stated goal of preventing the regime in Tehran from being able to acquire nuclear weapons. Even ifunique U.S. conventional strike capabilitiesare brought to bear, there could still be significant targeting challenges, especially if the Iranians move to disperse elements of their nuclear program. If the Iranian government were to collapse, and do so suddenly, there would be further impetus to ensure enriched uranium and other dangerous nuclear materials are secured. Though many actors could play a role, U.S. special operations forces, in particular, have been activelytraining to respond to scenarios exactlylike these for years.
In 2016, the Department of Defense formally designated U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as the lead entity for the Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) mission, a role that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) had previously held. Decades before then, the U.S. special operations community, especially the secretiveJoint Special Operations Command(JSOC), hadbeen training to take a newly active rolein tackling potential ‘loose nukes’ or other nuclear contingencies. This was driven in large part by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had left nuclear weapons and other material scattered across a number of newly independent nations.
Members of the US Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment and conventional supporting forces seen during a training exercise in 2024 involving a mock raid on a nuclear facility.US Army
What is not in question is that, prior to the current conflict with Israel, the Iranian government had amassed a significant stockpile of enriched uranium and established facilities capable ofproducing more at an appreciable scale. As of May, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had astockpile of close to 901 pounds, at least,of uranium enriched to 60% purity, which presents clear proliferation concerns.
The 60% enrichment level is well above what is required for civilian power generation (typically between 3% and 5%), but also below the level for it to be considered highly enriched or weapons-grade (90%). At the same time, it is understood to be a relatively short step, technically speaking, to get uranium from 60% to 90% purity. As a standard metric, the IAEA says that 92.5 pounds of 60% uraniumis sufficient for further enrichmentinto enough weapons-grade material for one nuclear bomb.
Lower-grade nuclear material could also be fashioned intoa so-called ‘dirty bomb’designed just to spread radioactive contamination across an area. In addition to any immediate effects from the detonation of such a device, itcould cause widespread panicand would require significant effort to clean up.
A member of the US Army trains with a backpack-mounted radiation detection system.US Army
Whether or not Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon now, the country is understoodto have been working toward that goalat least prior to 2003. Specialized equipment and other physical elements of the program, active or not, could also present proliferation risks.
This all, in turn, raises additional questions about whether or not Iranian authorities might seek to disperse nuclear material and other assets to a wide array of locations in the face of these growing threats, if they haven’t already, at least to some degree. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said over the weekend that unspecified “special measures” had been taken to protect the country’s nuclear program, and that these would not be communicated to the IAEA.
“I’m not so sure,” IAEA Director General Rafael GrossitoldBloomberg Televisiontodaywhen asked about the current potential whereabouts of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. “In a time of war, all nuclear sites are closed. No inspections, no normal activity can take place.”
“Iran’s 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of highly-enriched uranium could fit in three or four easily-concealed cylinders,”Bloomberghad also reported on Monday, citing nuclear-weapons engineer and former IAEA inspector Robert Kelley. “Even if Israel destroys Iran’s enrichment infrastructure, the location of that material will still need to be verified.”
Prior to the outbreak of the current conflict, Israeli authorities reportedly also raised thepossibility of Iran transferring nuclear assets to Houthimilitants in Yemen with their American counterparts, who said they had no evidence of any such plans. As noted, a collapse of the regime in Tehran, especially if it is precipitous, would present clear further impetus to try to secure whatever might be left of Iran’s nuclear program from falling into the wrong hands.
In any of the aforementioned scenarios, the U.S. special operations community, especially so-called “tier one” units like the U.S. Army’sDelta Forceand the U.S. Navy’sSEAL Team Six, could come into play.
U.S. special operations units are ideally suited to rapidly and discreetly infiltrate into a target areato extract items of interestfrom an objective like a nuclear facility in Iran. If the items in question are too large to be moved by the special operations force, depending on what they are, they could then be destroyed in place or secured until a larger follow-on force arrives. Conventional supporting forces and interagency elements offering unique capabilities could accompany special operations forces on initial raids, as well.
Marine special operators train in an underground facility.USMC
Special operations forces are also well-positioned to help intercept high-value targets on the move, including nuclear material that might make its way out of Iran, or threaten to do so, as the conflict with Israel continues. This could potentially include operations on land or at sea.
This is not speculative, but reflects real mission scenarios the U.S. military is actively prepared to carry out. For instance, roughly a year ago, members of the Army’s75th Ranger Regimentpartnered with a specialized non-special operations unit, called Nuclear Disablement Team 1 (NDT 1), toconduct an exerciseconsisting of a simulated raid under hostile fire on a decommissioned pulse radiation facility serving as a mock underground nuclear site. As another one of many examples, NDT 1 teamed up with Green Berets from the Army’s 5th Special Operations Groupfor an exercise in 2023involving a mock air assault on the Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant in Alabama and a simulated shutdown of the facility.
A scene from inside the decommissioned pulse radiation facility during the 2024 exercise involving the 75th Ranger Regiment and NDT 1.US Army
The NDTs are a prime example of conventional U.S. military units that could be called upon to support real-world special operations CWMD missions. The Army has three of these teams, all assigned to the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Command headquarters at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. These units are made up of personnel specially trained “to exploit and disable nuclear and radiological Weapons of Mass Destruction infrastructure and components to deny near-term capability to adversaries,”according to the Army.
“The possibility of dealing with a damaged nuclear power station or emergencies involving nuclear reactors in a hostile environment is an emerging threat,” Army Capt. David Manzanares, a Nuclear Medical Science officer from NDT 1, saidafter the 2023 exerciseat the Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant. “This training event was complex, dynamic and challenged our technical expertise.”
“NPPs [nuclear power plants] are a key part of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is the place all plutonium is produced. Therefore, reactors are a key area in nuclear weapon pathway defeat,” Army Maj. Aaron Heffelfinger, then-deputy chief of NDT 1, also said at that time. “The NDT’s ability to assess the state of a reactor, and if needed, control and shut it down, is crucial for our mission success and those we are directly supporting.”
Members of NDT 1 in the control room at Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant during the exercise in 2023.US Army
TWZhas also reportedinrecent years on effortsby the U.S. special operations community to hone other skill sets that could be particularly relevant to operations in Iran and its nuclear facilities, many of which are deep underground.
In its annual budget request for the 2021 Fiscal Year, published in 2020, the Pentagon asked for $14.4 million for a new dedicated 19,200-square-footsite to help JSOC train to raid“complex, hardened facility targets.” Whether or not that facility has since been built is unclear.
In 2021, the Army’s 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), or 1st SFC (A), also published an unclassified white paper that included details about a plan to establish “Hard Target Defeat Companies” of Green Berets. These would supplant existing Special Forces crisis response units, and be “uniquely organized to counter near-peer adversary campaigns” and “operate with regional partners to defeat hard targets in sensitive and constricted environments.” How those plans may have evolved since then is not immediately clear.
A US Marine crouches at a tunnel entrance during a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives-focused exercise in South Korea. USMC
All of this is also relevant when it comes to potential new non-nuclear proliferating risks that might now emerge from Iran, including in the aftermath of a sudden collapse of the regime in Tehran. For instance, there have been concerns aboutpotential Iranian chemical and biological weapons developmentsover the years. In 2011, U.S. troops were deployed to guard chemical weapons sites in Libya following the downfall there of long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Libya’s chemical weapons and related materials were subsequently destroyed in place, a processthat took some three yearsto complete. American forces supporteda failed effort to fully destroySyria’s chemical weapons stockpile in 2013.
Iran also has expansive stockpiles of ballistic, cruise, and other missiles, as well as other conventional weapons that the United States and others would not want to see make their way to other hostile actors or otherwise end up on the black market. The Iranian government already has an extensive history of proliferating ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, air defense systems, and other conventional capabilities to its proxies across the Middle East.
In the meantime, the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran continues to rapidly evolve. Questions similarly continue to mount about what the United States’ role, including any potential employment of U.S. special operations forces on the ground, might be going forward.