In an era where economic linkages are global and dense, strategic competition increasingly unfolds in the networks of supply chains, finance, and data rather than purely on physical battlefields. US military doctrine has long emphasized key terrain—ranging from hilltops or river crossings at the tactical level to major features whose control carries operational or even strategic implications such as the Bashi Channel, Fulda Gap, or Strait of Hormuz. But today’s most consequential terrain may be nonphysical: manufacturing dominance in key sectors like semiconductors, assured access to minerals like rare earth elements, control over natural gas infrastructure, or the security of undersea cables. These systems, once considered logistical backdrops, are now central instruments of national power.
As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have described with their theory of “weaponized interdependence,” states can increasingly use control over nodes in global networks to extract coercive leverage, shape rival behavior, and compromise operational readiness. For military professionals, recognizing these dependencies as strategic terrain beyond the traditional DIME (diplomacy, information, military, economics) framework is critical to effective planning.
China’s Rare Earth Elements: Strategic Denial in Practice
China’s dominance in the rare earth market offers a textbook example of weaponized interdependence. By controlling more than 85 percent of heavy rare earth processing and nearly 70 percent of global mining output as of 2024, China occupies a central node in the defense-industrial value chain. Rare earths are indispensable in night vision goggles, precision-guided munitions, missile guidance systems, and electric propulsion, placing downstream US defense manufacturers at risk.
In 2010, Beijing restricted exports of rare earths to Japan amid a diplomatic dispute, signaling that access to these inputs was contingent on political compliance. More recently, in 2023 and 2024, China imposed licensing controls on gallium and germanium, key materials for semiconductors and defense applications, raising alarms about strategic vulnerability. The effect is a form of strategic denial: Rather than fight kinetically, Beijing forces rivals into costly diversification efforts, reshaping global investment flows and complicating defense production timelines.
Taiwan’s Silicon Shield: Resource Entrenchment
Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor manufacturing, especially via Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, has made it an economic linchpin in the global value chain. Producing more than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips, Taiwan’s position not only supports modern electronics but underwrites US military technological superiority in artificial intelligence, computing and military hardware, weapons systems, and supply chain autonomy.
This has created what analysts call a “silicon shield”: Taiwan’s integration into global production systems raises the strategic cost of Chinese aggression, functioning as a deterrent rooted in economic interdependence. Simultaneously, US export controls on advanced chip equipment have sought to blunt China’s access to cutting-edge AI capabilities, reinforcing the logic of network exclusion as a tool of economic statecraft. The battle over semiconductor dominance is no longer just about market share; it is about denying rivals access to the computational terrain on which future conflicts will be fought. And the continued dominance of Taiwanese semiconductor development adds new planning consideration for downstream impacts by military planners.
Russia’s Weaponization of Energy Dominance: Shaping the Fight
Unlike the first two examples of economic key terrain, Russia has leveraged key terrain militarily, wielding economic nodes to provide strategic depth and maintain momentum in Ukraine. Russia’s manipulation of natural gas flows into Europe demonstrates how infrastructure that has been central to peaceful economic activities for years or decades—like gas pipelines— can quickly be exploited to achieve contemporary strategic objectives. Leading up to the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia used its pipeline dominance to pressure European governments, drive up energy costs, and sow division within NATO. This was not just economic blackmail; it was terrain shaping at the operational and political level through Nord Stream 1 and 2.
Europe’s reliance on Russian gas created a vulnerability that Moscow exploited to weaken European resolve and delay deterrent postures. Unlike traditional warfare, this form of coercion operates through price volatility, domestic protest, and elite fragmentation. Military leaders must therefore recognize how access to fuel and heating during crises affects the broader political landscape in which warfighting occurs. Military planners need to consider economic weaponization coupled with the role of domestic support on military operations beyond the traditional confines of a military battlefield.
The Subsea Frontier: Vulnerable Nodes in the Information Domain
Undersea fiber-optic cables carry more than 99 percent of the world’s intercontinental data, including financial transactions, government communications, and military orders. These cables are publicly mapped, minimally protected, and increasingly at risk. In 2024 and 2025, two separate cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea, one linked to a Chinese vessel and another to a Russian-owned ship, highlighted the ease with which malicious actors can impose costs on adversaries through gray-zone operations.
In 2023, Chinese-flagged ships severed digital connections to Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, effectively cutting off internet service and demonstrating how cable sabotage can achieve effects akin to cyber warfare without attribution. These systems function as operational terrain in hybrid conflict: They are cheap to attack, difficult to repair, and decisive in shaping tempo and morale. For US forces and allied planners, subsea infrastructure must be treated with the same vigilance as strategic ports or airfields. This planning consideration and impact on domestic affairs has raised its importance following the development of seaborne drones and devices that can quickly target or disrupt these undersea data lifelines in a globalized world.
Strategic Implications
For military planners and thinkers ranging from irregular warfare professionals to joint logisticians, the message is clear: Global economic networks are not neutral. They are contested terrain. Theories of weaponized interdependence must inform campaign design, wargaming, and red-teaming. When planning, military professionals need to consider how economic coercion, resource denial, and economic sabotage would impact domestic resolve of partners and military readiness. We continue to see the traditional military battlefields be influenced by these new forms of economic key terrain around the world.
Strategic competition today rewards those who can map and manipulate interdependence faster than their adversaries. It is no longer enough to protect convoys and airfields; military planners must also consider rare earth material stockpiles, shipping lanes, microchip intellectual property, and the resilience of subsea communications nodes. The future of warfare may be decided as much in data centers and supply contracts as in the battlespaces of warfighting domains.
Major Benjamin Backsmeier is an infantry officer currently serving as the noncombatant evacuation operations planner for the INDOPACOM Army Reserve Element. He previously served on active duty at US Army Japan and in the 82nd Airborne Division and has deployed or served overseas in eleven countries. He holds a BS from West Point, a master of international security studies from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, and an MBA from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image: Close-up of chip manufactured by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (credit: FritzchensFritz)
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