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Little Bighorn and the Enduring Lessons of Irregular Warfare

Little Bighorn and the Enduring Lessons of Irregular Warfare

Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer led approximately 600 soldiers of the 7th Cavalry against a Native American coalition of 4,000 to 8,000 people, led by Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Gall, and Two Moons. The Native Americans deployed decentralized command, superior terrain knowledge, mobility, psychological warfare, and cultural cohesion to defeat Custer’s force at Last Stand Hill, killing over 200 soldiers. The authors argue that Custer’s fatal underestimation of his opponent, combined with fractured command and control and a failure to conduct adequate intelligence preparation, exposed his force to a series of encirclements that his divided units could not survive.
Covert Crypto: a Double-edged Sword for Special Operations

Covert Crypto: a Double-edged Sword for Special Operations

In the current landscape of strategic competition and irregular warfare, the ability to operate covertly in the financial domain is a critical component of mission success. As nations and non-state actors compete for influence, the tools of unconventional warfare increasingly extend beyond the kinetic. Crypto has rapidly grown as a method to store and transfer value, providing speed, global reach, and 24/7 availability. For Special Operations Forces (SOF) tasked with enabling partner elements, conducting stabilization activities, or executing sensitive missions in politically complex environments, it offers an additional tool – provided crypto’s advantages and vulnerabilities are understood and effectively managed.
Redefining Readiness: Why US Special Operations Forces Must Be Optimized for Irregular Competition

Redefining Readiness: Why US Special Operations Forces Must Be Optimized for Irregular Competition

United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are increasingly evaluated through conventional readiness frameworks that degrade the human capital and relational capabilities essential to irregular competition. This article argues that military leaders must optimize SOF primarily for irregular competition by redefining readiness metrics, decoupling SOF employment from conventional readiness cycles, and institutionalizing disciplined mission selection—even at the cost of reduced preparedness for large-scale conventional conflict.
Weaponized Hesitation: Authority and Tempo in Gray-Zone Competition

Weaponized Hesitation: Authority and Tempo in Gray-Zone Competition

Western military thought often assumes that faster sensors and better data lead to faster action. In gray-zone competition, however, ambiguity over escalation thresholds creates a gap between recognition and authorization, allowing decisional authority to lag behind situational awareness. When that gap becomes predictable, hesitation itself transfers tempo to adversaries operating comfortably between peace and conflict.
Administrative Terrain and the Operational Role of SOF in Modern Irregular Warfare

Administrative Terrain and the Operational Role of SOF in Modern Irregular Warfare

SOF does not administer governance. It operates where governance determines what is possible. That distinction matters. Operators encounter this terrain long before doctrine has language to describe it. In modern irregular warfare, outcomes are increasingly decided before the first shot is fired. They are decided in regulatory frameworks, compliance regimes, and bureaucratic authority structures: the administrative terrain that shapes access, defines escalation thresholds, and determines who is authorized to act. SOF has been operating in this terrain for years. The community already understands it intuitively. The problem is that doctrine has not caught up. The intelligence that operators collect on governance fracture, regulatory capture, and institutional coercion risks staying isolated at the team level rather than informing theater-level planning.
Solving the Dilemma: A Leadership Model for Irregular Warfare (‘Guerrilla Leader Series’ – Part 3 of 3)

Solving the Dilemma: A Leadership Model for Irregular Warfare (‘Guerrilla Leader Series’ – Part 3 of 3)

“Every intervention begins as a story of liberation. Without adaptation, it ends as a story of occupation.” Why do militarily superior forces consistently win the fight—but lose the peace? This is not a new question. It is the defining paradox of modern irregular warfare. From Vietnam to Afghanistan to Iraq, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated overwhelming tactical superiority, yet struggled to translate battlefield success into enduring strategic outcomes. The explanation is not found in resources, capability, or even strategy in the traditional sense. It is found in how we lead.
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